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In this thesis I explore the possibility for a renewed communitarianism. Rather 
than present this as a rival to liberalism, however, I present it as a supplement. I start 
from the viewpoint that there are two basic facts with normative consequences the 
reconciliation of which is the central task of moral and political philosophy. One fact is 
the fact of individuality, which I believe produces a normative requirement that all and 
only obligations that respect a certain kind of individual autonomy are legitimate. This 
fact is well explained by liberalism, and so I am to that extent a liberal. Where I differ 
from contemporary liberalism, and where I think there is room for a renewed 
communitarianism, is in explaining the limits of autonomy. There are, I contend, a wide 
array of basic and legitimate obligations that cannot be adequately explained (i.e. the 
legitimacy of which cannot be explained) by autonomy alone. The role for 
communitarianism, then, is to explain the nature of a second legitimating principle and 
how these two principles – respect for autonomy and respect for (what I call) fraternity 
– can work together to explain when various maxims and policies are legitimate or 
illegitimate. In the first part I explain the importance of communitarianism. In the 
second, I try and determine the nature of the principle that should be seen as 
representing the normative requirements of the fact of sociality: the second inescapable 
fact of moral and political philosophy, that while we are individuals we are never alone. 
I will ultimately argue for a version of solidarity based on the role ethical obligations 
play in incorporating the interests of others in one‟s own set of interests. In the final 
part I explain how the ethical obligation at the heart of solidarity should work and then 




 The material in this thesis has been greatly improved from my participation in a 
wide array of conferences over the past three years. I am indebted to audiences in 
Manchester and Edinburgh for feedback on Chapter 1, in Copenhagen and Pavia, Italy 
for feedback on Chapter 5, and in London and Edinburgh for feedback on Chapter 6. 
Also, portions of Chapter 5 are drawn from my paper Shelby’s Account of Solidarity and the 
Problem of Compatibility, forthcoming in the Journal of Social Philosophy. I am indebted 
to the feedback of the three anonymous reviewers there. This level of activity would not 
have been possible without the generosity of the School of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Language Sciences Research Support Grants. 
 The three years of my PhD studies would not have been possible without the 
Rothermere Fellowship. My great appreciation is therefore due to Memorial University 
of Newfoundland for awarding me the fellowship and to the Rothermere Foundation 
for providing the financial backing for this wonderful opportunity. 
 I owe both personal and professional thanks to my doctoral supervisors, Mike 
Ridge and Matthew Chrisman. From my arrival in Edinburgh in 2007 they have 
challenged and supported me in equal measure. While I will accept the blame for any 
errors or flaws in this thesis, they deserve some share in whatever credit accrues from it. 
Thanks also are due to Campbell Brown and Jo Wolff, whose thorough criticisms of the 
initial version of this thesis have greatly improved (though not perfected) the final 
product.  
 My ridiculous gamble to abandon a career in law for the chance of a career in 
philosophy would not have been possible without the boundless support of my parents, 
Glenn and Marion Critch, and my wife Erin Drover. I hope they have enjoyed it, and 
are happy with the rewards of our risk. I know I am. 
 Lastly, this work is dedicated to the memories of my grandparents Raymond 

















Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………. iv 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...1 
Part I – Autonomy and the Standpoint of the Collective……………………………. 10 
Chapter 1 – Autonomy and the Failure of the Communitarian Critique ……………...11 
Chapter 2 – The Limits of Autonomy and the Need for Fraternity …………………..40 
Part II – Options for the Standpoint of the Collective………………………………. 69 
Chapter 3 – Tradition and the Scope of Sociality …………………………………….70 
Chapter 4 – Impartiality and the Demands of the Collective………………………….91 
Chapter 5 – Solidarity and the Grounding of Fraternity …………………………….118 
Part III – Consideration and the Standpoint of the Collective………………………147 
Chapter 6 – Solidarity and Consideration……………………………………………148 
Chapter 7 – Reconciling Fraternity and Autonomy………………………………….179 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………. 202 
 1 
 
Introduction: Dualist Communitarianism 
This work is an attempt to revitalize communitarianism by presenting it as a 
complement to, rather than a rival of, contemporary liberalism. I believe the failure of 
the original communitarian program, which I identify with authors like Sandel, Taylor, 
Walzer and MacIntyre, was because it focussed on critiquing liberalism. The version of 
communitarianism presented here starts from accepting the validity of liberalism but 
claiming that more is necessary to understand what justice requires. To have a just 
society we must have one in which all and only genuine ultima facie obligations are 
legitimate, or in which there is a minimum possible level of illegitimate obligations. What 
I claim is that liberalism offers one principle and communitarianism offers another 
which, when combined, can explain what makes various kinds of obligations legitimate. 
This project, then, involves three central tasks. The first is to explain the need for 
a communitarian principle: what are the shortcomings of liberalism such that a second 
principle is necessary to explain what makes legitimate maxims and policies legitimate? 
This will be the focus of part one. The second task is to determine exactly what the 
communitarian principle should be. I call it fraternity, but this is a label rather than a 
principle. It is at this point that the dualist methodology becomes important, which I will 
explain in this introduction. Determining what fraternity involves is the focus of part 
two. Part three tends to the final task – explaining how the two principles can work to 
explain the legitimacy or illegitimacy of various maxims and policies. To this end I 
explain how my preferred candidate for fraternity works, and then how it and the 
principle of autonomy I draw from liberalism can work together to make maxims and 
policies legitimate or illegitimate.   
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Methodologically, I begin with a dualist framework. I believe that the central task 
of moral and political philosophy is the balancing of the demands of two different 
features of human nature. One is the fact of individuality, which I believe makes 
autonomy important. The other I call the fact of sociality, which I will argue requires us 
to recognize that a version of solidarity has inescapable value. Thomas Nagel puts this 
dualist methodology clearly at the outset of Equality and Partiality, from which I quote at 
length.  
My belief is not just that all social and political arrangements so far are 
unsatisfactory. That might be due to the failure of all actual systems to realize 
an ideal that we should all recognize as correct. But there is a deeper problem – 
not merely practical, but theoretical: We do not yet possess an acceptable 
political ideal, for reasons which belong to moral and political philosophy. The 
unsolved problem is the familiar one of reconciling the standpoint of the 
collectivity with the standpoint of the individual; but I want to approach it not 
primarily as a question about the individual and society, but in essence and 
origin about each individual‟s relation to himself. This reflects a conviction that 
ethics, and the ethical basis of political theory, have to be understood as arising 
from a division in each individual between two standpoints, the personal and 
the impersonal. The latter represents the claims of the collectivity and gives 
them force for each individual. If it did not exist, there would be no morality, 
only the clash, compromise, and occasional convergence of individual 
perspectives. It is because a human being does not occupy only his own point 
of view that each of us is susceptible to the claims of others through private 
and public morality.1 
 
This quote sets out the main issues with which I am concerned in this thesis, and most 
of the introduction will be spent explaining those issues, defending my approach to 
them, and offering accounts of what I mean by some of the major terms at play here. I 
agree with Nagel that reconciling these two standpoints – or, rather, the normative 
requirements of the two facts I believe his standpoints represent – is the central task of 
moral and political philosophy. I also agree that prior to this reconciliation we must 
understand what the two standpoints involve and that the standpoint of the collective 
must, in some way, be mediated through the individual. Where we differ is on what the 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, (New York: Oxford UP, 1991) pp. 3-4. 
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standpoint of the collective, or the fact of sociality, requires. While I believe we have an 
adequate understanding of the ethical2 demands associated with the individuality, we do 
not yet fully understand the normative requirements of sociality. This thesis will explore 
why the sociality matters, why certain commonly offered options do not work, and 
offers a proposal for a principle that I believe does.  
 The methodology of the two standpoints should be seen as a form of moral and 
political dualism. I interpret the standpoints as representative of facts about the human 
condition with normative implications. The standpoint of the individual represents the 
fact of individuality, which can only be adequately respected by adopting maxims and 
policies consistent with a principle of autonomy. The standpoint of the collective should 
be understood as representing the fact of sociality, which is only properly respected by 
adopting maxims and policies consistent with a principle I call fraternity. The features of 
this definition naturally require explanation. I will start by explaining what I mean by the 
facts of individuality and sociality, how these facts connect to Nagel‟s standpoints and 
why they entail certain normative requirements.  
The fact of individuality is the inescapable feature of human life that we are 
separate individuals with ethically inaggregable plans and interests. I will explain this in 
more detail in the first chapter where I discuss the nature of autonomy, but for the 
moment it is important that we note the connection between the standpoints and the 
facts I claim they represent. There is such a thing as a standpoint of the individual 
because there exist a certain kind of individuals. That there are individuals of the 
appropriate kind makes it wrong to act pursuant to certain maxims or to implement 
certain policies that do not adequately accord with the normative requirements that 
                                                 
2
 My use of the term ‘ethical’ here means to include both moral and political, as does my use of the 
term ‘normative.’ It should not be seen as giving priority to either morality or the political. 
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adhere to individuality. I believe autonomy – which I will characterize as involving a 
recognition of the importance of a life led from within through making meaningful 
choices – is normatively required by individuality: to this extent, mine is a liberal theory. 
If people were not separate individuals in the relevant ways, if we did not have plans and 
interests that cannot adequately be aggregated, it would not matter whether we were 
treated autonomously.  
I believe a similar construction applies to the fact of sociality and the standpoint 
of the collective. Individuals invariably have moral and political obligations because of 
their ability to impact on the plans and interests of other individuals. This ineliminable 
feature of human life I call the fact of sociality. In the same way as individuality requires 
us to adopt maxims and policies in accord with autonomy, sociality has normative 
demands of its own. To this extent, my thesis is a development on the communitarian 
position. The nature of these demands will be the focus of this thesis, but whatever 
substantive norms they involve I will categorize them as the principle of fraternity.  
Fraternity here is a label rather than a definition, and it is one that I make with 
full knowledge of the conceptual baggage that could be attached to my choice. Both in 
its etymology and in its historical use, fraternity is a masculine word. Among the 
ancients, where its equivalent was an expression of friendship held possible only among 
male citizens, and among the moderns, where women were only included in the social 
contract through their public connection to a male – their father, their husband or their 
sons – fraternity was a sexist concept. In its last moment of prevalence, in the 
enlightenment revolutions, it referred to a bond among soldiers in wartime that was also 
exclusively masculine. I hope to remedy that defect here. I choose this word in full 
awareness of its gendered history. I can only hope the uses to which I put it will be 
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clearly seen as informed by my feminist – that is, sensitive to the moral worth of men 
and women – approach to moral and political philosophy. It is this sort of sensitivity 
with which Susan Moller Okin critiqued contemporary liberalism for lacking that I hope 
to bring to bear here, my central term notwithstanding.3 
I choose fraternity for two reasons. First, because I believe all its major uses are 
historical: it has largely fallen out of use over the past century. Rawls mentions fraternity 
in his discussion of social cohesion and the perpetuation of a just society,4 and Dworkin 
discusses it briefly in his explanation of associative political obligations,5 but neither 
explains what it really involves or why it would be required. Neither comes anywhere 
near to recognizing it as a principle akin to autonomy, representative of a second fact of 
ethical importance. As such, while it certainly has conceptual baggage, this is older and 
less closely connected to my study than the baggage that might come along with some 
other words. But for this problem I might have used solidarity. However given the re-
emergence of concern with solidarity amongst Anglophone philosophers, there are too 
many connections already underway.6 This might not be a problem were I to adopt a 
version of solidarity closely linked with one or another of the extant options, the version 
I will advocate is idiosyncratic. It is sufficiently different from the mainstream to warrant 
a different label. I considered two alternatives: community and alterity. But ultimately 
neither is particularly apt. Community seems to imply a wide number of individuals in a 
                                                 
3
 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, (New York: Basic, 1989), p. 76.  
4
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 2nd Ed., (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), p. 90. 
5
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1986) pp. 195-202.  
6
 Recent work on solidarity includes Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark, (London: Belknap, 2005), 
Sally Scholz’s Political Solidarity (University Park, PA: Penn. State UP, 2008) and a special issue of 
the Journal of Social Philosophy in 2007 dedicated exclusively to Solidarity, including contributions 
from Sally Scholz, Carol Gould, Jean Harvey, Larry May and William Rehg that will be mentioned 
elsewhere in this thesis.   
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way that I wish to avoid. Alterity, or „other-focussedness‟ is a relatively obscure term, so 
while lacking baggage it might also have difficulty resonating as a valuable principle.  
 Returning to the methodology, I must defend the dualism of the two facts in 
two different directions. Put simply, one objection asks „why two and not one,‟ while 
another asks „why two and not more?‟ There is a temptation with dualist theories to 
attempt to reduce one principle to the other or both principles to a third. I believe that 
the two facts representing the two standpoints are sufficiently different that any attempt 
to assimilate them in either direction would fail to adequately appreciate the concerns of 
one or both of the principles involved. Attempts to try and explain sociality in terms 
that reduce it to a component of autonomy would leave any resultant principle ill suited 
to actually explaining what sociality involves. Likewise, individuality and autonomy are 
so closely connected that attempting to reduce individuality to some other principle 
would undermine individuality, undermine the principle, or leave only tenuous 
connection between the two. On the other hand, I should consider whether there are 
more than two facts of fundamental relevance to moral and political philosophy. While I 
am open to this possibility, I cannot see what these alternative basic facts would be. As I 
discussed earlier, while some kinds of community will doubtless require further principle 
owing to other necessary features, a basic account of justice must explain what is 
required for any society to arise among individuals. This seems to me to involve two 
features: that society is the thing that arises among individuals and that individuals are 
the things among which society arises. The first feature connects with the fact of 
sociality, while the second leads to the fact of individuality. If there are more, they must 
arise from particular forms of community that are more advanced than is necessary for 
basic moral and political obligations to arise.  
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 At this point it might be helpful to explain my use of moral and political 
obligations and the role they play in this study. I follow Nagel in holding that the two 
facts are critically important in explaining what moral and political philosophy involve, 
but I will ordinarily frame this in terms of the legitimacy of obligations, and in particular 
of whether one ought to adopt a maxim or policy. Maxim, here, is meant to refer to a 
moral decision, while I intend to link policy with some political rule. I make no claims 
about the connections between morality and politics apart from that the same two 
standpoints underlie each sphere. That they are connected should be clear, but I will 
make no effort in this thesis to explain the nature of that connection.  
 Furthermore, I discuss maxims and policies in terms of legitimacy, but in much 
the same way as other authors discuss justice. In part, this is simply a matter of 
following Nagel‟s methodology, but in part this reflects a possible difference between 
the moral and the political. I believe that Rawls was wrong to claim that justice is the 
first virtue of all social institutions, since morality itself is a social institution and justice 
is not its first virtue.7 While justice seems an appropriate term for political legitimacy, it 
does not quite seem appropriate to call morally right actions just. Likewise, it seems 
awkward to call some politically just policies morally right. As such, I will use the more 
neutral term legitimacy to describe both. What legitimacy involves will be discussed in 
detail in chapter seven when I attempt to demonstrate how to reconcile the principles of 
autonomy and fraternity. For the moment, I will simply say that legitimacy involves a 
positive connection between a principle and a maxim or policy, such that a maxim or 
policy can be legitimate or illegitimate due to its fidelity or infidelity to a given principle. 
                                                 
7
 Rawls 1999, p. 1. See also for a response to efforts to expand the category of ‘social institution’ to 
encompass things like the family and morality as a whole see Brian Barry, A Theory of Social Justice 
Vol. 2: Justice as Impartiality, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), p. 72ff. Here, Barry claims that these are 
not properly political. For an explanation of why they are see Okin 1989. 
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To whatever extent this discussion applies to political questions it contributes to a 
theory of justice, while to whatever extent it applies to moral questions, it contributes to 
a theory of rightness. In either case, it is a question of what principle legitimates various 
proposed maxims or policies as consistent with the normative requirements of the fact 
of sociality. 
 As mentioned above, this thesis will follow in three parts. In the first part I 
explain why a study of the standpoint of the collective is important. This will involve 
two chapters. In chapter one I show how autonomy represents the normative 
requirements of the fact of individuality. I frame this in terms of a reply to the 
communitarian critique. Put simply, liberalism is right to contend that individuality is 
important and to whatever extent the communitarian critique relies on the claim that we 
are not autonomous individuals in the liberal sense it is doomed to failure. Nonetheless, 
I believe there is something left for a communitarian theory to do: to explain what really 
is required by our sociality and how these requirements should interact with the 
requirements of autonomy. I demonstrate the shortcomings of autonomy in the second 
chapter. There are many important maxims and policies, including family partiality and 
the obligation to obey the law, that cannot be adequately explained as legitimate by 
autonomy. Their legitimacy must come from a second principle, the content of which I 
will work out here. Finally, the ways in which autonomy fails here provide us with 
criteria for judging among candidates for the principle of fraternity. 
 Part two involves an assessment of three candidates for the principle of 
fraternity. In chapter three I assess whether tradition can play the role required. On its 
most plausible interpretation, tradition is insufficiently universalizable to account for the 
basic kind of ethical obligations required at the level of bare sociality. Chapter four 
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involves an examination of impartiality to determine whether this commonly discussed 
principle can adequately represent the standpoint of the collective. I find that a second-
order impartiality of the kind discussed by Brian Barry is too vacuous to serve,8 while 
first-order impartiality of a Nagelian kind is incompatible with the kind of obligations 
we are concerned to legitimate.9 Chapter five looks to three different conceptions of 
solidarity to determine whether one of these might fit with the needs of the dualist 
approach. While a robust version of solidarity found in Tommie Shelby is too strong to 
be compatible with autonomy,10 and a weak version based on self-interest is important 
but lacks the necessary alterity, I argue that a moderate version can work. This would 
involve the idea that the interests of another generate obligations to enter into 
relationships of solidarity under certain circumstances and through a very basic ethical 
obligation. I call this Moderate Ethical Solidarity, and explain how it is plausible at the 
end of chapter five. 
 Part three picks up with Moderate Ethical Solidarity and attempts to show how 
a basic ethical obligation of consideration can play the key ethical role of incorporating 
the interests of another into one‟s own interest set. This is the focus of chapter six. This 
conception of moderate ethical solidarity via consideration, then, is my proposed 
candidate for the principle of fraternity: the fact of sociality requires us to enter into 
relationships of solidarity with another when we recognize that a common interest will 
be more likely met by such entry, while consideration leads us to have this recognition 
when the circumstances exist. In the seventh and final chapter I explain how, on a 
dualist approach, this principle can be reconciled with autonomy to explain when a 
                                                 
8
 Barry 1995.  
9
 Nagel 1991. 
10
 Shelby 2005. 
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maxim or policy is legitimate. Ultimately, I contend that fraternity and autonomy have 
different valences of legitimacy. Fraternity requires a process of legitimation, while 
autonomy provides a standard below which obligations are difficult to legitimate. This 
leads to a stringent approach to legitimacy, one where each principle has a veto over the 
legitimacy of a maxim or policy. I defend this result as consistent with the phenomena 





























Part I: Autonomy and the Prospects for 







Abstract: In this part I explain why autonomy is an important but limited 
value. We are individuals of the kind Liberalism claims, but this is not our 
only morally or politically relevant characteristic. To focus on autonomy 
alone is to neglect the importance of our sociality and what principles it 
might require. In chapter one I will provide a characterization of autonomy 
in the context of explaining the failure of the original communitarian 
critique. In chapter two I will explain how the version of autonomy 
presented in chapter one cannot, by itself, provide a sufficient condition for 
the legitimacy of an important category of maxims. This should show the 
value of a renewed communitarian project focussed on explaining how a 














Chapter 1: Autonomy and the Failure of the Communitarian Critique 
Abstract 
 This chapter serves two purposes. Firstly, it argues that the original 
communitarian critique has failed. The critique‟s negative claims about liberalism – 
specifically that the liberal view of the concept of the autonomous individual is not an 
accurate depiction of human nature – depend on its positive claims about the nature of 
individuality. Since the positive claim fails – because the communitarian view of the 
concept of individuality is itself implausible or misunderstands the liberal project – the 
original negative claims also fail. Secondly, this chapter gives an account of autonomy 
that accurately represents the liberal discussion and that can serve as a central moral and 
political value. This kind of autonomy combines an authenticity condition with the 
importance of meaningful choice. This chapter will therefore prepare the way for what 
follows in the next chapter, where I discuss the need for a second legitimating principle, 
and the remainder of the thesis where I explain what that second principle should be.  
 
Introduction 
 This chapter will explore the failure of the original communitarian critique. In so 
doing, it will accomplish two goals. First, it explains how and to what extent the original 
communitarian critique failed. The core of the communitarian critique, in authors like 
Sandel, Walzer, McIntyre and Taylor, was a critique of the liberal view that justice 
requires us to treat others as autonomous because of our individuality. Communitarians 
based their critique on the view that we are not individuals in the way liberals contend, 
and so autonomy cannot have the importance it does in liberalism. In my view the 
problem with the communitarian critique is that individuals are like liberals believe: 
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separate selves deserving of autonomy. For communitarianism to have any role, then, it 
must claim that there is something more to the human condition than individuality that 
is relevant for explaining the legitimacy of moral and political obligations.  
Second, in defending liberalism against the original communitarian critique I will 
present an account of what I believe is at the core of the liberal position. This involves 
explaining the nature and importance of autonomy to liberal thought and defending it 
against communitarian objections. I will show how autonomy arises from the 
separateness of persons. The connection between autonomy and separateness is 
different for different theorists. For Rawls it is based on the fundamental intuition that 
people are „free and equal.‟ I claim, following Raz, that separateness can be seen as 
implying autonomy because of the incommensurability of plans and the importance of 
plans to individuality. These values seem, to me following Raz, to only be ensured in a 
society that recognizes a principle that individuals ought to be treated in such a way that 
they can live life from within through making meaningful choices.  
Following this explanation of the source and nature of autonomy I explain why 
the original communitarian critique fails. As Kymlicka shows, the communitarian faces a 
dilemma. He must either advance a view of people – a basic ontology of human nature 
– that is either deeply incoherent or accept one that that is no longer problematic for a 
liberal moral/political theorist. However, the communitarian position need not have 
failed so easily. It need not be premised on the plausibility of the communitarian 
conception of the self, or on the implausibility of the liberal connection between 
individuality and autonomy. A communitarian could, instead, argue against the liberal 
treatment of sociality. What I believe a communitarian should argue – what remains for 
the critique – is that the liberal conception of the self, while coherent, is limited. It can 
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only represent the normative requirements of individuality, and that liberals either omit 
or mischaracterize the demands of sociality. The view that autonomy is important 
because of individuality is correct, but it is a part, not the whole, of an explanation for 
which maxims and policies are legitimate in a just society. While liberals are right that we 
are individuals, what remains for the communitarian critique is to show that this is not 
all that we are. I will explain the importance of this role in the next chapter and will take 
up the task of developing a communitarian principle in the remainder of the thesis. 
I. Individuality and the Original Communitarian Critique 
At its core, the communitarian critique claims that the liberal connection 
between individuality and autonomy is wrong. Rather than disputing the connection 
between autonomy and individuality, most communitarians instead challenged the 
liberal approach to individuality. Ultimately, the claim is that we are not like liberals 
think we are: we are not individuals in the supposedly „atomistic‟ way that makes 
autonomy a genuinely valuable principle. There are two stages to the communitarian 
argument. The first is to deny the liberal claim of neutrality about the concept of 
individuality, while the second is to demonstrate that the conception of individuality 
operative in liberal thought, and on which autonomy depends, is implausible. While I 
will ultimately argue that this approach fails – that we are the kind of individuals liberals 
presume and that autonomy is an important political value – I nonetheless must present 
the communitarian critique first, so that we can understand both what fails and what 
remains. 
 Several different arguments are usually framed as communitarian critiques of 
liberalism but the important feature these arguments share – which unites them as 
communitarian – is an objection to the liberal understanding of the concept of 
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individuality. Of course, since Rawls, their primary target, claimed to be neutral about 
the concept of individuality, the first step in the communitarian argument is to claim 
that there is an implicit, if not explicit, concept of the individuality at work in liberal 
moral and political theorizing. This shows up in Taylor‟s argument against Rawls‟ 
reflective equilibrium and in Sandel‟s objections to Rawlsian claims of metaphysical 
neutrality, as I will discuss here. 
In his work on Hegel, Taylor discusses a Hegel-inspired approach to the 
Kantian-influenced Rawlsian liberalism. The distinction between moralität and sittlichkeit 
is key for both Hegel and Taylor. Moralität is characterized as an attempt to derive 
universal ethical principles from a single fixed point. It is meant in contrast with 
Sittlichkeit, which is an attempt to define ethical principles based on the practices of a 
community. To Hegel, the former is really a veiled attempt to do the latter – to attempt 
to bolster the practices of a community by claiming that they have a foundation in 
something beyond the community. „Hegel runs counter to the moral instinct of 
liberalism then and now,‟ Taylor says. „Between obligations which are founded on our 
membership of some community and those which are not so contingent we tend to 
think of the latter as transcending the former, as the truly universal moral obligations.‟11 
To Taylor, we err in favouring the universal and abstract over the communal and 
contextualized. Liberals make this mistake, Taylor claims, because they advance a 
conception of individuality that is indeterminate in a Kantian-Hegelian sense; it is 
without content, or „empty.‟ According to Taylor, Hegel claims that the desire to be 
autonomous in the moralität sense „expresses the demand of [Geist] to deduce its whole 
content out of itself, not to accept as binding anything which is merely taken up from 
                                                 
11
 Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), p. 377.   
 16 
the outside.‟12 This leaves Geist empty because it leaves an individual who seeks freedom 
or autonomy only for the sake of being free rather than for the sake of the plans that 
freedom might allow us to achieve; a form of an individual devoid of content. Only 
within a sittlichkeit could Geist, grounded in the practices of a community even while 
trying to change those practices, find a solid foundation and avoid the view that 
freedom is its own reward. 
Sandel‟s criticisms attempt to build on Taylor‟s initial critique. In Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice, Sandel claims that the liberal notion of the self is problematically 
“unembedded.” Sandel‟s argument is, in part, an argument from phenomena: liberal 
claims about the nature of the self violate our perceptions. We do not experience 
ourselves as unencumbered individuals. We cannot, Sandel claims, abstract away from 
our various characteristics and relationships to find some underlying core upon which 
we can then make moral judgements.13 In part, this can be seen as a reaction against the 
Rawlsian approach to the original position, but as such an argument it misses the mark. 
The original position is a device used to force moral deciders to abstract away from 
most of their morally irrelevant considerations, allowing only morally relevant 
considerations to influence deliberations about the fundamental principles of justice. 
This is not a phenomenal claim – it is not a claim that people are „really like that,‟ or that 
people can experience themselves as unencumbered selves. Nonetheless, whether these 
abstractions in the original position influence the content of the principles of justice and 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 369. Geist, in Taylor and Hegel’s terms, is a polysemous word. It translates into English as 
‘mind,’ ‘consciousness,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘soul,’ or, in some Hegelian contexts, as ‘reason.’ At this point, 
Taylor uses the term ‘spirit,’ which is also the term used in most translations of Hegel. However, I 
find this nomenclature misleading. It lends a critically important concept a sense of hokey 
supernaturality. It should be thought of as something closer to the mind’s consciousness. Particularly 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Geist, Geist undergoes a journey linked to the growing and unfolding of 
consciousness as it explores the phenomenal world. 
13
 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983), esp. pp. 24-28. 
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thereby prejudice the deliberations remains a potentially legitimate concern. Sandel 
claims that it does, but in making this claim he relies on a presentation of an alternative 
conception of the self. Rather then see ourselves as an ego with accidental traits, we see 
ourselves as inextricably „composed of‟ our commitments and attachments. According 
to Sandel, individuals self-perceive as a combination of a number of traits (educated, 
athletic, blind) and a series of relations (friend, brother, student) rather than as an 
underlying, unencumbered ego.14 
If people are not individuals in the way liberals claim this might undermine the 
importance of autonomy. However, to truly assess the success or failure of the 
communitarian position I must first explain what autonomy means in liberal thought. 
Only then will I be in a position to explain why it matters and why, insofar as it is an 
argument against the importance of autonomy, the communitarian critique must fail.  
II. Liberalism and Autonomy 
Most theories of justice, or of the legitimacy of moral and political maxims and 
policies, have some principle at their core. To borrow Rawls‟ analogy, one 
epistemological theory is differentiated from others in part by how they differ about 
what knowledge involves or how it can be reached. Moral/political theories are the 
same: they differ in which principles are taken to required and how. In this regard I take 
a principle requiring respect for autonomy to be the central principle in contemporary 
liberal theories. In this section I explain the concept of “central principle” before I 
discuss the role of autonomy in contemporary liberal thought.  
When I say that the requirement of respect for autonomy principle is the central 
principle for contemporary liberalism I claim that autonomy is something that a given a 
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maxim or policy must be positively connected to in order to be legitimate, or negatively 
connected to in order to be illegitimate. This legitimation can work in a two different 
ways, corresponding to the positive and negative connections just mentioned. In the 
positive context, a principle can provide a source of legitimacy: insofar as a maxim or 
policy is formed pursuant to a principle that maxim or policy is legitimate. In the 
negative context, failure to satisfy the demands of a principle can render a maxim or 
policy illegitimate. I characterize these two versions of legitimacy as “process” and 
“threshold,” and they will be discussed in detail in chapter seven, where they play a 
critical role in determining how to reconcile the demands of individuality and those of 
sociality. As such, I set aside questions of how much autonomy is necessary until then.15 
There is no one fixed definition of autonomy. It plays somewhat different roles 
in different systems of moral and political legitimacy. A communitarian who wishes to 
claim that their theory includes autonomy will be inclined to adopt a restricted definition 
of autonomy – one which makes it consistent with the communitarian‟s central moral or 
political principle. Conversely, a libertarian will approach autonomy as a much more 
exacting standard. Neither approach is necessarily wrong or incoherent. Nonetheless, I 
believe the liberal approach best characterizes both the consequences and the sources of 
autonomy. However, since not all liberals are in complete agreement about the nature of 
autonomy, I will develop a hybrid view that I believe would be largely supported by all 
the major thinkers in the contemporary tradition.  
My approach most closely parallels Raz‟s in The Morality of Freedom, but it is 
reflected, I believe, in Rawls, Kymlicka and other authors who, in my view, represent 
the core of the contemporary liberal tradition. Raz presents three central features of 
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autonomy: An autonomous individual has the (1) mental capacity and the (2) 
independence to choose (3) from a variety of meaningful options.16 All three of these 
requirements depend on the role of choice. The first quality sets a precondition of 
mental ability under which choice is possible. This reflects the care Raz takes earlier in 
The Morality of Freedom to distinguish biological self-interest from well-being.17 This 
distinction rests on the role choice does not play in our biological interests. Just as bees 
do not choose to work in hives, humans do not choose many of the things that are 
important to us. For humans, biological functions can be denied or overridden by other 
goals. Children can hold their breath until they pass out. Prisoners can starve 
themselves. Clergy can remain celibate. In some ways we might be best off if we did not 
have some of our biological urges, but we cannot choose simply not to have them. 
Desires to breathe, eat and mate persist even when we deny them indulgence. In the 
examples above, the child still has an interest in breathing, the prisoner in eating and the 
clergy in sex. In each case a more important interest – the child‟s spite, the prisoner‟s 
cause and the clergy‟s spirituality – overrides the biological interest. This ability to 
override, to choose, comprises the mental capacity necessary for genuine autonomy. 
The second requirement, independence to choose, introduces a threshold below 
which choice is not possible. If one is poor in a society where most basic goods and 
services require great wealth, ones autonomy is limited. One‟s autonomy would be 
limited, perhaps to the point of extinction, even though one would have the mental 
ability to choose and options that would be meaningful (to be explained momentarily) 
were they within the range of choices possible due to one‟s circumstances.  
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The third criterion‟s dependence on choice is more controversial as it is imbued 
with Raz‟s perfectionism. I will briefly explain the role this perfectionism plays, and why 
it is not necessarily problematic. What makes an option meaningful for Raz is its ability 
to further the well being of the individual involved. This is perfectionistic because it 
establishes one feature of human existence as central: by improving that feature you 
invariably improve that person‟s life. Fortunately, Raz establishes a very flexible 
approach to perfectionism by making well being the central good. Since we can 
understand well being in a number of different ways, it is sensitive to the demands of 
reasonable pluralism.  
What is most important about well being for Raz is its connection with an 
individual‟s plans and goals. „Improving the well being of a person,‟ Raz explains, „can 
normally only be done through his goals. If they are bad for him the way to help him is 
to help him change them, and not to frustrate their realization (except on rare occasions 
when this is an adequate way of getting him to change them).‟18 This emphasis on an 
established standard – well being conceived of as the satisfaction of plans even when the 
plans are wrong – is closely linked with the approaches of supposedly anti-perfectionist 
theorists like Rawls and Kymlicka. While for Raz meaningfulness pertains to well being, 
for an anti-perfectionist it could be restricted to whatever constitutes meaningfulness for 
the individual involved. Raz‟s characterization of well being is broad enough to be 
compatible with a certain limited anti-perfectionism. Kymlicka talks about 
meaningfulness in showing how leading a life from within is what is important to 
liberals.19 This works positively and negatively. On the positive side, the ability to choose 
life partners is a meaningful choice because, given the impact one‟s spouse(s) can have 
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on one‟s interests, this choice will almost always have value for the individual involved. 
On the negative side, the ability to choose among religions is not a meaningful choice to 
a religiously indifferent individual because - in Razian terms – it would not add to her 
well being or – in Kymlickan terms – because it is not a choice that has any value for the 
individual involved.  
 The centrality of choice to autonomy is most explicit in Kymlicka‟s Liberalism, 
Community and Culture. It comes up in his critique of Sandel‟s approach to embeddedness 
that I will discuss in detail at the end of this chapter. For the moment, consider 
Kymlicka‟s claims that what is wrong with Sandel‟s view about the importance of 
embeddedness is that „on this view, we neither choose nor reject [constitutive] 
attachments, rather we find ourselves in [the attachments]; our ends and goals come not 
by choice but by self-discovery.‟20 This view is rejected as implausible because „we can 
and do make sense of questions not just about the meaning of the roles and attachments 
we find ourselves in, but also about their value.‟21 Choice – the ability to determine value 
– is a central feature of human life that characterizes autonomy for Kymlicka and other 
liberals, whether perfectionists like Raz or anti-perfectionsists like Rawls and Kymlicka.  
Rawls usually frames the ability to choose in the more overtly Kantian language 
of a life led from within.22 The basic premise of Rawlsian liberalism is that people are 
essentially free and equal. This is the central premise that influences the original 
position, the deliberation of basic principles and their implementation after the lifting of 
the veil of ignorance. To Rawls, living autonomously is how one expresses one‟s 
freedom and equality. He says „by acting from these [basic] principles [of justice] 
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persons are acting autonomously: they are acting from principles they would 
acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational 
beings.‟23 Rawls‟ appeal to rationality fits well with Raz‟s first criterion of mental 
capacity, where the value of freedom is shown in autonomy‟s central ability to choose. 
The ability to acknowledge principles as our own, rather than because they are the 
principles of some other, is the central feature of autonomy. That we are all free and 
equal is why we must all be autonomous, otherwise it would make sense for the smart, 
strong, or wise to rule over those less capable. It would be in some of our best interests 
to rule and in some of our best interests to follow. Moral equality makes such a 
circumstance unjust, requiring all lives to be led from within by choosing and evaluating 
options for oneself.  
Kymlicka also serves as a bridge between the Razian and the Rawlsian approach 
to autonomy. While Kymlicka refers to autonomy as choice in some contexts, in others 
he adopts the Rawlsian language of the „life led from within.‟ He says, with reference to 
the ability to make mistakes in choosing from among meaningful options, that „no life 
goes better by being led from the outside according to values the person doesn‟t 
endorse. My life only goes better if I‟m leading it from the inside, according to my 
beliefs about value.‟24 Furthermore, we can see the language of autonomy as a central 
value in Kymlicka‟s Rawlsian formulation as well. Because living a life from within is 
always better, and lives are only better when led from within, all other potential political 
values must be included only in such a way as not to sacrifice that autonomy. This 
adopts the emphasis on choice of Raz‟s approach into language with which anti-
perfectionists will be more comfortable. For Raz, the choices have to be among 
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meaningful options. What counts as meaningful for Raz includes only those choices 
conducive to well being, characterized as the satisfaction of goals. What counts as 
meaningful for Kymlicka, Rawls and anti-perfectionists is defined by the values of the 
person involved, which is a broader class than for Raz.  
Ultimately, then I characterize the value of autonomy as the ability to live 
one’s life from within through making meaningful choices. This definition 
encompasses both the authenticity condition that we saw as important in Kymlicka and 
Rawls and the “meaningful choices” condition found in Raz. What is central to all is the 
importance of choice to a life led from within. This does not mean that one must have 
unlimited options, or unfettered ability to do whatever one wishes: a meaningful range 
of options given one‟s own priorities and inclinations suffices for autonomy. We will 
return to this definition of autonomy again in Chapter 7, where we see exactly how 
strong a requirement it is, but for the moment I must provide some justification for 
thinking that this value is what our individuality normatively requires. This justification 
is the focus of the next section.   
III. Autonomy and Individuality 
 Using the criteria for political value and autonomy presented above, a respect 
for autonomy is clearly the central principle of liberal political systems. For Rawls, 
autonomy plays a critical role in generating the two principles of justice and in their 
lexical ordering: it explains both why the difference principle is important as a version of 
a principle of equality and why the principle of liberty is more important. For Raz, 
autonomy is that central feature of political morality that makes freedom an essential 
requirement of legitimate authority. For Kymlicka, our autonomy is at the core of our 
natures and explains why an ability to choose among conceptions of the good (and their 
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applications) is of undeniable importance. For all liberals it is grounded in aspects of our 
individuality that any moral and political theory must address if it is to explain which 
maxims and policies are legitimate. 
A. Separateness and the importance of individuality 
In each case I believe autonomy gets its value from with individuality because of 
a commitment to the separateness of persons. Autonomy might not be linked to 
individuality. Collectives can be autonomous too. A collective can make judgements and 
have interests apart from the interests of its constituent individuals. Collective interests 
are the plans and goals that give rise to collective well being, on this view. Collective 
plans involve choices the following of which allow a group to live an authentic, self-
directed life. Collectives, just like individuals, could be seen as institutions demanding 
autonomy in the sense that they are institutions that could make use of the abilities 
autonomy is meant to encompass and protect. While the metaphysical commitments of 
this approach to society are problematic, the liberal claim should try and find a way to 
justify that individuals are the kinds of entities to which autonomy primarily pertains. 
The liberal claim that autonomy must be a property of individuals cannot be grounded 
on the belief that only individuals can have the kind of plans, goals, and ends the 
fulfilment of which requires autonomy. If capacity to have ends suffices to give rise to 
the importance of autonomy, then collectives could demand autonomy too. As such, 
liberals need an argument to claim that what is autonomous is the individual, rather than 
some other type of thing that can have interests and plans. 
 The liberal justification for stressing individual, rather than collective, autonomy 
as important relies on the separateness of persons. The separateness of persons makes 
collective autonomy different from individual autonomy. Collectives involve either 
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identification or aggregation of interests. Identification of interests happens when two 
people each have the same goal and the satisfaction of that goal for one of them 
constitutes satisfaction of the goal for both. If I have a goal of stopping global warming 
and you also have this goal, were these interests identifiable it would not matter which 
of us actually achieved the goal. In this way an identity of interests is different from a 
mutual interest. If we had a mutual interest in stopping global warming, this implies that 
we coordinate efforts to achieve this goal. If our interests identify, no coordination is 
necessary. Identity of interests is a significantly higher standard than aggregability of 
interests, since identifiable interests are necessarily aggregable, but aggregable interests 
are not necessarily identifiable. Identity of interests is also deeply implausible given what 
Rawls calls the „fact of reasonable pluralism.‟25 The fact of reasonable pluralism is the 
fact that reasonable people can reach different conclusions about what is important. By 
accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism we accept that people have different interests, 
and that even when they have the same interests they may value them differently. Since 
the fact of pluralism seems true,26 complete identity of interests is a dubious ground for 
judgement, leaving aggregability of interests the only option for showing that persons 
are relevantly non-separate.  
B. Aggregation and Individuality 
 What do I mean by the separateness of persons? There are many ways to 
express the intuition behind this slogan. Most ways are metaphysical. In one sense, we 
are separate people because we do not share a mind: I cannot know your thoughts 
without the mediation of some form of communication, nor can you know mine 
without similar circumstances. Why, however, would this be of any moral or political 
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relevance? Strictly by itself it might not. Suppose there are only two people left on earth, 
living at opposite ends. If they never interact, why would their separateness have any 
moral and political relevance? From where would the moral and political relevance 
come? Furthermore, if people were able to read minds or hear thoughts they would still 
believe that the thoughts they would (presumably) be able to tell their own thoughts 
from those of others.27 Even if, however, I was wrong about this, I do not depend on 
metaphysical separateness for my discussion. I discuss separateness in an ethical context 
rather than a metaphysical one. Where the moral and political relevance of the 
separateness of persons arises is through the attachment of individuals to interests and 
plans. We are separate in a way that is morally and politically relevant because we have 
interests and plans of our own, in which other people may or may not figure in morally 
relevant ways. 
 The question of personal identity is an ethical question because it is inextricably 
associated with our interests.28 My circumstances and my identity will give rise to a 
system of value for me because they make some things appear to be better for me and 
other things appear to be worse for me. This valuation is, to some extent, chosen. I am 
capable of questioning whether some goal or some activity is „worth it‟ for me. Indeed, 
some kind of weighing of interests is inevitable, given the finitude of mental and 
physical capacities. My life and its circumstances only provide me with the resources to 
accomplish so many of my possible goals. For instance, given the length of time I can 
reasonably expect to live and the length of time it takes to become a Symphony 
Conductor and a respected Philosophy Professor, I am unlikely to have the chance to 
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do both. To my knowledge, no one has. These goals are interests – it would be generally 
better for me in the Razian sense if I were to have them satisfied. They might also be in 
my interest in a different sense. It might be the case that my life will go better if I 
succeed at my chosen or stumbled-upon endeavours. Even if this was false, however, 
and I would be better off in the long run if my plans were to fail, it is still an interest (in 
the first sense) to have them succeed. In this way countervailing interests override rather 
than extinguish lesser interests, as pro tanto reasons for action override other, weaker, pro 
tanto reasons.29 Those overridden interests do not cease to have moral weight; rather 
their moral weight is overwhelmed by the moral weight of some other interest.  
C. How interests require separateness 
The explanation of why individuals, rather than collectives, are the kind of 
things to which autonomy is important is closely connected with the separateness of 
persons, but what effectively demonstrates that persons are separate is some basic 
features of ethical concepts themselves. The evidence for this claim is usually framed as 
an argument against utilitarianism (in Rawls) or consequentialism (in Raz), but ultimately 
it depends on the notion that our ordinary use of the concept of moral obligation is not 
legitimately aggregable. Individuals‟ interests cannot be legitimately traded off against 
those of other individuals, nor can an individual‟s interests be partially satisfied by partial 
satisfaction of a set of individuals‟ interests of which one is a member. In Raz this takes 
the form of an argument against comparability. In Rawls it involves the claim that 
individuals in the original position would reject such a schema. Ultimately, I believe the 
conceptual problem underlies both approaches, but my extreme view is unnecessary to 
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prove the point. In either event, individual interests cannot be legitimately aggregated, 
thus guaranteeing their ethical separateness and that the relevant kind of autonomy 
attaches to individuals.  
In the Rawlsian framework the separateness of persons plays a key role in 
distinguishing a utilitarian theory of justice from justice as fairness. „Utilitarianism does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons,‟ 30 Rawls claims because „it does not 
matter [to a utilitarian] how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals 
any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfactions 
over time. The correct distribution in either case is that which yields the maximum 
fulfilment.‟31 The trouble with this in a Rawlsian framework is that parties in the original 
position would not agree to it. Risk aversion means that those who are left worst off by 
this maximalist approach will reject it.32 However, for present purposes the Rawlsian 
argument illustrates the connection between aggregation and the separateness of (or, in 
Rawls‟ term, distinction between) persons. Aggregation is illicit because people are 
ethically separate. It matters not a whit to those at the bottom of the social food chain 
how happy those at the top are made by the unequal distribution of resources among 
them. Aggregation would be rejected in the original position and cannot, for Rawls, 
form any direct part of the principles of justice.33 
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Raz‟s perfectionist approach, however, deals with the problem of aggregation 
and separateness by demonstrating the incommensurability of individual plans. In his 
view, the incommensurability of individual interests makes them non-aggregable and 
thereby demonstrates that it is only by considering the individual and the smallest unit 
to which interests and plans attach that we can develop a theory of the legitimacy of 
moral and political obligations.  Consequentialism depends on a belief that the interests 
and plans of individuals are comparable, Raz claims, before presenting an argument that 
they are not.  
„The reasons for [a person] to be engaged in [a project, pursuit or relationship] 
are incommensurate with reasons for him to engage in some other projects, 
pursuits or relationships which are incompatible with those he has. There are 
two aspects to the proposition. First, the value of many pursuits to people 
other than the agent, their value to society, cannot be compared with the value 
of many alternative pursuits. Second, their value to the agent, their contribution 
to his well-being, cannot be compared with that of many others.‟34  
 
While this can be framed in epistemic terms, as an inability to know which set of 
projects is more valuable overall, it is more accurately understood as a version of what 
Raz calls incommensurability. Two options are incommensurable when „neither is better 
than the other‟ or „there is (or could be) another option which is better than one but is 
not better than the other.‟35 Plans and the satisfaction of interests are a key example of 
this. While it is difficult enough for one individual to choose among possible life plans, 
it is distinctly more difficult to choose among possible life plans for multiple individuals. 
Indeed, it is only by treating a collective as though it were an individual that we think 
such a comparison possible.36  
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What each of these two approaches shows is that individuality matters to the 
satisfaction of plans and interests in a way that makes their aggregation conceptually 
illicit. If people‟s interests are aggregable, alike plans would be equal in worth to other 
like plans. Plans could be commensurable if, for example, one person‟s success were just 
as good as another person‟s success no matter who succeeds. If a theorist treats 
individuals solely as the bearers of plans, non-ethically separate individuals would be 
individuals whose plans could be aggregated. The satisfaction of plans and interests 
could be pooled and individuals would be entitled to a certain percentage of satisfaction 
as members of a pool. However, as Rawls points out, the distribution of satisfactions 
matters. If aggregability were legitimate, the satisfaction of the plans of one part of the 
set is equally as good as the satisfaction of the plans of another part of the aggregation.  
However, this is an implausible picture of individuals. Those in the Rawlsian 
situation would reject it, while those in the Razian picture would find it an inaccurate 
depiction of their circumstances. When individuals are considered as people with plans, 
the natural conclusion is that they are separate, and that the satisfaction of one‟s plans is 
not equivalent to the satisfaction of another‟s. Any attempt to make people‟s plans 
commensurable either involves an implausible approach to plans or an implausible 
approach to people. As I believe Raz has shown in my prior discussion, this becomes 
clear when we look in detail at what it is to have a plan and to have that plan succeed. 
This shows that the picture of the connection between individuals and their interests 
that allows pooling of interests is implausible from the start, and that any attempt to 




D. Separateness and Liberalism 
 The importance of the non-aggregability of individual plans is apparent in the 
justification of individual autonomy throughout the liberal tradition. The separateness of 
persons permeates Rawls‟ work, arising out of reflective equilibrium‟s key conclusion 
that people are „free and equal.‟ However, the connection between „free and equal‟ and 
separateness becomes more obvious at certain key points. The clearest presentation 
comes in his discussion of why rationality can serve as a thin theory of the good. He 
claims that central to the notion of personhood is Royce‟s idea of a plans. He says that 
„for Royce, an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he 
intends to do in his life.‟37 (Theory 358) In this emphasis on plans Rawls is close to Raz 
and to the argument from incommensurability above. However, this is one point at 
which reflective equilibrium seems to be, in Taylor‟s phrase, holding a lot of the cards.38 
We know that for Rawls reflective equilibrium generates the central view that justice 
depends on a society where people are „free and equal,‟ but we do not know why. Why 
this is unfortunate will be explained in a moment when I discuss the communitarian 
critique, but since Kymlicka picks up on the Rawlsian approach, their views should be 
examined in tandem. 
In Liberalism, Community and Culture, Kymlicka attempts to clarify the concepts of 
Rawls‟ Theory in a way that meets, rather than accommodates, the objections presented 
by the early communitarian critiques. Individuality is important, and persons are 
separate, because the basic unit of choice must always remain with the individual. 
Nothing smaller than individuals can make choices based on coherent plans, and no 
group can have plans without depending on the plans of individuals; consequently, for 
                                                 
37
 Rawls 1999, p. 358. 
38
 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), p. 89.  
 32 
Kymlicka, as for Rawls, the person, not the self, is the basic unit of morality (55-56). I 
am unconvinced by Kymlicka‟s view about the plans of collectives, or for that matter 
about the need for individual coherence, but nonetheless believe the connection 
between plans and the separateness of persons remains important. 
The difficulty in this is that Kymlicka, like Rawls, simply accepts that individuals 
are „free and equal‟ as the product of reflective equilibrium. Neither explains why it is 
individuals are the things that must be treated as „free and equal‟ nor why they must be 
treated as „free and equal‟ rather than as „comrades‟ or „according to rank.‟ Was the 
freedom and equality of individuals the only option for a standard for political 
legitimacy and the thing to which it attaches, this would not be problematic. However, 
because a case could be made for the sovereignty of the community, the state, the family 
or some other collective entity, this argumentative gap is problematic. This gap is not, 
however, found in Raz, who I follow in presenting the argument from 
incommensurability of plans above. Nor is it found in the argument against aggregation 
from poolability that I claim underlies both the Rawlsian and the Razian approaches to 
the importance of individuality. 
Autonomy is central to the liberal program, but it is an individualistic autonomy. 
This was not the only option. Collectives, like families and clubs, can be autonomous; 
they can have plans and make decisions from an array of alternatives. Therefore the 
separateness of persons is a critical value, informing the scope of autonomy in liberal 
thought. Separateness arises from a number of possible contexts – from reflective 
equilibrium as the view that people are free and equal is but one example – but the most 
consistent one is the argument from incommensurability. In clubs or other associations 
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we look at people only as a member of that club, rather than as a member of a number 
of possible organizations.  
I should note, however, that as Sen discusses in Identity and Violence, our interests 
might be incommensurable within individuals as well as between people. One person 
can have different, potentially conflicting interests depending on the presence and 
strength of their various attachments.39 I have interests that arise from my relationships 
with my family, with my culture(s), with my department, and with my friends, inter alia. 
Where I differ from the collective, is that when I am choosing among incommensurable 
interests my dignity is not violated. I am not less of a free and equal being because of 
my inability to choose a good option when I am only left with varying degree of evil. I 
am still separate, even though the same intransitivity applies at the personal level just as 
it did at the social level. The ability to choose from among plans, even when that choice 
is made among incommensurables, is central to autonomy. However, if people are not 
separate in the relevant moral and political sense, those plans should be aggregable. That 
plans are not commensurable implies that people are separate. The communitarian 
critique is problematic insofar as they argue against this approach to individuality.  
IV. The Failure of the Original Communitarian Critique 
In this section I explain the shortcomings of the original communitarian 
critique. Ultimately, communitarians claim that we are not autonomous individuals in 
the way liberals claim. I will argue, however, that Taylor‟s approach denies the value of a 
particular kind of autonomy, but this is not the kind of autonomy to which liberals are 
committed. While Sandel‟s “embeddedness” approach denied the importance of 
individuality, this results in a dilemma neither horn of which leaves the communitarian 
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with any room to stand on, as Kymlicka so convincingly demonstrates. Whatever 
remains of the communitarian critique it cannot be that we are not individuals deserving 
of autonomous treatment in the way liberals claim. What remains will be the focus of 
the concluding section of this chapter and the whole of the next. 
 Most of the various authors associated with the communitarian critique draw on 
the work of Charles Taylor. Taylor argued that the liberal elevation of autonomy to the 
level of a central principle is misguided because it imagines that freedom can be 
something intrinsically good. This might be a legitimate argument against some view of 
autonomy or of separateness, but it is not effective against the views presented above. It 
would be an effective argument against a view that claimed the exercise of autonomy or 
of separateness was good in itself, rather than good as a basic condition for moral and 
political legitimacy. Kymlicka allows that some might have said things amounting to the 
view that the exercise of freedom is its own reward, but he also agrees with Bernard 
Williams‟ arguments that these claims do not work.40 The difference between Taylor‟s 
target and the liberals under examination here is in what constitutes freedom. 
Communitarians seem to believe that post-Rawlsian liberals are concerned only with 
what Isaiah Berlin called negative liberty, when in reality Rawlsians and liberals who 
have followed him are more closely concerned with advancing both negative and 
positive freedom. Was negative freedom itself the only liberal good, a liberal would then 
judge the better life the one lived like Kierkegaard‟s aesthete: flittering from possible 
pleasure to possible pleasure, seeking out the new, rather than the better or more 
genuine, experience. Likewise, were freedom its own reward the ideal life would be one 
lived in single-minded attempt to differentiate oneself from others, choosing only 
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activities no one else had already done. Since liberals need not, and usually do not view 
autonomy or separateness like this, this kind of autonomy and separateness cannot be 
seen as their central value. Liberal freedom, encompassing both positive and negative 
liberty, is already situated. It is situated in the judgement of an individual rather than in 
the ethos of a community.  
 Sandel‟s argument – the argument from embeddedness – can be interpreted in 
two ways. If embeddedness is interpreted strongly, it relies on the claim that the 
particular ends given to a person‟s circumstances are fixed. This claim is implausibly 
strong, and rejected by Kymlicka. It seems a clear fact that many of our ends can 
change, including, from time to time, some of our most fundamental ends. It seems 
quite plausible that changing one fundamental end might, after other changes, involve 
changing other fundamental ends such that, in time, all our fundamental ends have 
changed. Furthermore, since Sandel also allows for some choice among ends, among 
traits and relations, demonstrating that the kind of strong embeddedness he discusses is 
unpalatable even to a communitarian.41 This leaves the second communitarian argument 
with a view compatible with the liberal project it was meant to critique. If we are able to 
choose among options, whether discovered – to use Sandel‟s term – or otherwise, that 
choice is enough for the liberal theorist. Kymlicka‟s contention that „the advertised 
contrast with the liberal view is a deception‟ holds.42 The communitarian must allow that 
we are autonomous in the sense where the central characteristic is choice among 
meaningful options, on pain of attempting to argue in favour of an implausibly strong 
sort of embeddedness. Furthermore, since the concept of the self is one with plans, the 
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argument for separateness from the incommensurability of plans also applies, 
reinforcing that this kind of selfhood is ethically separate. 
Since plans are the parts of selfhood or personal identity central to the moral 
and political philosophy of Raz, Rawls, and Kymlicka, the positive aspect of the 
communitarian critique – its concept of individuality – fails. Since liberal theorists only 
need to conclude that we are autonomous enough to form plans and to have interests, 
the target of the communitarian critique becomes noticeably smaller. Charges that the 
kind of individuals who can do this are characterless, or that this relies on self-interest in 
a robust sense, are seen to be misplaced. If there is to be a communitarian critique, it 
will have to be on some other ground than the implausibility of the liberal view of the 
self because, in both its formulations, that view has become pretty plausible as a 
representative of the normative requirements of individuality. 
Conclusion – What Remains of the Communitarian Critique? 
I wish to claim that while we are, in a morally and politically relevant sense, 
autonomous selves, this is not all that we are. Where I think this opening for the 
communitarian critique emerges most clearly is in the move from autonomy to 
impartiality in Nagel. At the outset of Equality and Partiality, he claims that the „unsolved 
problem [of or moral and political philosophy] is the familiar one of reconciling the 
standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual.‟43 Were this really 
what Nagel meant, that there are two morally relevant standpoints, one arising from 
autonomy and another arising from our sociality, we would have no quarrel. However, 
Nagel goes on to say that this question is „not primarily ... a question about the relation 
between the individual and society but ... as arising from a division in each individual 
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between two standpoints, the personal and the impartial.‟44 While the standpoint of the 
individual is clearly one equated with partiality or self-interestedness, a role is given to 
the interests of all – that is, the interests of other people and oneself together, not 
simply the interests of others – through impartiality. While I will discuss the problems 
of Nagel‟s version of impartiality in chapter four, for the moment is it important to note 
that his formulation simply substitutes the impartial point of view for the social point of 
view, rather than examining other possible options for what sociality might require. By 
taking sociality as a fact of basic moral and political relevance, like the separateness of 
persons, I can show how it entails a second source of political legitimacy: the case for 
fraternity. This dualism would require a different interpretation of how autonomy 
operates. Autonomy would not be able to operate alone, or solely with the separateness 
of persons as its influential foundation. Autonomy would have to be balanced against 
another principle with another foundation. 
This other foundation might, I believe, be found in looking at the 
communitarian argument from another angle. Instead of focussing, as earlier 
communitarians, on the liberal view of the self, in what follows I will focus on the 
liberal view of sociality and what the standpoint of the collective, or our common 
sociality as I interpret it, requires. This is somewhat more difficult. Liberals generally 
agree on what autonomy constitutes. They approach sociality differently. Nonetheless, I 
hope to show in the next chapter that their diverse approaches to society all undervalue 
sociality in their accounts of moral and political legitimacy by connecting it to closely 
with autonomy. How this plays out is different in for each liberal theory, but they all 
seem to have problems with reconciling the demands of sociality with the demands of 




separateness because they treat autonomy, grounded in separateness, as the only central 
moral and political value. In different ways, they are all reductive of sociality in favour of 
autonomy. 
I will claim that this approach to sociality is wrong. Sociality is a centrally 
morally relevant part of the human experience just like separateness. While individuals 
are, in one sense, separate, we are also, in another morally and politically relevant sense, 
deeply social. That our sociality has a number of common features will be fleshed out in 
the next chapter, but just as separateness gives rise to the features of autonomy, sociality 
and its dependent traits give rise to various norms of moral and political importance: 
norms of fraternity. These norms of fraternity should become a central part of a theory 
of moral and political legitimacy when they are seen as representative of the normative 
requirements of the fact of sociality. 
There are a couple of possible liberal replies to this basic claim for fraternity, 
which I mention here but will explore further in the chapter to follow. The first is to 
claim that while fraternity might be of some moral relevance, autonomy really is of 
primary relevance. There might be some circumstances in which the bonds of 
community, or family, or nationhood might come into play, but they can only do so, or 
can only do so justly, when done in a manner consistent with the principles of justice 
derived from autonomy.  
I would respond that a communitarian approach that emphasizes the 
importance of fraternity would not necessarily be one that undermines the importance 
of autonomy. We can take autonomy as central and yet deny its claim to exclusive 
centrality. Autonomy must be balanced with fraternity rather than set against it. The 
argument in the next chapter will attempt to show that many of the problems that arise 
 39 
for liberal theorists – including questions about the role of moral psychology and the 
limits of toleration – raise questions about the plausibility of autonomy-exclusive moral 
and political theories. Autonomy alone cannot do all the things required of a plausible 
moral and political principle. This failing, however, does not indicate that it is not a 
necessary source of moral and political legitimacy, but simply that it is not sufficient, 
which is where a new communitarian approach could begin. 
A possible further rejoinder claims that liberals were not talking about moral and 
political legitimacy in general, but justice, for which a narrower, institutionalized set of 
criteria is all that is required. While autonomy, this response claims, might not be 
sufficient for establishing general moral and political legitimacy claims, it is enough for 
establishing what counts as just.  
My rebuttal is to claim that justice goes deeper than the response indicates. If, as 
Rawls claims, justice is to be the central value of social institutions, its role must be far 
broader than simply legitimating certain narrow politically or constitutionally established 
abstract objects like laws and parliaments. If justice is to be the central value of social 
institutions it must also apply to, as others have pointed out, the economy, the family, 
morality, friendship, international and intercultural relationships inter alia.45 All of these 
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Chapter 2 – The Limits of Autonomy and the Need for Fraternity 
Abstract 
 In chapter one I argued that autonomy is an important part in accounting for 
the legitimacy of moral and political obligations. In this chapter I argue that it cannot be 
the only such principle. As such, I will be attempting not to disprove the value of 
autonomy but to find its limits. An important limit of autonomy is its inability to 
adequately explain the legitimacy of non-voluntary positive obligations. I show that 
there are legitimate moral and political non-voluntary positive obligations before arguing 
that any attempt to explain these obligations through autonomy only is doomed to fail. 
Accordingly, this discussion will show not only that autonomy cannot answer all the 
questions demanded by the fact of legitimate obligations, but what an account of 
fraternity will need to do to meet this challenge.  
Introduction 
 Proving that autonomy cannot be the only central principle to a comprehensive 
assessment of the legitimacy of moral and political obligations is this chapter‟s task. I 
will be attempting not to disprove the value of autonomy, but to find its limits. My 
argument will take the following form: there are legitimate non-voluntary positive 
obligations; the legitimacy of these obligations cannot be adequately explained by 
autonomy; accordingly, autonomy cannot be the only legitimating value. I show that 
there are legitimate non-voluntary obligations in the first section of this chapter, but the 
difficult work will be in the second section when I explain why autonomy cannot 
adequately account for these obligations. Finally, I discuss how autonomy‟s 
shortcomings are illuminating. By understanding what autonomy cannot do, we will be 
in a better position to assess what fraternity as an equivalent value representing the 
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demands of our sociality will need to accomplish. Accordingly, the final section of this 
chapter lays the groundwork for the search for fraternity that will occupy part two of 
this thesis. 
I. Associative obligations and the Legitimacy of Ordinary Moral Opinion  
 The first stage of my argument is the claim that there are non-voluntary or 
associative obligations and that these obligations are legitimate. The strongest evidence 
for this claim is what Samuel Scheffler calls „ordinary moral opinion.‟46 In this section I 
explain what associative obligations are, which will involve an initial account of why 
they are prima facie incompatible with the account of autonomy from Chapter 1. This 
explanation will then require me to justify why these associative obligations are 
legitimate. My defence of associative obligations involves showing the central role they 
play in our ordinary ethical lives. In so doing I will note an interesting feature of 
associative obligations that will come to play a key role in my account of fraternity in the 
parts of this thesis to follow. Associative obligations seem to be generated by the impact 
individuals have on one another. Specifically, the more often and important an impact, 
the stronger the obligation and the less dubitable the intuitions involved. 
 A. What are associative obligations? 
 Associative obligations are duties „we have only to those particular people with 
whom we have had certain significant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in 
certain significant sorts of relations.‟47 Associative obligations are to be juxtaposed with 
general obligations. However, to fully understand how they work we must clarify a 
number of the concepts in this definition. First, I will confirm how what associative 
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obligations are contrasted with general obligations in Scheffler‟s thought. Second, I will 
clarify the importance of interactions and relations in generating associative obligations. 
Third, I will note the important role particularity plays in associative obligations. Finally, 
I will distinguish between two sets of associative obligations: voluntary and non-
voluntary obligations. These are two fundamentally different sets of associative 
obligations, and they present contrasting problems for autonomy. For voluntary 
obligations, autonomy has a difficult time explaining the circumstances under which we 
think that an authentic choice can be, nonetheless, illegitimate. For non-voluntary 
obligations, the trouble is deeper. Autonomy cannot adequately make sense of how non-
voluntary obligations can be legitimate at all. I use the caveat „adequately‟ carefully here. 
I will show, in the next section, how any attempt to construe non-voluntary obligations 
in a manner consistent with autonomy does a disservice either to the obligation in 
question or to the nature of autonomy.  
 Before I get into the substance of the question, I must make a few quick 
explanations about terminology. I will follow Dworkin‟s terminology rather than 
Scheffler‟s. What Dworkin, in Law’s Empire, calls „Associative Obligations,‟48 Samuel 
Scheffler calls „Special Duties.‟49 The two are interchangeable, as Scheffler (writing after 
Dworkin) notes. I should also note the normativity of the associative obligations in 
question. Scheffler speaks of „duties‟ rather than „obligations,‟ due to a belief that 
„obligation‟ is best reserved for „moral requirements deriving from promises,‟ and a wish 
to avoid any implication that special duties/obligations could be understood 
voluntaristically. While I can sympathize with his motive, I feel no such stricture and will 
use the terms „duty/duties‟ and „obligation/obligations‟ interchangeably. Furthermore, 
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whatever term I happen to be using at the time, I intend always to refer to pro tanto, 
rather than ultima facie, responsibilities, unless I clearly indicate otherwise. 
 Associative obligations become important when they are contrasted with general 
obligations. Scheffler formulates the difference as one of scope. I owe general 
obligations to all people, regardless of who they are in relation to me. A Kantian 
obligation not to lie and a Millian harm principle are good examples of general 
obligations in Scheffler‟s approach. If I am in negotiations with you for the loan of your 
book, I have an obligation not to lie to you that does not arise because we‟ve entered 
into negotiations. This obligation precedes the negotiations. I owe you the truth 
because, for a Kantian, lying would mean treating you as a means rather than an end in 
yourself, violating the categorical imperative. I think, however, that this formulation 
does not go far enough toward explaining the generality involved in a general obligation. 
The obligation not to lie to my negotiating partner is too specific for a real contrast with 
general obligations; I can simply remain silent and refrain from engaging with you and 
still meet my obligation not to lie, but it seems that I have also changed the nature of 
our relationship when doing this. By interacting with another, in this case by negotiating, 
I have already „particularized‟ an underlying obligation. To preserve the importance of 
particularity in associative obligations, I would formulate the matter differently. Rather 
than focusing on obligations „to people as such,‟50 I would frame general obligations as 
„standing obligations.‟  To use the above examples, I have a general obligation to treat 
others as ends, for a Kantian, or, for a Millian, to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 
How those obligations turn into specific acts in particular circumstances seems, to me, 
to move them from general to a very broad class of associative obligations: obligations I 
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owe to a particular individual because of some relationship, however brief, with them. 
The relationship here shifts the obligation from a general one grounded in an agent 
neutral reason to a special one grounded in an agent relative one. However, if I am 
overstating this difference, little depends on it. Differences in the scope of particularity 
and connections between it and interaction don‟t undermine the basic approach to 
associative obligations. There will still be a category of associative obligations arising 
from interactions and to which particularity is important. 
 This formulation points toward the important role that interactions play in the 
generation of associative obligations. A hermit has general obligations; alone in the 
desert he is as subject to the categorical imperative or the greatest happiness principle as 
anyone who lives in a crowded city. Where the hermit and the city dweller differ is in 
how often they will have associative obligations. Because the hermit does not interact 
with anyone, he has very few associative obligations.51 He has no one with whom to 
negotiate, contract, or converse. The urbanite, however, is constantly interacting with 
others. She must sign a lease or a deed. She must buy food and communicate with 
others to achieve her ends. In doing all these things she interacts with others and, in 
interacting, takes on associative obligations – applications of the more general 
obligations under which both her and the hermit live that have a different character 
because of their basis in the relationship. 
 Because interactions generate associative obligations, particularity will play an 
important role in how they are to be satisfied. The city dweller‟s obligation not to lie will 
be satisfied only by not lying to the particular people she meets at the particular times 
when they meet. It only rises to the level of an associative obligation because they are 
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already engaged in communication. It is because of the particular nature of associative 
obligations that contractual examples play such a central role. They illustrate clearly the 
intransitivity of ethical obligations, which gives rise to the importance of particularity. If 
I contract with you to provide coffee for a workshop, and someone else gives me 
coffee, my contract with you might diminish in importance but it does not lose any of 
its enforceability. I still have the (moral, political and, often, legal) right, if no longer any 
strong reason, to compel you to bring me the coffee you promised. Furthermore, a 
contract is between you and me, so for someone else to bring me coffee does not satisfy 
your obligations unless, through some other agreement, you arranged for them to bring 
it and I consent to this modification.52  
 The importance of contractual examples in explaining associative obligations is 
overstated and, in Scheffler‟s view, misleading. Within the category of associative 
obligations there are two very different kinds: voluntary and non-voluntary obligations. 
The emphasis on contracts obscures the significant nature of non-voluntary interactions 
in generating associative obligations. Furthermore, the kind of particularity involved in 
contracts is not as strict or as tightly connected to the interactions as the kind of 
particularity involved in non-voluntary obligations. However, the most problematic 
aspect of the emphasis on contract is that it obscures the difficulty an autonomy-
focused approach to the legitimacy of moral and political obligations will have in 
accommodating both voluntary and non-voluntary obligations. While I will explain this 
more fully in the next section of this chapter, some aspects of this feature of non-
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voluntary obligations must be pointed out in order to understand how they work as a 
species of associative obligations.  
 Many non-voluntary interactions give rise to associative obligations. The key 
examples so often commented on in the literature are family and friendship,53 but I 
prefer to frame this discussion in terms of neighbours. I do not ordinarily choose my 
neighbours, nor do they ordinarily choose me. While there are often some predictors as 
to the kinds of neighbours I am likely to have that correspond to the neighbourhood in 
which I live, these predictors are neither exact about whether I statistically „should‟ be 
living in that neighbourhood nor whether my neighbours „should‟ statistically be there 
either. Furthermore, even relatively strict residency requirements – racial, economic, 
aesthetic – cannot determine which particular people will be living within shouting 
distance (an important test) of one‟s residence.54  
 Without getting too deeply into the specific obligations that can arise from 
neighbourliness, I wish to show how what obligations there are arise from interaction. 
Let us assume that the neighbours we are discussing all live in a block of apartments. 
Neighbours on each floor share a hallway and the stairwell leading up to their level. This 
joint ownership is a form of interaction. If the stairwell is particularly narrow (spiral, 
perhaps), a neighbour who leaves his bicycle chained to the rail will be impeding the 
movement of his neighbours. It seems reasonable that the bicycle-owner has a duty to 
store his bicycle in such a way as to minimize his impact on his neighbours: by keeping 
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it in the wider hall or in his apartment, perhaps. The obligation here is not voluntary – 
he cannot choose to have it or not to have it. It arises simply by virtue of living in the 
same building as others and sharing a narrow stairwell with them. If the bicycle owner 
lived in the building alone no such obligations would arise – he would have no 
neighbours with which to interact. As such, we can see that the associative obligation 
the neighbour has to keep the stairwell clear arises through interaction with the other 
residents of his building through their joint ownership of the stairwell.   
 Likewise, particularity is as important for non-voluntary associative obligations 
as it is for voluntary ones. However it is often couched in terms of role rather than 
individual. I owe my particular neighbours obligations, rather than the individuals who 
happen to be my neighbours. If some of the bicycle-owner‟s upstairs neighbours move, 
and new people move in, the duty remains the same even if the individuals to whom the 
duty was owed have now changed. Nonetheless, the obligation to keep the stairwell 
clear is not something owed to neighbours in general – suburban single-family dwelling 
life doesn‟t give rise to this kind of neighbourly obligation. It is owed to the particular 
neighbours one happens to have when one happens to have them. A similar feature 
could apply to keeping one‟s pets out of the neighbour‟s flowerbed, if that were a 
genuine obligation of suburban life. It would apply to whoever owned the particular 
flowerbed rather than to a particular individual. 
 Furthermore, the importance of relationships that arise from the kinds of 
interactions that give rise to particular non-voluntary associative obligations illustrates a 
closer connection between the interactions involved and the particularity of the 
associative obligations in question. One has duties as a brother, friend, or neighbour 
because of the interactions implicit in that role, rather than because one happens to fit 
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many of the criteria of that role. Take, for example, Tom, Dick and Harry. Tom and 
Dick have the same biological father but different biological mothers. They knew 
nothing of one another‟s existence until they were adults, but are nonetheless biological 
brothers. Tom and Harry were raised together by the same woman who each 
acknowledges as his mother but who is only biologically related to Tom. Who, in this 
scenario, is more Tom‟s brother? An ambiguity lurks in this question. One could 
reasonably favour the biological or the social and argue in that way. However, if 
brotherhood involves certain ethical obligations – say, for example, the obligation to 
treat a brother‟s children as one‟s nieces and nephews – I think ordinary moral opinion 
would be clearer about that. I think it‟s safe to say that Tom should treat Harry‟s 
children as his nieces and nephews, if there is such an obligation. They share a 
relationship formed through years of interactions that Tom and Dick do not have, and it 
is the relationship founded on interaction on which we base the non-voluntary 
obligation. In the neighbours case it is sharing a stairwell that generates the obligation, 
rather than the mere fact of neighbourhood.  
 The difficulties an autonomy-focused theory will have in accommodating non-
voluntary obligations should be apparent. Autonomy aims to protect an individual‟s 
dignity by safeguarding their ability to live life from within by making meaningful 
choices. If choice is what is central to autonomy, non-voluntary obligations cannot be 
directly legitimized by autonomy. However, the relationship between non-voluntary 
associative obligations and autonomy is more complex than this basic assessment. There 
is more to autonomy than choice, and so a more sophisticated analysis is necessary. 
However, in order to make such an analysis worthwhile we must first show that non-
voluntary obligations are important enough to need accommodating. As such, defending 
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the importance of non-voluntary associative obligations is the focus of the next sub-
section, while assessing the limits of autonomy will be the focus of the following 
section.  
 B. Are associative obligations legitimate? 
 Non-voluntary associative obligations form an important part of our moral 
phenomenology. Nonetheless, denial of their reality is one strategy some use to 
undermine the view that they are legitimate. Some, notably A. J. Simmons, claim that 
belief in the importance of non-voluntary obligations – specifically „associative political 
obligations‟ like the obligation to obey the laws of a jurisdiction – is a product of false 
consciousness.55 However, there are two problems with this view. First, it fails to 
distinguish between the allegedly illicit „political‟ obligations and other, supposedly 
apolitical, non-voluntary obligations that might be genuine. Second, given the 
importance of this phenomenology to ordinary human life, a case that this is a product 
of mass delusion would have to be very strong to be convincing. Simmons‟ arguments 
amount to little more than a repetition of the claim that only voluntary obligations are 
legitimate, which merely begs the question against ordinary moral opinion. 
 Underlying Simmons‟ attack is an implicit division between „political‟ and „non-
political‟ obligations. His primary claim is that associative political obligations are illicit, 
which says nothing explicit about the status of non-political associative obligations.56 He 
claims that advocates for associative political obligations are drawing a false analogy 
between the kinds of obligations among family members and the kinds of obligations 
among citizens. While his intent is to critique this analogy and claim that the way the 
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family works cannot explain the way the state works, this move rests on the validity of 
the claim that there are non-voluntary familial obligations. Simmons‟s reliance on this 
divide is suspect. While the associative political obligation to which Simmons objects is 
the obligation to obey the law, there are a whole spectrum of less strident yet 
nonetheless political obligations that fall short of the basic duty of citizenship. Feminist 
philosophers have been arguing for a generation, convincingly to my mind, that the 
family is itself a political institution.57 Political decisions determine what counts as a 
family and impact deeply on how families arrange their affairs. Likewise, as Aristotle 
recognized, friendship is often political. The highest form of friendship could only exist 
among the ethically [including politically] good,58 and some of the lesser forms of 
friendship were predicated on individuals being of [potentially political] use to one 
another. As such, any critique of the associative obligation to obey the law must show 
that it is substantively different from the rest of the spectrum or attempt to undermine 
the institution of non-voluntary obligations entirely. 
 Some of what Simmons says indicates that he would favour the latter option. 
For example, he does not attempt to distinguish between the obligation to obey the law 
and various other non-voluntary obligations, focusing only on non-voluntary 
obligations. However, denying the existence of any legitimate non-voluntary obligations 
is a very difficult road. What an opponent of non-voluntary associative obligations must 
do is show in some way that, while it is normal to feel the weight of a non-voluntary 
obligation, this feeling nonetheless attaches to a maxim or policy that is not in fact 
obligatory. He must separate out the legitimacy from the phenomenology. One way to 
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do that would be to claim that all and only voluntarily adopted obligations can be 
legitimate. This is, in the end, Simmons‟ tactic. 
 Simmons‟ approach is to deny that the phenomenology involved is actually 
legitimate. Feeling that I ought to obey the law because I happen to be a citizen, rather 
than because I have chosen citizenship, is, for Simmons, inaccurate. This is the most 
robust form of what Scheffler calls the voluntaristic objection.59 As he puts it, „this 
objection does not deny that we often have special duties to people who are related to 
us in certain ways and to the members of various groups with which we are affiliated, 
but it insists that such duties or responsibilities must always arise from our own 
voluntary acts.‟60 A first problem with the voluntaristic objection arises when we ask 
what, then, demarcates the voluntary from the involuntary or the non-voluntary? In 
Simmons‟ work this is combined with a cosmopolitan view of the relationship between 
the individual and the state to support the claim that we can choose what laws pertain to 
us by choosing where we live. However, if the voluntarist‟s target is not simply the 
obligation to obey the law but all non-voluntary associative obligations, then the 
voluntarist seems to treat as identical links between the family, friends, neighbours and 
co-nationals as equally suspect. Are they? This unexplored consequence of Simmons‟ 
approach is troubling to even the narrowest individualist. Even if a voluntaristic 
requirement seems to fit with our basic intuitions about how we interact with our co-
nationals, does it not do great violence to the idea of family? Such rampant voluntarism 
is this kind of consideration that leads David Miller to claim that co-nationality is one of 
those things, like family and friendship, the lack of which is always a loss.61 Even if this 
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is not true of co-nationality (and arguments could be made in either direction on this 
point) it seems unreasonable to deny it about family and friends.  
 Furthermore, the voluntarist objection – even in its weaker, more plausible form 
– seems problematic. The voluntarist claims that obligations arising from non-voluntary 
relationships are not legitimate because they are not voluntary. This presumes, rather 
than proves that only voluntarily adopted obligations, or obligations arising from 
voluntary relationships, are capable of legitimacy. This is a critical issue, and will be dealt 
with fully within the next section, but for the time being I should simply point out that 
this view seems to lead to a dilemma. A voluntarist might claim that some apparently 
non-voluntary relationships are in actuality voluntary, but this seems to fundamentally 
misconstrue the nature of those relationships. On the other hand, a voluntarist might 
argue that obligations arising from non-voluntary relationships are illegitimate 
notwithstanding their importance. However, this kind of voluntaristic fetishism is both 
rare and implausible. Any account of the legitimacy or moral and political obligations 
that cannot explain the demands of family, friendly and neighbourly relationships as 
legitimate seems so remote from ordinary life that almost any other account should be 
preferred. 
 However, there is another, non-voluntaristic objection to non-voluntary 
associative obligations. Scheffler is particularly concerned with explaining what he calls 
the distributive objection.62 This objection claims that the problem with associative 
obligations is not between those involved in the relationships but on the impact these 
demands have on those outside the relationships. This view claims that special 
relationships create a sort of “in-group,” which will lead to disadvantages for those 
                                                 
62
 Scheffler 2002, pp. 56ff.  
 53 
outside the relationships involved. This is particularly important when addressing 
questions of global justice and the distribution of wealth between richer and poorer 
countries. If co-nationals have relationships that give rise to weighty obligations not 
owed to foreigners, and those obligations impact on the distribution of wealth, the rich 
are justified in preserving an unequal distribution of resources and perpetuating global 
injustice under the moral cover of (potentially non-voluntary) special relationships. 
 The first response to note when addressing the distributive objection is that it 
applies equally well to voluntary and non-voluntary associative obligations. It attacks the 
special character of these obligations, rather than their potential for arising from non-
voluntary obligations. Accordingly, the distributive objection does not depend on any 
distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary obligations. Nonetheless, it is 
important since, if it holds, it undermines the important relational character of non-
voluntary obligations. Scheffler‟s first line of defence doesn‟t adequately take this into 
account. In his first assessment of the distributive objection63 he claims it is non-
problematic because it focuses only on the advantages that arise to members of the in-
group through that membership. Essentially, this argument claims that the distributive 
objection ignores the reality that belonging to the in-group is just as likely to increase the 
burdens on a member as to alleviate them. However, as Scheffler later realizes, this is of 
little comfort to the theorist advocating the distributive objection. The distributive 
objector realizes that relationships give rise to benefits and obligations, and objects to 
each equally. It is the reliance on an in-group to legitimize obligations that worry the 
objector. Claiming that these might end up being burdensome to its members does 
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nothing to address whether they are the kinds of things that can give rise to legitimate 
obligation. 
 Accordingly, Scheffler takes a different approach in his later work on associative 
obligations. He defuses the impact of the distributive obligation while recognizing its 
basic legitimacy. All it takes to reconcile the distributive objection with associative 
obligations is to recognize the pro tanto character of the latter. That someone is my 
neighbour or my co-national is a basic reason to favour their interests, but this basic 
reason needs to be weighed against other reasons I have, including the general 
obligation to treat individuals as equally deserving of moral wealth. Where the two 
conflict, we must acknowledge the conflict rather than claim that one or the other is 
simply “not really a reason.” As such, the distributive objection is legitimate insofar as it 
reflects a kind of general duty of fairness in distributing wealth, and non-voluntary 
associative obligations are legitimate as well, even when they conflict. Otherwise, the 
distributive objector must maintain, even more stridently than the voluntaristic objector, 
that relationships are simply not the kind of things that can give rise to legitimate 
obligations. 
II. The Limits of Autonomy 
 In the end, the legitimacy of non-voluntary associative obligations rests on the 
basic intuitions that there are some legitimate maxims and policies that are I do not 
choose but that I am nonetheless wrong not to adopt. No account of the legitimacy of 
moral and political obligations can do justice to these intuitions and use autonomy alone 
as a central principle. Each of these intuitions conflicts with some important aspect of 
autonomy, but two are particularly problematic. The first is that there are relationships 
that are legitimate despite being unchosen. The second is that, from time to time, one‟s 
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non-voluntary obligations will override other, potentially voluntary, obligations. Shades 
of the first problem can be found in Scheffler‟s reply to voluntarism, while the second is 
highlighted in his response to the distributive objection. In the end, this section will 
show that there are legitimate obligations that cannot be accounted for by an autonomy-
focussed theory of the legitimacy of moral and political obligations. Doing this involves 
exposing as false the dilemma mentioned earlier, in which an obligation is either 
construed voluntaristically or dismissed as illegitimate. I will show that neither option is 
really open, and accordingly that a fuller picture of legitimacy requires something more 
than autonomy. 
 A. The Non-Voluntary Character of Obligation 
 The first approach, adopted by voluntaristic theorists ranging in sensitivity from 
the blunt dismissal of Simmons through Kymlicka‟s nuanced and sympathetic 
multiculturalism, is to characterize our obligations as voluntaristic. There are two main 
lines this approach could take. Simmons dismisses the basic intuition as a product of 
false consciousness. This, however, seems too harsh when dealing with such basic moral 
institutions as family and friendships. That overreach makes it a less compelling view 
when it comes to other, less intimate, forms of society like neighbourhood, co-
nationality and citizenship.64 Kymlicka is deeply sympathetic to the demands of culture, 
but he adopts another approach to these obligations that nonetheless misconstrues 
them in an effort to reconcile them with his basic liberal voluntarism.65 His aim is to 
reconcile minority rights with the basic tenets of Rawlsian liberalism. However, by 
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„voluntarizing‟ cultural obligations – characterizing them as involved in advancing the 
demands of individual autonomy – he misconstrues their essential nature. What both 
Simmonds and Kymlicka‟s approaches attempt to do is claim that what we thought were 
non-voluntary obligations either just are voluntary or are intimately connected with other 
voluntary obligations in such a way that to serve the non-voluntary obligations implies 
serving the voluntary obligations. Both of these approaches fail, and so the voluntarist 
cannot truly deny the non-voluntary character of some intuitively central obligations. 
 Central to Simmons‟ arguments against the legitimacy of associative political 
obligations is his claim that their basic intuitional support is a product of false 
consciousness. Simmons seems, through most of his essay, to be arguing against the 
view that all and only obligations arising from association are legitimate, though whether 
this is an accurate characterization of his opponents‟ position is doubtful. He opposes 
the claim that „insofar as membership in political societies clearly carries with it certain 
duties or obligations, the nonvoluntary character of membership entails that our 
political obligations also fall on us independently of our voluntary choices.‟66 As part of 
this, he routinely questions the role and the existence of the basic „intuition of 
belonging‟ that underlies the non-voluntarist‟s position. He asks 
[w]hy would we think that this kind of identification with a social or political 
role is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for possessing a moral 
obligation to abide by the rules of local practice? … Oppressed people are 
frequently brought by long periods of humiliation and indoctrination to identify 
with their subservient roles and to acknowledge as their own the degrading, 
locally assigned obligations of second-class members … And even when 
immoral practices are not at issue, people can mistakenly identify with certain 
social roles (and feel obligated by the locally assigned requirements for these 
roles) … We should not be likely to conclude from such mistaken identification, 
however, that I have certain associative moral obligations for as long as I 
mistakenly identify with a role in this way, but cease to have those moral 
obligations at the moment the truth is revealed. (264) 
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In this key passage, Simmons raises two problems. The first is the possibility of false 
consciousness through unjust coercion. The second is the possibility of false 
consciousness through mistake. The first is a serious concern insofar as it addresses a 
legitimate problem that naturally arises through role-based approaches to obligation. I 
believe the second presents less of a problem for the associative obligation theorist in 
that one could simply accept the intuition Simmons finds controversial. He presents 
three examples: false ethnic identification; mistaken parentage; mistake as to whether 
another is a neighbour.67 In the case of the first example, belief in the importance of a 
particular culture makes that culture important, and would make the cultural obligations 
important to the individual involved. Much the same happens in the case of a religious 
conversion. In the case of mistaken parentage, again, the associative obligation theorist 
can deny the intuition. Parentage, I would claim, is a matter of a social rather than a 
biological relationship, and intuitions to the contrary are misinformed. Finally, if I 
mistake someone for my neighbour this does not mean that I no longer have obligations 
to my neighbour, it only means that I don‟t have obligations to that individual as a 
neighbour. I am mistaken about the reference of the „neighbour‟ indexical, rather than 
about the obligations owed. 
 Simmons‟ more troubling claim is the possibility of genuinely false 
consciousness produced by something tantamount to brainwashing. Whether the 
brainwashing leads an individual to believe they have unjust obligations is not, in itself a 
problem. After all, non-voluntary special duties are prima facie, not ultima facie, 
obligations. They can still be tempered or overridden by more pressing concerns, 
including general duties. Where the brainwashing could be problematic is that it raises 
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the possibility that many of our most deeply held and basic intuitions – about 
obligations to families, friends, and neighbours as well as to our communities at large – 
could be suspect. In the end, however, Simmons will have to do more than raise a 
sceptical spectre for his brainwashing point to be taken seriously. That there have been 
oppressed peoples, and that people in non-oppressive situations also develop adaptive 
preferences, illustrate the reality of the possibility, but they also illustrate the limits of 
that possibility. In the end, Simmons‟ claim deserves much the same reply as all sceptical 
claims; on what basis should we doubt how we feel, particularly when the object of our 
sentiments is something so elemental to society as family, friendship and 
neighbourliness? Without serious evidence showing that these widespread intuitions are 
suspect, we should give little credence to sceptical posturing. 
 Simmons does allow for one other approach to non-voluntary obligations that 
mirrors an approach better explored in Kymlicka‟s work. This involves an attempt to 
voluntarize the apparently involuntary. In Simmons‟ work this is dismissed, justly, as 
contradictory with the basic character of non-voluntary associative obligations, but 
Kymlicka‟s more subtle approach deserves consideration. Liberalism, Community and 
Culture represents Kymlicka‟s attempt to reconcile minority rights with the broad tenets 
of a Rawlsian liberalism that is usually antithetical to them. In the Rawlsian schema, 
Kymlicka claims,  
„individual liberty is so important that the only legitimate ground for restricting a 
particular basic liberty for everyone – like the right of political participation – is 
to secure a more extensive system of overall basic liberties for everyone. And 
the only legitimate ground for unequally distributing such a basic liberty is to 
secure for the less free person a greater system of basic liberty than she 
otherwise would have had. Other than that, “the system of equal liberties is 
absolute.”68 
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For Kymlicka, the trouble here is that many measures taken in otherwise liberal societies 
to protect minority communities, notably North American aboriginal communities, are 
illegitimate under the strict Rawlsian approach to liberty. Measures to restrict voting 
rights, property ownership, and to promote the locally dominant, globally minority 
culture through the education system create further inequalities and not for the benefit 
of the locally disadvantaged. Kymlicka‟s approach is, first, to construe Rawls‟ liberalism 
as grounded on the basic value of self-respect. Consequently, a measure intended to 
enhance self-respect acquires the status of a primary good. He then claims that the 
importance of culture to liberal theorists is in its ability to provide a „context of choice‟69 
according to which individuals can come to make evaluations. Without an important 
array of cultures, individuals cannot „become aware, in a vivid way, of the options 
available to them, and intelligently examine their value.‟70  
There are two different issues that undermine this approach. The first is to 
wonder whether Kymlicka‟s self-respect focused Rawlsianism is adequate. An analysis of 
the role of self-respect in a liberal theory shows that self-respect is associated with 
liberalism, but the nature of that association is debatable. Self-interest could inform 
autonomy, be on a par with autonomy as a consequence of some prior feature, or be 
grounded in autonomy. I think the „grounded in autonomy‟ interpretation is most likely, 
and will briefly attempt to show this. The second problem deals with whether 
approaching minority rights as intended to foster self-respect is true. This problem is 
more important for my purposes. I will show how even if self-respect is a fundamental 
part of autonomy, rather than one of many competing values it generates, this will not 
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reconcile cultural membership with autonomy-only liberalism because doing so 
misconstrues what it means to be a member of a culture.     
 The connection between self-respect and autonomy in Kymlicka is pragmatic. 
Kymlicka claims, following Rawls, that self-respect „isn‟t so much a part of any rational 
plan of life, but rather a precondition of it.‟71 However this is not closely connected with 
his primary justification for minority rights. His main claim is that individuals that lack 
self-respect will not be in a position to take advantage of the opportunities that come 
with being a member of society. This should be clear, given the current conditions of 
aboriginal communities following decades of assimilationist policies.72 Accordingly, 
protections for minority cultures are necessary so that the individuals who are members 
of those societies can come to respect themselves and engage with the broader society. 
Promotion of a single culture within a community is, therefore, good because it allows 
the individuals from that community to better engage with the members of the wider 
culture. 
 It seems, however, that there is a deep conflict between Kymlicka‟s goal here 
and the means he claims are necessary to achieve that goal. Promotion of individual self-
respect is a laudable goal, one completely consistent with, and potentially demanded by, 
liberal individualism. Let us presume, then, that having a „context of choice‟ is a 
necessary condition of self-respect. Two problems arise. First, why does the need for a 
context of choice justify protection of minority cultures? Second, does not the attempt 
to protect minority cultures from the influence of outsiders deny (a) outsiders within the 
minority community the same protection and (b) the members of the minority culture a 
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genuine choice? In the end, understanding these problems will show why an autonomy-
focused approach cannot adequately account for non-voluntary obligations by 
construing them voluntaristically. 
 The importance of cultural membership in helping individuals generate values – 
a major part of living a life from within through making meaningful choices – is 
dubious. Earlier in this work I used Kymlicka‟s claims to illustrate the important role of 
choosing among values as central to the liberal project, contra the communitarian 
critique.73 To now argue that context is a necessary component of choice seems 
awkward, given that a communitarian could make much the same argument. However, 
why does the need for “context” mean that that context must be “cultural” in the 
narrow sense used here? Of course, there must be some “cultural” features that inform 
value judgements: some aspects of life must be considered valuable, whether intrinsically 
or instrumentally, and „aspects of life‟ are the constituent parts of a „culture.‟ However, 
that is not what is meant by „culture‟ in this context. A culture here is a more or less 
stable group of social features like language, political structure, religion and other kinds 
of what Rawls would likely call „basic social institutions.‟ The importance placed on 
culture as providing a „context of choice‟ worthy of protection seems to run counter to 
both the basic principles of justice and to the reality of cultural change Kymlicka 
recognizes in his discussion of the „Quiet Revolution.‟74   
 The kind of practical proposals that follow from Kymlicka‟s argument – 
aboriginal-language only education, restricted non-aboriginal voting rights and property 
rights – might make sense if cultural membership were a primary good, but they also 
seem to undermine their own application. If cultural membership is necessary to 
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provide a context of choice, outsiders who enter into aboriginal communities seem to 
need the same protections from those communities as the aboriginal community seeks 
from the larger body politic. Their „context of choice‟ would be undermined by 
requiring attendance at a native-language only school; by elimination of their rights to 
civic participation; by the instability that comes with denial of property rights. These 
measures seem like an attempt to crystallize aboriginal cultures so that its members can 
then engage with the outside world. However, in attempting to accomplish this sort of 
“reconciliation without assimilation,” we deny the reality of cultural change and fail to 
genuinely reconcile the cultures. We end up ghettoizing one group, thus further 
depriving them of the benefits that come from social cooperation liberalism is meant to 
ensure. That this separation is accomplished in the name of accommodation is the 
ultimate irony. 
 In the end, Kymlicka‟s focus on trying to justify minority rights as „in the service 
of autonomy‟ is misguided. As Berlin frames the issue; 
„The desire for recognition is a desire for something different [from freedom, 
positive or negative]: [it is a desire] for union, closer understanding, integration 
of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice. It is only the 
confusion of desire for liberty with this profound and universal craving for 
status and understanding, further confounded by being identified with the 
notion of social self-direction, where the self to be liberated is no longer the 
individual but the „social whole‟, that makes it possible for men, while 
submitting to the authority of oligarchs or dictators, to claim that this in some 
sense liberates them.‟75 
 
Cultural relationships might advance an individual‟s interests, and therein autonomy, but 
Berlin reminds us that these relationships are not of value only when free, and certainly 
not because they advance the cause of freedom. While a theorist could tie himself in 
knots attempting to reduce the value of cultural membership to some other feature 
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more consistent with autonomy, Kymlicka‟s attempt shows the difficulty. Since 
autonomy is the only central value advanced by contemporary liberalism, that we do 
value such relationships in non-autonomous terms indicates its limits. 
 B. The Importance of Non-Voluntary Obligations 
 But are these limits nonetheless legitimate? The autonomy-focussed theorist has 
one option left – deny the legitimacy of obligations that do not further the ability of an 
individual to live life from within through making meaningful choices. It seems at this 
stage we have entered a war of conflicting intuitions. Those who believe strongly in the 
legitimacy of non-voluntary associative obligations find a particular set of intuitions 
both basic and compelling, and either (a) reject other intuitions as false accordingly or 
(b) reject the view that the two sets are mutually exclusive. I believe either of these 
options is open, but those not convinced by my denial of Simmons‟ contradictory 
intuitions should nonetheless be satisfied with the weaker, latter, option.  
 Simmons need not deny the authenticity of our phenomena. He could, and at 
times does, deny their legitimacy instead. His denial rests on the basic intuition that we 
cannot be held responsible for non-voluntary aspects. For example, while he rejects the 
view that people can have obligations arising from involuntarily identifying as a member 
of a group due to the possibility of false identification, he seems to claim that a 
voluntary identification with the same falsity could nonetheless give rise to legitimate 
moral demands. Voluntariness, here, cures all manner of ills. This seems to rest on 
something akin to Rawls‟ principle of desert: individuals cannot justly benefit from, or 
be harmed by, qualities for which they are not morally responsible. In this principle, 
moral responsibility is closely connected with choice: we deserve the consequences of 
our intentional acts, and not the consequences of our involuntary acts. The basic 
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intuition underlying this approach seems to be a negative one: I am not responsible for 
that which I do not control. There are two ways to counter this view. The first is to 
question its primacy; is this intuition really basic? The second is to question whether it 
really weighs more than the other intuitions in question – that I am right to prefer the 
interests of my family.  
 Ultimately, the view that the intuitions underlying the principle of desert are not 
basic cannot hold. There are better and worse intuitions in a number of spectra: depth, 
pervasiveness, indubitability, and elementariness. These spectra are not discrete; they 
often blend one into the other. Depth is a phenomenological quality – an intuition feels 
deeper or shallower. Pervasiveness is more numerical – a pervasive intuition is one held 
by more people. An indubitable intuition is one the contrary of which is difficult to 
believe or is self-defeating – Descartes‟ cogito is an example. Elementariness is a quality 
of indivisibility – an elementary intuition cannot be easily broken down into more basic 
intuitions. On this view, the intuition underlying the principle of desert is a basic one. It 
is deep, largely pervasive, difficult to contradict, and hard to divide into more minimal 
intuitions. The intuition of responsibility for choice, and non-responsibility for non-
chosen outcomes incites the emotions in a way characteristic of a deep intuition. It is 
common, and satisfies pervasiveness accordingly. It cannot easily be divided into smaller 
intuitions. While it does not have cogito-like certainty, it is still difficult to argue directly 
that the intuition is wrong – it is more plausible that it is simply not ultimate.   
 However, it is equally difficult to dismiss as basic intuitions underlying non-
voluntary associative obligations. This is a version of Bernard Williams‟ „one reason too 
many‟ problem.76 The basic intuition in Williams‟ case is that I am right to save my 
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spouse not simply due to various ethical theories but simply because of our relationship. 
The obligations arise directly from the relationships involved. This intuition also 
matches the depth, pervasiveness, incontradictability and elementality of a basic 
intuition – at least as much as the intuitions on which a voluntarist relies. As such, using 
one intuition against the other will result in a stalemate. Both intuitions are basic, but 
they have many contradictions.  
Given that there are two different, basic intuitions, we cannot reasonably 
dismiss both. Some kind of accommodation is necessary. Kymlicka‟s work illustrates 
one attempt to do this. As mentioned earlier, he attempts to reconcile liberal 
individualism – in which the principle of desert plays a major role – with the importance 
of cultural membership. However, his reductive approach will not work. In the end, 
reductive approaches like this have one or another problems. Either the „more basic‟ 
principle is compromised to explain the „less basic,‟ or vice versa. Kymlicka has the 
second problem; he characterizes cultural membership as legitimate because done for 
the promotion of individual autonomy. For the reasons already discussed, this account 
cannot work. What this failure illustrates is a deeper problem. Part of the importance 
each of these intuitions has is due to their elemental nature – the one cannot be reduced 
to the other in any coherent way without compromising its basic character. This kind of 
reductive reconciliation is too much to ask of basic principles. What is needed is a kind 
of compatibilist accommodation instead. We must (and, in chapters 6 and 7, I will) find 
some way for the principles that arise from these equal yet irreconcilable intuitions to 




III. The Demands on Fraternity 
Simmons‟ assessment of political obligations as depending on an analogy with 
familial obligations is mistaken.77 The link between the obligations of citizenship and the 
obligations of family is not analogy. The basic source of all obligations is not the mere 
existence of separate individuals, but the relations between separate individuals as 
depicted in the relationship between the fact of individuality and the fact of sociality. 
There are two operative terms in this ontology, not just one. In an autonomy-centred 
liberalism, the individual alone is the basic unit of morality because only individuals have 
moral worth. This claim is suspect. While individuals do have moral worth, worth is not 
the only kind of basic property for which moral and political philosophy must account. 
Obligation is another, and obligation cannot directly arise from the separateness of 
persons. Obligations arise because of the other salient term highlighted above: relations. 
That obligations ordinarily attach to individuals does not mean that understanding 
individuality alone, or reducing sociality to some feature of individuality, will suffice to 
explain how they are legitimate. Obligations also attach to communities, to groups, and 
to institutions. As such, the existence of separate individuals is not a sufficient condition 
for the legitimacy of obligations.  Furthermore, that there are separate individuals does 
not necessarily give rise to any obligations in itself. An individual alone on an island will 
generate no new ethical obligations. He may have prior obligations – a promise he made 
to quit smoking, while moot in his current context, is still valid. It is only through 
interaction with others78 that obligations arise. Even autonomy, the central ethical 
principle generated by the fact of human separateness, only gives rise to obligations 
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because of the presence of other individuals in a society, which has to be examined on 
its own to properly understand how those obligations work. 
If we take the relation as the basic unit of obligation, we can see the obligations 
of family and of citizenship as two examples of the same underlying phenomenon. We 
have, involuntarily, relations with our family members and our fellow citizens. The 
former are generated through a life lived together, while the latter are brought about by 
being subject to the same laws (which generate an equal moral obligation on all such 
subjects). In either event obligations come about through interaction, and when those 
obligations come about through involuntary interactions they generate non-voluntary 
obligations. In this formulation, general obligations are simply associative obligations 
owed universally through universal sorts of relations; for example, membership in the 
same species, and occupation of a common planet seem to generate obligations to all.  
 This account is meant to explain the „ordinary moral intuition‟ that I do have 
obligations to others that do not arise from and cannot be explained by my voluntary 
actions. This is, it seems to me, an inescapable feature of basic ethical life for all people. 
A morality that characterizes inescapable features of ordinary human existence as wrong 
is not a morality worth having. While various elements of this schema will play a central 
role in the following chapters, the point here is that there is a prima facie plausible basic 
ontology that can explain non-voluntary obligations alongside general obligations, that 
can account for the duties that arise from a wide array of involvements, and that 
explains our moral phenomenology rather than dismiss it like Simmons‟ anarchist 
approach or omit it like Kymlicka‟s Rawlsianism.  
 This is, as should be apparent, a dualist approach to moral and political 
obligation. Legitimate obligations are generated by relationships governed fraternity, and 
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must, in some way, coalesce with autonomy as the central value of our inherent 
individuality. However, I think what is important here is to find an approach that can 
accommodate, rather than reconcile, fraternity and autonomy. This will leave some 
situations irreconcilable. However, as a methodological maxim, I believe the purpose of 
an account of moral and political obligations is not to find some single unifying 
principle, some ultimate calculus that makes one of many. Often, the best an ethical 
theory can do is account for and explain irreconcilability. „To demand more than this,‟ 
Berlin says,‟ is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow such a need 
to determine one‟s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral 
and political immaturity.‟79 As such, the schema set out in the following chapters will not 
attempt to find right answers to all the difficult questions. Rather, I will try and set out a 
schema that makes clear what makes some questions difficult and accommodate 
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Part II: Options for the   
















In this part I examine three alternative candidates for the normative 
demands of sociality – tradition, impartiality and solidarity – and explain 
why most versions of these do not adequately explain its requirements. 
While each has something to commend it, none can ultimately explain the 
demands of sociality. However, a characterization of fraternity that 
incorporates some of their elements is possible, and will be presented at the 
















Chapter 3: Tradition and the Scope of Sociality 
Abstract 
In this chapter I analyze the demands of tradition as a possible candidate for the 
moral and political demands of our sociality. First, I explain the way in which some 
authors, focussing on Edmund Burke and Roger Scruton, use tradition as a value meant 
to legitimate some of the non-voluntary obligations we discussed in chapter two. Both 
Burke‟s „entailed inheritance‟ approach and Scruton‟s „cultural‟ approach face serious 
problems that make them unacceptable candidates to explain the ethical demands of our 
sociality. In addition to potential problems of internal consistency that would undermine 
any candidate, tradition cannot be universalized in the way a principle of fraternity must. 
 
I. Introduction: Preliminary Considerations 
 While this chapter will focus on the question of whether tradition can play the 
role required of a principle of fraternity in explaining the basic demands of sociality, a 
note explaining the methodology of this section will be helpful at the outset. This part 
of my thesis is devoted to explaining what sociality requires. I will proceed by examining 
a series of potential candidates, looking both at their philosophical value – measured by 
internal consistency and ability to explain the phenomena in question – and at whether 
they are appropriate for the role at the heart of this enquiry. At the end of the second 
chapter we saw that there are things a principle of respect for fraternity must be able to 
do if it is to adequately explain our basic sociality and represent its demands. We are 
looking for a principle that is universalizable, that can explain the kind of alterity 
involved in non-voluntary obligations, and that is consistent with the version of 
autonomy as a life led from within through meaningful choice presented in chapter one. 
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Three major candidates seem to fit some, if not all, of these criteria, and should be 
examined to determine whether they fit. In this chapter I examine whether tradition is 
an appropriate value to place at the core of fraternity, while in the two that follow I look 
to impartiality and solidarity.  
 The importance of reconciling fraternity with autonomy cannot be overstated. 
Nonetheless, unlike the other constraints noted above, it is methodological rather than 
substantive. Like any concept, there will be multiple interpretations of fraternity that are 
both internally consistent and that meet the substantive criteria. What we should do is 
favour the version of fraternity that best accords with our substantive criteria but seems 
least likely to conflict problematically with autonomy. Whether such a version is 
possible remains to be demonstrated, but I believe that it is. This methodological 
principle will, I believe, play a key role, but that will become more apparent as the 
examination of the candidate value unfolds. For the time being, the question of 
compatibility with autonomy can remain in the background as a straightforward 
methodological constraint. 
 The substantive criteria are more important for this part of the paper. The first 
of these, universality, illustrates the scope of a moral and political demand. Any 
individual can, prima facie, be in a society with any other individual or any group of 
individuals, depending only on circumstances. Simply put, almost any encounter of 
more than one person is a kind of society in this context. Consequently, the values 
incorporated in the principles by which societies are governed must be capable of being 
applied in this universal way. This is not to say that a principle must give the same result 
for every individual in the same situation, but that a principle must be capable of giving 
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some answer to every individual in the same situations.80 It must, so to speak, cover the 
field. Tradition fails this standard. In most of its advocated versions, tradition as a social 
value is of dubious value on general philosophical grounds – it is potentially incoherent 
and has little explanatory power at the level of bare sociality – but it also has trouble on 
methodological grounds. I raise them nonetheless because the non-universalizability of 
tradition shows the way to the next possible candidate, impartiality, which I will discuss 
in chapter four to follow.  
 The second of the substantive criteria arises from the limitations of autonomy. 
A theory of moral and political legitimacy cannot hope to be accepted as explaining 
sociality if it cannot explain what it is that makes certain institutions legitimate even 
though they are not freely chosen and what makes their rejection always a loss. It is this 
criterion that makes tradition attractive. It seems like tradition might have some 
normative force that can explain why certain non-voluntary obligations, including family 
obligations and the general duty to obey the law, are legitimate. Nonetheless, I think the 
problems that tradition faces in satisfying my other criteria undermine this apparent 
ability to explain the kind of alterity involved in non-voluntary obligations.  
 In this chapter I will conduct the first of the three examinations required. I will 
examine two different accounts of what tradition involves and how it offers an account 
of the legitimacy of the kind of non-voluntary obligations discussed in chapter two. The 
first version is Edmund Burke‟s „entailed inheritance‟ approach to tradition. This 
approach claims that we have certain rights and liberties and duties because our 
forbearers acquired them and passed them on to us in trust for future generations. The 
non-voluntary obligations may be some of these entailed obligations. Alternatively, 
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Roger Scruton‟s conservative traditionalism involves the claim that our culture 
legitimates non-voluntary obligations. His approach here is akin to the Hegelian 
Sittlichkeit, but without the idealist metaphysics or methodology. While this position is 
more plausible than Burke‟s, it nonetheless has serious conceptual and methodological 
difficulties that preclude it from playing the role of fraternity in an explanation of the 
normative requirements of sociality.  
II. Tradition and the Social 
 On the surface, tradition does not seem to arise from sociality in the way some 
other candidates might. Nonetheless, for some thinkers, it meets some of the criteria of 
a legitimating value and plays some of the roles sociality must. Tradition‟s answer to the 
question of why some relationships have an unchosen value comes from cultural 
background of the people involved in those relationships. I call this view traditionalism, 
though it is often seen in various strands of conservative political thought. In this 
section I will distinguish between conservatism, which includes many general moral and 
political principles also found in other approaches, and traditionalism, which is simply 
one aspect of contemporary conservatism, focussed on the legitimating potential of 
tradition. I will then show that the proponents of traditionalism face a dilemma. It can 
be interpreted strongly, so as to give a substantive role to the purported traditions. This 
strong interpretation, however, is a myopic traditionalism, out of sync with many basic 
features of ordinary social life that are subject to change without losing their legitimacy. 
The weak interpretation, soft traditionalism, while consistent with reality, is nonetheless 
inconsistent with the universalizability criterion and is ill suited to serve as a principle 
representing the demands of sociality. 
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 A. Burke and Tradition as Inheritance 
 Tradition plays a central substantive role in conservative thought. Nonetheless, 
what constitutes conservatism is a point of great dispute, not in the least because of its 
position in the claims of partisans and opponents in the political arenas of most western 
democracies. Nonetheless, the patchwork nature of conservatism is found in its earliest 
clear exposition – Edmund Burke‟s Reflections on the Revolution in France. Originally a letter 
to distinguished members of the French Assemblé National, the author‟s reaction to the 
revolution, and to claims that the revolution is consistent with the English „Glorious‟ 
Revolution of 1688, provides a number of possible sources and principles of 
conservative thought. However, several of those are more matters of political, moral 
and jurisprudential good sense. Two exemplary candidates are prudence and argument 
by analogy. Prudence, Burke claims, is a key conservative virtue. His view of prudence is 
best summed up in the now-cliché proverb „fools rush in where angels fear to tread.‟81 
However, in this way, prudence is more of an ordinary virtue that could be adopted by 
liberals, libertarians, or communitarians. Liberals need not be radicals, and 
communitarians have often looked like conservatives with the emphasis they put on 
social cohesion and the importance of tradition in establishing inflexible social roles.82 
Likewise, argument by analogy – the principle that new rules should be made in a 
manner consistent with old rules according to the analogousness of the new situations 
with old – plays a critical role in the jurisprudence of every common law court and has 
since their foundations in the middle ages. Liberal and conservative judges use it, but 
simply draw different analogies from similar facts and legal principles. 
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 The legitimating role of tradition is the truly distinctive feature of conservative 
thought. For Burke, the source of rights, responsibilities and other features of the 
English constitution provides those features with their value. „The idea of a liberal 
descent,‟ he says, „inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity … By this means 
our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a 
pedigree and illustrating ancestors.‟83 The importance of pedigree in this argument by 
analogy is key. Like a show-dog, the basic rights and obligations of Englishmen derive 
their value not simply from their current usefulness or attractiveness (a difference 
between late-18th century conservatives and reformers like Bentham) but from the line 
of their descent.  
 While the “pedigree” argument by analogy is an interesting one, it is not Burke‟s 
primary argument for the legitimacy of tradition. Burke‟s main focus is on rights as an 
„entailed inheritance.‟84 An inheritance is something passed from one generation to the 
next, but an entailed inheritance is an inheritance subject to conditions. In this case, the 
conditions are twofold – preservation and acquisition. First, the rights are passed on 
subject to the condition that they be preserved for the next generation. Such restrictions 
were once more common in property arrangements, like family heirlooms and manorial 
houses, but have become rare in our culture and are often overruled by contemporary 
courts. Second, these arrangements „leave acquisition free; but [they] secure what [they] 
acquire,‟85 for future generations. Unlike his mention of „pedigree,‟ Burke‟s discussion of 
inheritance is not an argument by analogy. Burke is speaking literally about a matter he 
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believes to be empirical fact when he talks of the importance of inheritance to the 
legitimacy of the rights of Englishmen. He says 
„You will observe, that from the Magna Charta to the Declaration of right, it 
has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our 
liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers and to be 
transmitted to our posterity; as an estate specially belonging to the people of 
this kingdom without any reference whatever to any other more general or 
prior right.86 
 
This statement shows the importance of inheritance as a legitimating concept in 
conservative thought. What is legitimate in a conservative interpretation of a political or 
moral scheme is that which is grounded in an inheritance relationship. The “general or 
prior” rights any citizens might have are of no value in determining the legitimacy of the 
rights in question. Accordingly, they are legitimate whether they are chosen or not, and 
indeed because of the „entailed‟ quality, they cannot be shirked or sundered because of 
the impact of this change on the liberties and obligations of future generations.  
 While Burke usually spoke about rights and liberties, he would also include the 
obligations of Englishmen in his entailment. A principle of tradition like Burke‟s could 
attempt to explain the legitimacy of various non-voluntary obligations, then, by claiming 
that they are an entailed inheritance that one does wrong in failing to observe and 
preserve. Take, for example, the case of family obligations. Parents have certain rights 
over and certain duties to their children that are not voluntary. That these rights are a 
part of the tradition of a society might explain why they are legitimate much as 
precedent determines judgements in a court governed by stare decisis. How well this 
works will be examined in the following sections, but I note here that it is not prima facie 
implausible. 
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 B. Scruton and Culture as a Legitimating Value 
More contemporary resonances can be found in a number of conservative and 
not-quite conservative authors. David Miller‟s approach to nationality is partly 
analogous to, and partly reliant on, a traditionalist approach to legitimacy. Nationality, 
like tradition, can require the allegiance of its members over and above any choices they 
might make.87 Nonetheless, he attempts to distinguish himself from what he calls 
„Conservative Nationalists,‟ like Roger Scruton. While national membership, when 
present, requires some loyalty in Miller‟s view, for Scruton and conservatives, the term 
used is „piety.‟88 Scruton is best known for his work in aesthetics, but his interest in that 
field comes from an underlying moral and political conservatism much like Burke‟s 
traditionalism. A society‟s cultural inheritance, particularly its high culture, is what 
demarcates one society from others and must, especially in a non-religious society, serve 
as the template from which that society draws its ethical doctrines and lessons.89 We 
learn what duties we owe because of the appreciation of the art objects of our culture – 
its stories, poems, sculpture, architecture, etc. This serves to reinforce the conservative 
claim that various ethical norms are valid because of their grounding in a common 
culture.90  
Scruton‟s views are not new. If anything they are a form of ethical Hegelianism 
without the idealist metaphysics or the dialectical methodology. The foundation of 
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morals is not located in the individual or rational choice but in the adherence to the 
„transcendent‟ or „objective‟ standards of the community. Scruton claims, 
Impiety is the refusal to recognize as legitimate a demand that does not arise 
from consent or choice. And we see that the behaviour of children toward 
their parents cannot be understood unless we admit this ability to recognize a 
bond that is “transcendent,” that exists, as it were “objectively,” outside the 
sphere of individual choice. It is this ability that is transferred by the citizens 
from hearth and home to place, people and country. The bond of society – as 
the conservative sees it – is just such a transcendent bond, and it is inevitable 
that the citizen will be disposed to recognize its legitimacy, will be disposed, 
in other words, to bestow authority on the existing order.91  
 
The success of the central conservative claim – that society imposes unchosen 
but legitimate moral obligations on individuals through tradition – does not depend on 
whether one accepts the claims about children and parents. Scruton does, but at this 
point that example is meant as an illustration rather than an argument. In grounding the 
legitimacy of ethical principles in membership in a society, Scruton starts conservatism 
down the path to traditionalism, but only because society is viewed as the bearer of 
culture and tradition.  
Scruton is explicit about his belief that consent is not required for political 
legitimacy. Like me, he partly uses the family to make this case. In The Meaning of 
Conservatism, family operates as an analogy with society. „The family,‟ Scruton says, „is a 
small social unit which shares with civil society the singular quality of being non-
contractual, if arising not out of choice but out of natural necessity.‟92 In this statement 
civil society is the group from which a culture arises. Natural necessity could be 
understood as claiming that the family is beyond political legitimation, but this version 
would run into the same problems as the Rawlsian take, as amply illustrated by the 
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feminist critique.93 Alternatively, it could mean that whatever their source, choice or 
natural necessity, the family and civil society are legitimate institutions because of the 
role they play in individual lives. Since tradition is the constitutive principle of these 
institutions, it is the principle by which maxims and policies are declared legitimate or 
illegitimate within them. While this approach has problems it does not rely on an 
arbitrary distinction between types of societies and should be preferred here accordingly. 
Scruton‟s claim is that the insufficiency of choice in explaining legitimate 
institutions necessarily leads to the view that tradition plays the legitimating role. While 
my full arguments against this view will follow in the next section, one point is required 
first. In Scruton‟s view society legitimately demands allegiance, and it is in viewing 
allegiance as an end, rather than as a means, that his conservatism comes to depend on 
the value of tradition. It is through viewing traditions as constitutive of a society that 
observance of those traditions is seen to entail the acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
society constituted by them. In other words, Scruton claims that by participating in the 
rites of a given society, I declare myself a member of that society and furthermore that 
the society‟s control over me is legitimate. The American Pledge of Allegiance, or 
standing for national anthems, are examples, but Scruton‟s preferred example involves 
the British monarchy. 
Consider the Enligishman‟s allegiance to the Crown, as he envisages and enacts 
it … It is not the personal qualities of the Queen that draw the Englishman to 
her, not is it any considered knowledge of the function and the history of the 
Crown. It is rather a sense of the monarch as a symbol of nationhood, as an 
incarnation of the historical entity of which he is a part.94 
 
In this example, the allegiance owed does not depend on knowledge of the tradition, but 
on respect for the tradition without any demand for knowledge. That a policy or 
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practice is a part of the society‟s tradition is sufficient to render it legitimate. To fail to 
observe these practices would violate tradition and be illegitimate within society or 
tantamount to declaring oneself outside the social union: far too heavy a price to pay for 
a choice to be meaningful. 
II. The Inadequacy of Tradition – Applicability and Universality.  
There are two problems with the view that tradition provides an explanation of 
the ethical demands of the social.95 The first is that tradition, particularly interpreted in 
Scruton‟s strong sense, does not seem to fit with a comprehensive view of what people 
are basically like. In this, it corresponds closely to several of the problems Amartya Sen 
raises for identity politics in Identity and Violence. The second problem with tradition as a 
central social value is that it does not fit one of the important substantive criteria we 
found in the last chapter. Tradition is not universalizable. In Scruton‟s formulation it 
does not intend to be, but in other formulations it could appear so. Nonetheless, I 
believe it is not universalizable in the way that a candidate for the normative 
requirements of sociality should be. I believe it is quite possible to be ungoverned by 
tradition and nonetheless subject to the kind of unchosen demands important to 
sociality. 
A. The Applicability of Tradition 
 In my view Scruton‟s faith in the non-controversial nature of his examples is 
misplaced. Institutions he presumes legitimate need not be. While Scruton exempts the 
family from the social sphere, this exemption is not as thorough as it seems. The 
interconnectedness of civil society and the family is easily seen when we consider the 
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example of an abusive family. If the parents are raising their children in ways that 
conflict with the interests of society, civil society is permitted or compelled to 
intervene.96 However, if the family is a self-contained source of legitimacy, on what does 
society ground the legitimacy of its intervention? Two possibilities present themselves. 
In the first instance, the society could intervene because happenings in the family sphere 
impact on the social sphere. If a family is sufficiently dysfunctional it may impede on the 
sphere of the social through involving the criminal justice system in its actions or by 
creating children who become a burden on society, either through reduced capacities or 
through active criminal behaviour. Alternatively, a society could recognize that what 
counts as a family is not some sort of universal constant. Families are mutable, 
particularly in the sense that the sphere of individuals to whom a duty is owed changes 
between societies. Some norms are constant – while the children are in their minority, 
parents have duties of care to their children, and children have duties of obedience to 
their parents; every society has incest-related taboos – but other norms are equally 
important for a society but are nonetheless not universal. In some cultures, heterosexual 
married couples move to the husband‟s family‟s village, while in others they gravitate 
toward the wife‟s kin. In some polygamy is accepted, while in others it is forbidden. In 
certain western sub-cultures (which Scruton would probably call decadent in the 
classical meaning of the term), close-knit groups of friends take on many of the care 
responsibilities normally reserved for family members. The notion of a university as an 
„alma mater‟ arose from its role of taking on the family‟s supervisory and care role, a 
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practice that continues in many cases despite changes in the notions of what constitutes 
„care‟ for a young adult. 
For a traditionalist, either of these options is acceptable, but each raises 
problems. Recognition of the impact of one sphere of life on another is not problematic 
in itself, but over the long term can expose a traditionalist to another set of problems. 
As spheres interact, changes in one sphere will demand changes in others, and 
sometimes tradition will be silent on how to approach these changes. Burke and Scruton 
speak of an „analogistic‟ approach to gradual change, but there are times when the 
analogy approach is not necessarily conclusive, nor is it necessarily gradual. In federal 
constitutions, some powers are reserved to the national government while others are 
reserved to regional governments. However, problems arise in determining what 
happens when an action involves elements the affect both jurisdictions, and in dealing 
with new matters not addressed under the original constitution. International relations 
are usually reserved to federal governments, while the power to implement social 
programs are usually regional. However, international agreements often require local 
implementation. Likewise, whole new issues, like environmental protection and 
telecommunications, require legislation but since there is no clear delineation, whatever 
principle we adopt must find a way to address these problems. However, sometimes 
tradition will speak for both possible solutions to the jurisdictional problem. It can, in 
other words, contradict itself and is of no help in determining a legitimate outcome 
here.  
Furthermore, societies can change such that traditions once considered valuable 
become obsolete or offensive, indicating that what is really valuable is not tradition for 
tradition‟s sake. Quebec in the 1960s underwent what is usually called the „quiet 
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revolution.‟ In the late 1950s, Quebec was an impoverished, culturally backward 
province. Its education, infant mortality, birth, and marriage rates were more similar to 
third world countries than any of the other Canadian provinces. Its primary moral and 
political influence was the Catholic Church. However, by the mid 1960s it was more 
ethically liberal, more nationalistic, better educated and less religious than any other 
province in Canada. Consequently, what was once considered a valuable tradition like 
schooling in strict Catholic schools for francophone children became an unwanted 
oppression. Without serious outside influence, a society changed such that policies 
tradition would have legitimated were no longer really legitimate for that society.97 
Similar circumstances happened in Spain following Franco‟s death and following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.98 Spain‟s example has mirrored Quebec‟s in the shift from 
conservative Catholicism to liberal individualism, while near-libertarian individualism 
has taken root in the formerly collectivist parts of Russia. 
A traditionalist can nonetheless account for some of these problems of 
coherence. One could claim that in changing particular traditions, the society is 
nonetheless protecting others. The decline of the importance of Catholicism in Quebec 
coincided with a rise in Québécois nationalism, such that the traditionalist could claim 
that the rejection of the former tradition was connected to the protection of the more 
valuable latter. There is, indeed, some evidence for this. Likewise, in Spain, the decline 
of many centralizing traditions, including, again, Catholicism, can be connected with 
efforts to protect other decentralizing traditions. The rise in Catalan, Basque and 
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Galician nationalism in the years following Spain‟s transition to democracy seems to 
evidence this fact. Still, there is a contradiction here, as one tradition – the nationalism – 
seems to be in conflict with a second – religion – such that tradition itself leaves no way 
of deciding among these.  
The problem these examples illustrate is that even if some version of tradition 
could be found that was internally consistent, it could not fit the facts of contemporary 
life. In explaining how this works I will first explain how there are two different „facts of 
pluralism.‟ One is Rawls‟, and traditionalists claim to be able to address this.99 This is the 
fact that different people can reasonably disagree about the nature of the good. In 
traditionalist language, this is equivalent to saying that different people have different 
traditions. These people would then not genuinely be in society with one another, even 
if they manage to coexist through a modus vivendi or an overlapping consensus. The other 
is Sen‟s. This fact of pluralism is like Rawls‟ only it reminds us that individuals can, and 
almost always do, have more than one set of ultimate ends.100 In traditionalist language, 
this translates as individuals have multiple traditions and belong to multiple societies. 
This raises the possibility of internal conflict of the sort for which traditionalists do not 
ordinarily account.  
The fact of pluralism in Rawls is the social fact that different people can reach 
different reasonable conclusions about the nature of the good. In the terms of a 
traditionalist, where what is good is determined by the traditions a person is obliged to 
respect, this means people are bound to different, potentially incompatible traditions. 
On the surface, this seems problematic for a traditionalist. After all, it sure seems like 
people with different traditions form one society from time to time. Scots, English and 
                                                 
99
 Rawls 1993.  
100
 Sen 2005.  
 85 
Welsh, after all, have different traditions or different approaches to the same traditions, 
leading to different evaluations of the same maxims or policies in either case. 
Nonetheless, they are British as well, and form part of the same society in that way. 
However, a traditionalist can account for this much as Rawls accounts for different 
conceptions of the good. A traditionalist can claim that there is an overlapping tradition 
that binds all these supposedly distinct societies together that runs through the set of 
traditions each member is bound to observe. It would thus simply be a part of what it is 
to be Scottish, Welsh and English that one is also British. 
Nonetheless, this example highlights an additional difficulty for the traditionalist 
that cannot be escaped as easily. The second fact of pluralism is not that individuals 
have different conceptions of the good, it is that any single individual likely has multiple, 
potentially conflicting, conceptions of the good. Each individual is a plurality of goods, 
or in traditionalist terms, a plurality of traditions and a member of multiple societies. 
This perspective becomes clearest in Amartya Sen‟s Identity and Violence. In a social 
context, any individual is not normally associated exclusively with one identity. In Sen‟s 
case, he is Bengali, British, Anglophone, Son, Father, Husband, Professor, Alumnus, 
Supervisor, Economist, Laureate, etc. He, like anyone, is the sum of multiple different 
identities, each with their own particular claims to his allegiance. A traditionalist should 
claim that as a member of each society, he is bound to observe the traditions of that 
particular society. However, the sheer number of possible identities should make clear 
the difficulties involved in this. An example, focussing on the important traditions that 
attach to nationality, should suffice to illustrate the problem. 
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 Traditionalists are often inclined to adopt something like „the cricket test‟ in 
determining social membership.101 This was seriously proposed as a method of 
determining whether someone was „truly British‟ or whether one still bore more 
allegiance to another country by watching how that person cheers in a cricket match. 
Aside from obvious problems of limitation (plenty of people don‟t care about cricket, or 
any sport), scope (some people cheer for quality of play or other factors rather than 
partisan nationality), and forgery (people can pretend to cheer for a country), the cricket 
test fails to account for the second fact of pluralism. Any one person can have multiple 
legitimate reasons for each side of a conflicting decision, even when both reasons are of 
the same kind. As Sen explains, a person of Bengali origin who has lived their entire 
adult life in the UK could easily feel compelled to cheer for both, and could do so. They 
could simultaneously feel joy for the victors and sorrow for the defeated. They are 
partial to multiple, conflicting traditions, or they could be partial to no tradition at all.   
There are two difficulties here. The first is that traditions, even in their more 
dispute-resolution modes, can conflict, and do not necessarily provide any way of 
recognizing or resolving those conflicts. Second, there comes a point at which tradition 
is silent. Just as we are unlikely to have basic philosophical intuitions about extremely 
unusual ethical dilemmas, there comes a point beyond which tradition has nothing to 
say because the members of a society have not necessarily encountered anything 
analogous to a situation before. Such conflicts and such novelty are ordinary parts of the 
human experience. Together, they undermine tradition‟s claim to provide an explanation 
of the ethical demands of sociality because of internal contradictions within the 
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principle of tradition itself. If it cannot keep its conceptual house in order it cannot 
represent the normative element of our sociality. 
B. The Universality of Tradition 
 The second major problem with tradition is that its view of society is too narrow 
for it to play the role of a central legitimating value. There might be some types of 
society in which tradition plays a role in making some policies legitimate, but that sphere 
is not the broader sphere of the ethical demands generated by the bare kind of sociality 
at issue here. The crux of tradition‟s problem is that it cannot be universalized. There 
are several different approaches to universality, and it is clear on examination that 
tradition meets none of them. The three main approaches are the empirical approach, 
the rationalist approach, and the transcendental approach. An empirical approach looks 
to instances of society and determines by induction whether tradition is a necessary part 
of each of those collectives. A rationalist approach attempts to derive the central 
legitimating value from some a priori feature of our sociality. Neither of these 
approaches is particularly promising for the traditionalist. Finally, a transcendental 
approach asks whether tradition is a necessary precondition of any social ethical 
demands. While this seems more like what most traditionalists, including Scruton, have 
attempted, counter-examples abound and undermine this possible approach. 
 The traditionalist claims that tradition plays the same role in society as nature 
plays in the family, and attempts to give examples to support this claim. Arguing by 
example is sometimes effective, but it depends both on the effectiveness of the 
examples and the immunity to counter-example. As I discussed above, the examples 
used by Scruton and Burke – particularly of political institutions like the crown – are 
highly mutable entitles. In Burke‟s case, his example of the continuity involved in the 
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„Glorious‟ Revolution is greatly overstated, and is further undermined when one looks 
to the English Reformation, a hundred and fifty years before the „glorious‟ revolution.102 
A society persists, and can persist legitimately, even after one or more radical changes in 
their political institutions. France has seen five republics, two monarchies, and a couple 
of dictatorships over the last 220 years but persists nonetheless, despite Burke‟s 
warnings to the contrary. Countries have rejected many of their founding traditions 
when the content of their inheritances have become too burdensome. The United 
States, with a great deal of difficulty, rejected slavery. Many south-east Asian nations 
have rejected or vastly curtailed their monarchies. My home province of Newfoundland 
rejected a tradition of independence to join Canada when the economic burdens of 
autonomy overwhelmed that freedom‟s value. Newfoundland, Nepal, Japan, and 
America continue to exist even though they have had radical institutional change. When 
looking at the world more broadly than Burke or Scruton we find not only that the 
examples they use are suspect, but that counter-examples abound. 
 A rationalist approach, one that tries to derive traditionalism from some a priori 
principle of society, remains largely untried by traditionalists. While a transcendental 
argument would claim that some kind of concept of tradition was a necessary condition 
of the possibility of society, a rationalist argument would claim that the existence of 
society necessarily generates tradition as a legitimating value. Set aside, for the moment, 
the concerns about the possibility of generating an “ought” from an “is,” since we 
should consider society as something already normative. How, then, could tradition be 
generated by society in such a way as to be a necessary component of any legitimate 
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society? I claim it cannot. The non-voluntary obligations at the core of society do not 
depend on any kind of tradition to be legitimate, nor do they automatically generate 
traditions of their own. Tradition requires a host of background features that would not 
be present in many fleeting collectives or in the early stages of more permanent 
societies. Again, this is not to say that tradition might not be an important, even 
necessary, feature of some kinds of societies. It is, rather, to say that tradition is not an 
essential feature of the kind of sociality at the root of all societies.  
 These problems also seem to pose a problem for a transcendental approach to 
tradition as a central legitimating value. Nonetheless, the argument would run in the 
opposite direction from a rationalist approach. It would claim, as Scruton does, that one 
only has a society when one has a set of established traditions to provide a moral 
education.103 I believe this mistakes an epistemic for a ontological solution, and even 
then is short-sighted. We may only “know” that we have a society – in some rather 
advanced sense of the term like nation or community – when we have a set of 
traditions, but that does not mean that without the traditions we have only some kind of 
proto-society. Societies exist whether we are aware of their existence, or their practices, 
or not. However, even if we accepted Scruton‟s order of explanation, tradition is still 
inadequate as a condition of the possibility of society. Some trivial instances of society – 
individuals passing one another on a street; fellow passengers on a train – are too 
fleeting to develop traditions, yet they are nonetheless collectives that entail moral and 
political obligations of the kind a principle of fraternity must explain.  
 There may be some kinds of societies in which tradition is a necessary 
legitimating criterion; societies that cannot be understood without understanding how 
                                                 
103
 Scruton 2007. 
 90 
they are governed by various sorts of traditions. However, not all societies have this 
feature. Since we are looking here for the most basic kind of legitimating criterion – one 
that applies to all possible collectives, however durable or fleeting – tradition is 




























Chapter 4: Impartiality and the Demands of Sociality  
Abstract 
In this chapter I will examine the second of the two most plausible candidates 
for a principle reflecting the demands of the fact of sociality – impartiality. This is the 
view, best expressed by Nagel, that liberal societies are premised both on partiality to 
the self and objective impartiality. I believe impartiality faces a dilemma, neither horn of 
which allows it to legitimate the kinds of maxims and principles a principle of sociality 
must justify. While there is one sense in which impartiality might be a central value, I 
believe this sense – the sense called second-order impartiality by Brian Barry – is too 
vague to be genuinely useful in determining whether a maxim or policy is legitimate 
unless it also implies the other, more specific, sense. However, the more specific, first-
order sense of impartiality – more akin to the kind used by Nagel – is far too closely 
linked to autonomy to helpfully explain the kind of non-voluntary, relationship-based 
maxims the second principle is meant to address. 
Introduction 
 Impartiality, in one form or another, is the principle adopted most often by 
liberals to explain the normative implications of sociality. It is not, in my view, up to the 
task. The two authors who are clearest about the importance of impartiality in 
explaining how maxims and policies are legitimated in a liberal society are Thomas 
Nagel and Brian Barry, and as such my efforts in this chapter will focus on 
demonstrating the inadequacy of their proposals.  
 At the outset of Justice as Impartiality, Barry makes the critical point that there are 
two different levels of impartiality. First-order impartiality requires individuals to act 
from impartial motives or according to impartial reasons in choosing what to do and 
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how to live.104 This kind of impartiality is not what liberals have in mind, Barry claims, 
and is unnecessary to ensure the success of the important, second-order kind of 
impartiality they believe is required for a just society. He then shifts to focus on second-
order impartiality, the kind of impartiality involved in establishing social norms at the 
abstract level of an original position. This kind of impartiality faces a critical dilemma 
that leaves it unable to adequately explain the demands of sociality. In the first section, I 
explain how impartiality works in Barry and in Nagel. In Nagel‟s case it is the principle 
arising from the standpoint of the collective, and maxims or policies that an individual 
would like to pursue are to be examined in its light to determine whether they are 
legitimate. In Barry‟s case, impartiality is the central requirement of justice, 
accommodating both autonomy and equality in much the same way Nagel‟s „two 
standpoints‟ approach tries. However, Barry‟s synthesis here leaves some dangerous 
ambiguities that come into focus in the critical sections to follow. 
I. The Case for Impartiality: Nagel and Barry 
 Nagel makes the connection between sociality and impartiality clearly, but it 
plays an even more significant role in Barry‟s approach to justice. In the first subsection 
I discuss how impartiality plays the role of the normative requirements of sociality in 
Nagel, in order to demonstrate the problems with this approach in the next section. 
Nagel discusses impartiality, framed in terms of equality, as one of two criteria a maxim 
or policy must accord with in order to be legitimate. Then, I will explain how Barry tries 
to develop a theory of justice grounded in impartiality as its central value, incorporating 
both autonomy and equality, which he, following Nagel in a certain way, takes to 
represent the normative demands of sociality. Once we understand how impartiality 
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works in these accounts we will be in a better position to understand why it cannot 
address the demands of sociality. 
A. Nagel and Impartiality as the requirements of sociality 
 Nagel begins, as I do, from the methodological view that there are two basic 
ineliminable factors, each of which generates independent demands that a moral and 
political philosophy must appreciate and reconcile. Furthermore, he appreciates that 
these factors must both be, in some respect, a part of the individual. That is, insofar as 
individuals choose from among, and determine the legitimacy of, maxims and policies 
pursuant to principles that accord with one or another of the two standpoints, the 
demands of those principles must be acknowledged and balanced by an individual agent. 
However, Nagel quickly moves from this internalization of the demands of sociality to 
the claim that the sociality requires the individual to assess his desires, wishes, plans, and 
reasons for action according to the impartial perspective. I will first discuss what the 
impartial perspective, in Nagel‟s view, consists in before I assess its demands. Then I 
attempt to explain why Nagel thinks that impartiality is what sociality requires.  
 We start, for Nagel, in our own partial viewpoint, but given this, he claims, we 
are only one abstraction away from understanding the impartial point of view. „Nothing 
further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory,‟ 
he claims, juxtaposing this sort of abstraction from the more advanced kind of 
abstraction involved in scientific theorizing.105 This is not, however, to claim that the 
impartial point of view is all that is required for ethical theorizing. To do this would 
omit the importance of partiality and individuality. What Nagel ultimately proposes then 
is a two standard test. For a maxim or policy to be legitimate in the lights of each of the 
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two factors it must be both partially and impartially acceptable. As I explained in 
Chapter 1, Nagel‟s approach to the partial point of view accords nicely with the value of 
autonomy as other liberals characterize it, but his focus on impartiality here is unique. 
 Impartiality, in Nagel‟s view, requires that the individual making the judgement 
about whether a maxim or policy is legitimate ensure that that maxim or policy respects 
a certain kind of equality among individuals. The role of equality is critical here, since it 
is not the only option a theorist interested in impartiality might have chosen. From the 
impartial view it is not obvious that every individual‟s interests are of equal weight. 
Some individuals will have plans that will ameliorate the condition of a great many 
people, while others have goals that will make a great many other people worse off. 
Impartiality could concern itself with the promotion of the plans of the former 
individuals and with condemning the plans of the latter group. This is Hare‟s approach 
to impartiality, but it is not how impartiality works in Nagel.106 Hare‟s maximalization 
approach violates the kind of autonomy liberals hold important, which is one of the two 
aspects Nagel has in mind when he talks about „the duality of the self.‟ Impartiality is the 
other. „If we accept the duality of the self,‟ Nagel says, „then from the impersonal 
standpoint two general judgements will emerge which there is no obvious way of 
combining, viz: 1. Everyone‟s life is equally important. 2. Everyone has his own life to 
lead.‟107 In the second of these two judgements we can see the principle of autonomy, 
while in the first we find a characterization of how impartiality works for Nagel. He says 
„instead of morality being more like politics in its sensitivity to the balance of power, we 
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should want politics to be more like morality in its aim of universal acceptance.‟108 This 
links his project with the Kant-Rawls tradition where the truly legitimate society is one 
that achieves unanimity among its members on the central principles, and the only way 
to achieve this unanimity is to treat individuals as autonomous and as of equal worth. 
Furthermore, given the closeness of these two characteristics, Nagel‟s two general 
judgements above have a built-in means of reconciliation: everyone‟s life is equally 
important because everyone has his own life to lead. We are equals, then, because we are 
all autonomous.  
 Nagel‟s approach seems to me to fail to adequately appreciate the demands of 
sociality. Ultimately on this view sociality produces no demands that would not be 
produced by the individuals involved. In other words, it has the normative implication 
of reducing society to the sum of individual obligations, without reference to obligations 
they might have to one another. This is not enough to explain the demands of sociality. 
Society is, to borrow the Moorean phrase, an organic unity; a whole not reducible to the 
sum of its parts.109 There are demands that arise uniquely from sociality rather than from 
the sum of the demands of individuals. Such an approach to sociality could not justify 
the kind of non-voluntary obligations central to the demands for a second principle. It 
might recognize that they are legitimate, much as Rawls recognizes some „natural duties‟ 
as legitimate, but it could not adequately explain their legitimacy as a product of the 
theory.110 However, I will explain this criticism shortly, alongside a critique of a similar 
issue in Barry‟s approach to impartiality. 
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B. Barry and Justice as Impartiality 
 There is a sense in which Barry picks up where Nagel leaves off. Both attempt 
to present theories that use impartiality as a central but are nonetheless faithful to the 
Rawlsian tradition. However, central to Barry‟s approach to impartiality is a 
disambiguation between what he calls first- and second-order impartiality. In Nagel, as 
in other liberals and their critics, these two different and not necessarily connected levels 
of impartiality are often problematically conflated. In this subsection I explain the 
difference between first- and second-order impartiality and discuss Barry‟s approach to 
second-order impartiality. He claims that a version of second-order impartiality is a 
sufficient principle for explaining when a maxim or policy is legitimate. This discussion 
leads to next two subsections where I argue that Barry is wrong. If impartiality matters 
in the way that a candidate to explain the normative requirements of sociality must, 
there must be a connection between first- and second-order impartiality such that the 
latter implies or requires the former. Once we understand this connection it becomes 
easier to see how impartiality is either too vague to be a meaningful legitimating 
criterion or cannot adequately represent the demands of sociality.  
 The distinction between first- and second-order impartiality is key to Barry‟s 
approach, since most of the criticisms of impartial conceptions of justice focus on 
problems with what he calls first-order impartiality. In Barry‟s view, first-order 
impartiality is the idea that individuals are to be guided in their moral deliberations by an 
impartial ideal and that moral obligations arising from partiality are illegitimate. This is a 
quite different kind of impartiality than second-order impartiality. While first-order 
impartiality is „a requirement of impartial behaviour incorporated into a “precept,” what 
second order impartiality „calls for are principles and rules that are capable of forming 
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the basis of free agreement among people seeking agreement on reasonable terms.‟111 
Second-order impartiality, then, is whatever the outcome of an original position-type 
exercise will produce given willing participants and a goal of reasonableness. This is, 
however, more of a label than a requirement, as becomes clear when we examine exactly 
what second-order impartiality requires and how it is supposed to lead to a just society.  
 Barry‟s approach to impartiality is intended to further the liberal tradition started 
by Rawls and further developed by Scanlon.112 The Rawlsian approach used an 
autonomy-focussed account of fairness as a central value, but Barry argues that 
impartiality plays a key role in explaining the concerns of fairness. He locates this in 
Rawls‟ argument against utilitarianism. While Rawls acknowledges that „the utilitarian 
principle – maximizing the average expectation – might seem to be an attractive gamble 
from the point of view of the original position,‟ Barry claims that „inequalities that arise 
under the Rawlsian principles of justice can be justified to those who fare least well 
under their application, whereas those that arise under the application of utilitarianism 
cannot be justified to those who do least well.‟113 The difference here is that the 
Rawlsian position is fairer than the utilitarian position because of its sensitivity to the 
least well off. However, in Barry‟s view Scanlon‟s approach to the original position is an 
improvement on Rawls‟ take. He notes two key differences – continued awareness of 
own interests rather than total ignorance of their position in society and a „desire for 
reasonable agreement‟ rather than self-interest – and how these lead Scanlon to the “no 
reasonable rejection” standard.114 In Barry‟s view, this standard better reflects the 
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impartiality already implicit in Rawls‟ justice as fairness by spelling out how fairness 
requires impartiality. For Barry, impartiality is the principle by which informed people 
with a commitment to reach agreement choose from among various maxims and 
policies. Impartiality requires agreement on principles as fair, Scanlon‟s approach leads 
to fair principles through the use of a principle of equality, therefore justice as 
impartiality will require a principle of equality.  
 Barry contends that this second-order impartiality neither implies nor requires 
first-order impartiality. He mounts a more thorough defence of non-requirement in the 
final part of Justice as Impartiality. He defends his view against three different critics of 
impartiality: the Williams, Kohlberg and feminist approaches. The Williams approach 
draws from Bernard Williams‟ attacks on the role of impartiality in both Kantian and 
consequentialist approaches to morality. Williams argues that failure to accept partiality 
is a major shortcoming of every major system of morality, but Barry claims that 
Williams‟ arguments are off-target.115 While Williams is right about particular versions of 
consequentialism and Kantianism, Barry claims that these versions are themselves 
inadequate and, as such, arguments against them have no real bearing on more nuanced 
approaches to impartiality like his. Because of this misdirection, Barry holds that 
nothing in Williams‟ approach makes it necessary for a second-order impartiality theory 
to require first-order impartiality, and so it only has purchase against theories with first-
order impartiality. In this sense, Barry‟s attacks on Williams miss the mark themselves. 
Since Williams says nothing about the connections between first- and second-order 
impartiality so central to Barry‟s approach, critiquing Williams‟ approach is itself 
unnecessary. 
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 The Kholberg approach is based on a statistical analysis claiming to show what 
ordinary people think morality requires.116 Based on a methodologically unsound set of 
studies conducted during the 1960s and 1970s, Lawrence Kohlberg argued that the 
apogee of ordinary morality is found in either of a utilitarian or Kantian approach to 
impartiality.117 Without getting into too many of the empirical details, Barry 
demonstrates quite effectively how Kohlberg‟s approach does not demonstrate any way 
in which first-order impartiality is required by second-order impartiality. Rather, 
Kohlberg argues in the opposite direction: claiming that the prevalence of commitment 
to first-order impartiality should lead political philosophers to use something like 
second-order impartiality in establishing the justice of political institutions. In addition 
to the clear commission of the naturalistic fallacy here, Barry accused Kohlberg of 
skewing the studies to ensure the primacy of the utilitarian/Kantian outcome by 
generating an unrealistic scenario on which to evaluate the subjects‟ attitudes and by 
arbitrarily limiting the tabulation of results into his overly narrow characterizations. 
However, the weakness of Kohlberg‟s position means that while Barry‟s separation of 
first- and second-order impartiality is safe for the moment, it remains to be seen 
whether it was under genuine attack from Kohlberg to begin with. 
 The feminist critique of impartial morality grew out of opposition to the 
Kohlberg studies. The „ethic of care‟ advocated by Carol Gilligan and many feminist 
authors who followed her is based directly on an objection to Kohlberg‟s methodology. 
Relationship-based ethics, of the kind many contemporary feminist philosophers 
advocate, was allocated a third-level status by Kohlberg, two notches below his 
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preferred approaches. In Gilligan‟s view an ethic grounded in relationships, rather than 
one grounded in justice, should be seen as a rival to the Kantian and utilitarian camps 
dominant in philosophy, but the former approach rejects impartiality while the latter 
makes it a central value.118 Barry‟s approach to this is to try and claim that there is room 
within an ethics of justice for an ethic of care. When justice is silent for whatever reason 
– its considerations balance out or the matter is deemed „private‟ rather than „public‟ in 
some relevant way – an ethic of care can appropriately answer the question of what one 
ought to do. However, when there are impartial considerations that require a course of 
action, Barry contends that the ethic of care does wrong to insist on the value of 
partiality in such circumstances.  
Barry‟s approach here seems to miss the main focus of the feminist critique, that 
the personal is political.119 In this context, deciding about what is public and what is 
private is itself a question about which the ethic of care and the ethic of justice might 
give different answers and to which neither can presume the legitimacy of pre-
theoretical intuitions. Take, for example, the decision about whether to hire one 
individual or another in a small business. In one sense, we think it perfectly acceptable 
that some businesses are able to remain within a family, but when the business becomes 
important in some way – by growth or by providing an essential service at a critical 
moment – such hiring practices will be seen as problematically nepotistic. While an ethic 
of care will promote hiring based on relationship and will consider the family business 
to be a personal matter, an ethic of justice insisting on full equality of opportunity will 
consider all hiring to be a public matter (since it involves the distribution of limited 
goods, namely work opportunities) and will insist on an open competition or some 
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other impartialist procedure. What makes an issue public or private is itself a question 
that Barry illicitly presumes should be answered by impartial justice. Failure to 
adequately deal with this problem undermines Barry‟s approach, as it demonstrates the 
potential for second-order impartiality to require actions that, from some angles, are 
seen as private. This makes the second-order impartiality imply the kind of first-order 
impartiality Barry sought to avoid as obviously problematic.  
II. Second-order Impartiality 
 Second-order impartiality without first-order impartiality is not an adequate 
conception of justice. Put simply, my claim here is that in Barry‟s approach to „justice as 
impartiality,‟ impartiality itself is not doing any of the normative work. Rather, all the 
work is done by the various principles built into Barry‟s account of what reasonableness 
in a Scanlonian „reasonable rejection‟ test would require and that reasonableness is not 
equivalent to impartiality. First, I explore Barry‟s contention that a „reasonable rejection‟ 
test would reject first-order impartiality. While I can appreciate the approach, I find his 
objections uncompelling. Then, I move into the explanation of what reasonableness 
requires for Barry to demonstrate that impartiality itself plays no real role in determining 
whether a maxim or policy is something another could reasonably reject. This leads to 
the view that whatever justice requires according to Barry, it does not require second-
order impartiality. Therefore, for impartiality to serve as a principle representing the 
demands of the collective standpoint, it must be something more like first-order 
impartiality.   
 A. Does reasonableness preclude first-order impartiality? 
 Barry‟s strongest argument for the claim that second-order impartiality does not 
imply its first-order counterpart is the argument that the former precludes the latter. He 
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argues that individuals in a Scanlonian or Rawlsian original position would fail to 
endorse a norm of first-order impartiality. However, I believe the plausibility of his 
argument here rests on a failure to adequately examine the standard of reasonable 
rejection. Barry says  
„that the people in a Scanlonian original position could not reasonably reject 
established norms governing first-order impartiality provided they fell within a 
certain range. However, this range does not extend as far as a norm of 
universal first-order impartiality or anything like it. The people in a Scanlonian 
original position could reject a norm that did not leave sufficient scope for 
individual discretion.‟120 
  
To this end Barry examines three different problems with a universalized first-order 
impartiality: control, coordination, and compliance. I will examine each of these in turn 
and demonstrate that they fail to make the case for reasonable rejection.  
 Barry believes justice as impartiality can reject universal first order impartiality 
for three reasons. The first is what he calls „control.‟ This is essentially an argument that 
the importance of a sphere of privacy leads individuals in the original position to reject 
universal first-order impartiality. „Regardless of our conception of the good,‟ Barry 
claims, „we all want some ability to control our own corner of the world … to put it 
another way, we all want some room for discretionary choices within the areas that are 
the most important to us.‟121 How this would be affected by a norm of universal 
impartiality is not spelled out, but should be clear nonetheless. Barry believes that if 
there is a requirement of first-order impartiality, the projects, property and well-being of 
one individual can be sacrificed for the benefit of another. This, then, is simply a claim 
that autonomy, in the sense discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, is important 
enough to exclude first-order impartiality as a principle. However, while this is a good 
post-hoc argument for explaining why we might not want to adopt impartiality writ 
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large, it does not explain why it could be reasonably rejected by individuals in the 
original position – particularly if those individuals adopt many of the values Barry seems 
to give them elsewhere. Earlier in the book he focuses on the role of equality in the 
basic intuitions underlying impartiality, but equality does make impartial demands 
limiting the sphere of the private for the benefit of the sphere of the public. Equality 
requires transfers of personal property from one individual to another to promote the 
cause of a just society. Equality does not care about how important those resources 
were to the first party.122 That a multi-millionaire might have done something truly 
brilliant with his money is of little comfort to nearby starving children. If equality is 
important and implies impartiality, then it implies first- and second-order impartiality 
even at the expense of autonomy. 
 Ultimately Barry‟s claims about control depend on his claims about coordination 
and compliance. While control seems to be the factor involved when Barry says „life 
goes better if what I do with my toothbrush is my own business,‟123 ultimately his 
defence of this claim is not that it is better all things considered if each individual has a 
right to a sphere of privacy including personal property but that „I should not be under 
any obligation to ask myself whether somebody else could make out a better case for 
using my toothbrush than I can.‟124 The core of the problem of control, then, is one of 
coordination. It is too difficult for each of us to spend a lot of our time determining 
how to best allocate our finite resources. This seems sensible enough, but to presume 
that first-order impartiality would require such an effort seems a bit of a leap. First-
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order impartiality could require the optimal distribution of toothbrushes without 
requiring each individual to think about how this distribution should be achieved. To a 
limited extent, Barry acknowledges this. „Either coordination would have to be done by 
some public authority operating impartially according to general norms,‟ He says, „or 
[coordination] will have to come about through private actions governed by a norm of 
universal first-order impartiality.‟125 Nonetheless he dismisses each of these two 
possibilities as ineffective without much explanation as to why.  
This dismissal is too quick. A moral and political division of labour is one of the 
most ordinary features of modern life. We have rules – ranging in demandingness and 
enforceability from norms of etiquette to corporally punishable laws – that govern a 
wide range of situations from when to start eating at a dinner party to how much tax an 
individual has to pay to when the state can and must kill its citizens. Each of these 
egalitarian, first-order norms is a relatively novel invention that we have nonetheless 
effectively coordinated. There is no a priori reason to think that first-order impartiality 
could not be solved by the same coordinative devices as other moral principles and no 
better empirical reason to think this than there was to think the same about taxation and 
egalitarian dining practices several centuries ago.  
 Similar comments apply to Barry‟s use of compliance. He maintains that „in an 
attempt to secure strict impartiality in all areas of life a huge number of decisions that 
are now left to private judgement would have to be turned over to public officials; and 
all decisions left in private hands would be open to scrutiny and censure on the basis of 
the hypertrophied positive morality of the society.‟126 Firstly, whether this morality is 
hypertrophied depends on whether our current morality is considered healthy, a claim 
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needing support unoffered by Barry. Second, why should we think that justice as 
impartiality would stand in any greater need of bureaucratization with a first-order 
requirement of impartiality as without? Given the importance of equality to impartiality, 
and the great deal of bureaucracy required by an egalitarian state, why should we worry 
about it in an impartialist state? 
In all of these criticisms of first-order impartiality Barry treats the public/private 
divide as thought it were a natural fact rather than as something that is itself a question 
of justice. Whether toothbrushes or the use or destruction of other scarce resources is a 
private or a public matter is itself a question of justice. To use such a divide in an 
attempt to claim what justice does and does not require introduces a problematic 
circularity of which Barry seems unaware. This makes it seem as though Barry here is 
attempting to use justice as impartiality to claim that no one can reasonably reject the 
status quo, when in reality justice as impartiality might require a much more radical 
reorientation. In any event, problems arising from control, coordination and compliance 
do not have the force Barry believes. They do not prove that a society in a Scanlonian 
original position can reasonably reject a principle of impartiality. 
 B. Does reasonableness require impartiality? 
 It seems to me that without first-order impartiality, Barry‟s justice as impartiality 
does not really involve impartiality at all. I believe the normative work in Barry‟s 
approach is done by the concept of reasonableness, which only looks like impartiality 
because of the closeness of some of its constitutive principles to first-order impartiality. 
As such, if I am wrong in the prior subsection, and Barry‟s approach to second-order 
impartiality does not require first-order impartiality, then it is not really a theory of 
impartiality. Barry sets out a definition of impartiality at the outset of his approach that 
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is barely reflected, and carries no normative weight in the substantive approach he 
adopts. Ultimately, this leaves me with the impression that impartiality is a label for a 
theory rather than a description of that theory‟s content. If this is what Barry means by 
justice as impartiality, then it becomes quickly clear that this is not a kind of impartiality 
that can explain the needs of sociality.  
 Barry has three questions that set out the methodology meant to guide our 
understanding of what a theory of justice must involve. „First, what is the motive (are 
the motives) for behaving justly? Secondly, what is the criterion (are the criteria) for a 
just set of rules? And thirdly, how are the answers to the first two questions 
connected?‟127 Barry‟s answers to these three questions constitute his explanation of 
what justice as impartiality involves and his advocacy for it. To this end, Barry adopts 
Scanlon‟s reasonable rejection test wholesale and then explains how this test satisfies 
each of the three questions.128  
The answer provided to the first question involves advocating a desire for 
reasonable agreement over mutual advantage as an answer to the „why be just‟ question. 
This is in addition to their desires to pursue their individual aims, and so should be seen 
as a supplement to the desire for mutual advantage that drives the Rawlsian answer to 
the first question. Barry does not discuss how two motives can easily conflict. A desire 
to pursue particular ends might be compromised by my desire to reach general 
agreement. A goal of world domination might not be possible, or, at least, might not be 
just, in a society based on agreement. Even if it were possible, such an end would likely 
conflict with my desire to reach agreement with others, unless they all happen to have a 
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desire to be relieved of the burden of governance, a coincidence on which Barry cannot 
rely. More importantly, Barry does not explain any way in which this motive (these 
motives) leads to impartiality as a requirement. This is not too serious at this point as 
impartiality could be involved in the answers to the second and third questions. But it is 
noteworthy because if there are difficulties involved in connecting his answers to the 
second and third questions with impartiality, Barry cannot use the „desire to reach 
agreement‟ motive as a source of impartiality.  
The criterion Barry, following Scanlon, adopts is that of reasonable rejection. 
Quoting Scanlon, Barry characterizes this as follows: „an act is wrong if its performance 
under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general 
regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonable reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement.‟129 Naturally, such a principle stands in need of explanation 
on several points, and Barry does an admirable job of making its implications clear. 
However, these implications do not seem to connect reasonable rejection with any sort 
of substantive principle of impartiality. While Scanlon is focussed on acts that are 
wrong, Barry is focussed on rules that are just, but little depends on this distinction. The 
nature of unforced and informed decision is important for both Barry and Scanlon. An 
unforced agreement in their view precludes coercion or allowing for disparate 
bargaining power. In other words, that I could do better without an agreement than you 
is no good reason for me to reject an otherwise reasonable system of rules. Meanwhile, 
Barry claims to depart somewhat from Scanlon on what counts as informed. While 
Scanlon would exclude „“agreement based on superstition or false belief about the 
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consequences of actions,”‟130 Barry contends that „one person‟s superstition is another 
person‟s belief.‟131 While Barry recognizes that some informed belief requirement is 
necessary, he believes this should take a proceduralist form. Parties to the original 
position should be aware of the way their society works and of the alternatives. This 
seems to leave open the possibility of agreement based on superstition or false belief, 
provided it is universally held or universally seen as reasonable.  
What counts as reasonable is, however, underexplored in Barry‟s account. While 
it seems clearly connected with universalizability, this condition is already an explicit 
part of the standard. Furthermore, given the possibility of multiple reasonably 
acceptable systems of rules, this principle gives no further determination about which of 
them to choose. We can look for clues to reasonableness in Barry‟s determinations 
about what is and is not reasonable, but in these I find little insight. I find little in the 
way of explanation for his claim that „it is one thing to be praised for behaving 
generously against a background norm which leaves the act optional and quite another 
to be led by generosity to accept a rule that would expose one to moral condemnation 
unless one were to sacrifice oneself unilaterally. It would not be reasonable to accept the 
latter.‟132 It seems far from obvious to me that there are not circumstances under which 
one does wrong not to sacrifice oneself which, on a Scanlonian proceduralist account 
makes such acts required by justice. While we can hope for these occasions to be rare 
this rarity does not make them any less important for a comprehensive theory of justice. 
While the Scanlonian approach to the motive for agreement does incline towards 
generosity, Barry seems to wish to tailor this generosity by making what counts as 
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reasonable closely tied to the pursuit of one‟s own inclinations. This is quite different 
from the approach to rationality in Scanlon‟s later work What We Owe to Each Other, 
which focuses on a very restricted approach to irrationality leading to a broad approach 
to rationality. For something to be rational, for the later Scanlon, is just for it not to 
contradict a proposition one currently endorses.133 That this might involve limiting one‟s 
generosity in the original position is a possibility, but neither Barry nor Scanlon explain 
how these are to be counter-balanced.  
Finally, nothing in this discussion of the Scanlonian approach to justice indicates 
the importance of impartiality. There is a certain emphasis on equality, but it is more of 
a prioritarian than an egalitarian approach, and a prioritarian approach is less committed 
to impartiality.134 Prioritarians explicitly favour those who are worst off and require 
amelioration of their position excluding the possibility of levelling down. Inequalities in 
the Scanlon/Barry approach must be justified to all, including those who are worst off, 
but universality and unanimity do not necessarily require impartiality. This implies that 
fairness plays an important role in this approach, but again fairness is not the same as 
impartiality. If we start, as Barry does, from the point of view that fairness requires 
certain moral features, we are already a significant way from the Scanlonian starting 
point where fairness is one of the things that has to be determined by the reasonable 
rejection test. Finally, any attempt to insert a more normative version of fairness would 
fall afoul of Barry‟s own warning against making too much of the concept of equal 
treatment, where he says „we can talk about equal treatment only after we have settled 
the prior issue of what should count as relevant and what should be excluded as 
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irrelevant.‟135 Fairness has to be determined through the original position or via some 
process of reflective equilibrium defended on its own merits. Neither of these are 
options Barry has available to him at this stage in his enquiry. 
What this leaves us with is the label „justice as impartiality,‟ but with no 
substantive impartiality in its content. Therefore, to whatever extent impartiality is 
required by our sociality it cannot be Barry‟s second-order impartiality. Whether it could 
be a different sort of impartiality, closer to how Nagel uses the term, is a final option 
that I will examine in the next section. 136 
III. First-order Impartiality 
 Nagel starts from the assumption that impartiality represents the normative 
requirements of sociality, but, as mentioned before, I believe his approach here is 
mistaken. If some sort of first-order impartiality is an ethical requirement at all it must 
be from some other source than the basic demands of human sociality. I believe Nagel 
presents this version of impartiality as a sort of equality of autonomy. I contend here 
that this version cannot adequately explain the kind of non-voluntary character of the 
obligations addressed in chapter two and it fails to explain the kind of alterity that seems 
to be important to our sociality. Yet if we understand impartiality more like Barry‟s first-
order impartiality, this principle might be deeply incompatible with autonomy in 
violation of another of my methodological presumptions here. In this section I examine 
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each of these possibilities in turn, concluding that the demands of sociality cannot be 
properly represented by impartiality.  
A. Impartiality as Equality 
 While my earlier discussion focussed on how Nagel might not have chosen 
equality as the requirement for impartiality – he might have followed a utilitarian route 
and required maximalization of interests – my discussion here will focus on the fit 
between equality and the impartial point of view. For Nagel, impartiality both reflects 
and requires equality. It reflects equality in that a sort of formal equality arises from the 
abstraction from the personal to the impersonal point of view, while it requires equality 
because this is the normative consequence of the abstraction.137 Nonetheless, I believe 
this kind of „impartiality as equality‟ cannot be what sociality requires because, strictly 
speaking, formal equality does not require anything. The normative force of 
egalitarianism comes because of the moral worth individuals are taken to have. In 
Nagel‟s case, this arises by making the impartial/egalitarian principle include the 
interests of the individual in a way tantamount to autonomy. In this kind of impartiality 
autonomy is doing all the work and equality, effectively, none.  
 While I set out the connections between impartiality and equality briefly earlier 
in this chapter, a brief rehearsal is in order before I begin critiquing the position. The 
abstraction from the partial point of view to the impartial point of view is accomplished 
by omitting from consideration only the fact about which interests are one‟s own. Once 
we have abstracted away from our own identities we are left with a world of equal 
individuals/interest combinations. The individuals themselves are not necessarily what is 
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important as much as the individuals and their attached interests. They are equally 
important because they are all equally attached to interests and plans.  
 However, impartiality does not necessarily follow from the kind of abstraction 
Nagel presumes here. Some plans and interests are, or seem to be, more important than 
others. It does not seem unreasonable to presume that an individual whose plan will 
make the plans of many others more likely to succeed ought to be favoured by the 
impartial point of view over some other individual whose plans will help fewer 
individuals or, indeed, whose plans will harm other individuals. Nagel needs some non-
aggregable property here to prevent the kind of aggregation involved in this kind of 
maximalization approach. It is in this way that we can see the extent to which the 
impartial point of view is influenced by the importance of autonomy. We are all equal, 
but the equalisandum, what we are equal in, is autonomy. What is important, then, is not 
the satisfaction of plans but the satisfaction of the individuals with plans. Otherwise, 
aggregation would be more of a problem for Nagel. 
The importance of autonomy to impartiality is, however, pernicious and 
undermines Nagel‟s root claim that the standpoint of the collective is best understood as 
requiring impartiality. The inclusion of autonomy as the equalisandum by Nagel 
demonstrates a key feature of egalitarian theories. While the theories focus on equality, 
what we are all equal in is autonomy. We are all equally deserving of having our interests 
met and our plans come to fruition. The difficulty with this is that is ultimately reduces 
to the kind of autonomy-only theory, the shortcomings of which I explained in chapter 
two. Egalitarian theories like Nagel‟s combine an account of formal equality with some 
substantive moral principle to determine what sociality requires, or what a just outcome 
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involves. The trouble is that the equality condition is vacuous and the substantive 
condition does all the normative work.  
I believe there is a bi-conditional at the core of formal equality claiming that we 
ought to treat one individual in a certain way (say, as an autonomous individual) if and 
only if we ought to treat another individual that way. In this case, we ought to treat A as 
an autonomous individual if and only if we ought to treat B as an autonomous 
individual. However, the same result – the treatment of A and B as autonomous 
individuals – can be accomplished without any reference to equality. If A deserves 
treatment as an autonomous individual because A has interests and plans and B 
deserves treatment as an autonomous individual for the same reason, then justice 
requires us to treat A and B as autonomous individuals. They happen to be treated as 
equals because they are both deserving of the same treatment, but equality plays no role 
in determining the treatment they are due. This leaves the view that treatment as an 
autonomous individual matters, but equality does not. It adds nothing, leaving a fairly 
basic conception of desert and the connection of individuals and interests we 
characterized as autonomy from the outset, doing all the normative work.  
This can be seen in Nagel‟s approach to impartiality as well, particularly in how 
he distinguishes his egalitarianism from utilitarian egalitarianism. In Nagel, what we 
ought ultimately to satisfy are the plans of individuals (one of whom is oneself), rather 
than plans simpliciter, the plans we would see from a level of abstraction one beyond 
Nagel‟s, where we abstract away from all individuals as well as from oneself. Interests 
simpliciter can be aggregated, and we could legitimately choose to satisfy those leading 
to the greatest good. That we cannot do that illustrates the importance of autonomy; 
that we cannot aggregate plans means that what is treated as equal is the autonomous 
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individual. Individuals are due treatment according to certain norms of respect, dignity 
and through the satisfaction of their plans: a standard roughly equivalent to my 
approach to autonomy from chapter one. However, the individuals need not be seen as 
equals to accomplish this. They need only both be seen as bearing the same trait 
(individuality) entailing the same normative consequence (autonomous treatment).  
What this leaves Nagel with is an attempt to represent the standpoint of the 
collective as ensuring the autonomy of the individual. This violates the desiderata of 
chapter two, in which we discussed the shortcomings of autonomy and how it cannot 
adequately explain why certain important features of our ethical and political lives are 
legitimate. Nagel‟s impartiality as equality is ultimately a version of impartiality as 
autonomy, and cannot adequately represent the demands of the fact of sociality.  
B. Impartiality as Non-partiality 
 It remains to be seen in the final part of this chapter whether a version of first-
order impartiality, of the kind Barry dismisses but to which I believe his theory is 
committed, can adequately represent the normative requirements of sociality. Using 
Barry‟s characterization, I will briefly explain what first-order impartiality involves. 
There are a few different options. As Barry presents it, first-order impartiality could be 
an overriding obligation to act according to the results of some impartial utility calculus 
such that someone always does ultima facie wrong in failing to act accordingly. Following 
Barry, I will call this Kagan-style impartiality, though I believe Barry‟s use of Shelly 
Kagan‟s „extreme‟ approach to morality is an uncharitable reading of the latter‟s work.138 
Alternatively, impartiality could involve a pro tanto, rather than ultima facie, reason for 
action. While this is a more acceptable option than the Kagan-style approach, it 
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nonetheless cannot adequately respond to the type of concerns that a principle of 
fraternity representing the demands of sociality is supposed to address. Put simply, there 
are obligations arising from partiality that we believe to be legitimate and that any value 
attempting to explain the importance of sociality must address. First-order impartiality, 
even in its more plausible form, is ill suited to explain the legitimacy of these obligations 
and, therefore, is an appropriate candidate for explaining the demands of sociality. 
 Barry is quick to dismiss first-order impartiality, and therefore his discussion of 
it is brief. Nonetheless, in that brief discussion he does provide some guidance as to 
what a first-order impartialist approach to legitimacy (or justice, in Barry‟s terms) would 
require. Kagan‟s goal in The Limits of Morality is to examine whether there is a plausible 
case for what he calls „ordinary moral opinion,‟ but what it results in is a strong case for 
a version of „extreme‟ morality. Extreme morality involves a pro tanto obligation to 
maximize the good with no legitimate countervailing obligations. This results in an 
ultima facie obligation to maximize the good, where the good is viewed impartially. What 
this leaves us with is a view that any maxim or policy inconsistent with the dictates of 
impartiality is illegitimate, and impartiality requires us to maximize the good.  
 While there are aspects of Kagan‟s approach to morality that I find convincing, 
Barry‟s use of it here as a strategy to explain a consequentialist approach to first-order 
impartiality is incompatible with my methodology. I start from the presumption that 
there are two facts, sociality and individuality. A framework like Kagan‟s leaves little 
room for individuality. If there is always an ultima facie obligation to pursue the good, 
there can be no real autonomy since the choices of individuals would always be subject 
to the demands of impartial morality. The maximalist approach Kagan uses here 
contradicts the separateness of persons explained in chapter one, which is why it 
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undermines the kind of autonomy that relies on the separateness of persons. It is, 
therefore, not a particularly helpful candidate for explaining impartiality as an expression 
of the demands of sociality.  
 Nonetheless, Kagan‟s approach to impartiality as the maximalization of the good 
could be softened to make it a more plausible approach, though this softening is not 
apparent in Barry‟s discussion. If the pro tanto obligation to pursue the good were merely 
one pro tanto obligation among many it could offer a form of impartiality that, while also 
inconsistent with autonomy (and as such not preferred on my account) might 
nonetheless be plausible. In this version impartiality is one reason, while autonomy is 
another, and conflicts between the two must be resolved through some procedure I 
need explain here.139 
 I need not get into this explanation because there are deeper problems with 
first-order impartiality that infect even more moderated versions. A first-order 
impartiality that requires us to maximize the good cannot explain the legitimacy of 
special obligations of the kind that played such an important role in chapter two. While 
second-order impartiality might allow for, or even legitimate, some special obligations – 
particularly those to the family or the obligation to obey the law – first-order impartiality 
stands directly opposed to the kind of partiality that is central to such obligation. Family 
partiality, obligations to co-nationals, the whole set of special obligations cannot be 
justified if first-order impartiality is the legitimating principle invoked. It is too far 
removed from the kind of alterity we need here, and as such cannot do the kind of work 
that a principle representing the demands of sociality must.   
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Conclusion 
 While some liberals have used impartiality to explain the demands of sociality, it 
is ill suited to explain that fact‟s normative requirements. I believe Nagel‟s approach to 
impartiality as an explanation of the demands of sociality is misguided. While second-
order impartiality seems promising, it is ultimately either vacuous or only valuable 
because it implies first-order impartiality. However, first-order impartiality, even in its 
most plausible version, is at odds with the phenomena any candidate for the principle of 


















Chapter 5 – Solidarity and the Grounding of Fraternity 
Abstract 
 In this chapter I examine whether a concept of solidarity might play the role 
needed for a value of fraternity. I distinguish between interest- and identity-based 
approaches to solidarity, and explain why I favour an interest-based approach. I examine 
the normative and motivational requirements of the obligation to enter into solidarity 
with others and the obligations that arise from a solidaristic union. Then I analyse three 
different kinds of solidarity. While common self-interests alone cannot suffice for 
solidarity, they are a necessary feature of a valuable account. Solidarity grounded on 
prior relationships seems like a candidate, but violates autonomy in important ways. 
However, a version of solidarity where the interests of another are incorporated into 
one‟s own interest set through one‟s own conscience seems to me like a plausible 
candidate. It may also represent the demands of our sociality. 
Introduction 
 Alterity is at the core of solidarity, and explains why it is a candidate for a 
political value that arises from our basic sociality. Alterity in general involves a focus on 
the other. In an ethical context, it narrows to a focus on some aspect of the other‟s well 
being. Impartiality was lacking in alterity, but solidarity is grounded in it. Solidarity exists 
when there is some unity among individuals, some identification with another leading to 
common support for a common goal. Initially, I must distinguish some of the normative 
features of solidarity. Ordinarily, Solidarity is discussed as a valuing of some common 
property individuals share. I argue that this approach to solidarity is short-sighted and 
pernicious if solidarity is to help explain the legitimacy of moral and political obligations. 
Instead, solidarity ought to be understood as involving identification with the interests 
 119 
of another. I then explain the nature of solidarity‟s normativity. There are two distinct 
obligations involved in solidarity: entry and union obligations. While each is a kind of pro 
tanto reason for action, one is weak but nonetheless difficult to defeat, while the other is 
stronger but more often overridden. This forms the content of the first section of this 
chapter.  
 Once I have explained the nature of the obligations involved in solidarity, I turn 
my attention to the mechanism by which another individual‟s interests can become 
incorporated with my own. I examine three possible answers. The first, based on 
common self-interests, tells part of the story but not all. I explain how self-interest plays 
a necessary role in an account of solidarity, but that basing solidarity wholly on common 
interests misses critical elements of what the normative requirements of sociality should 
include. Some of those elements might be provided by an account built around 
individual loyalty, the second possible mechanism. However, since the kind of loyalty on 
which solidarity would, I argue, depend is deeply incompatible with a principle of 
respect for autonomy it fails on methodological grounds. The third possibility, which I 
call „moderate ethical solidarity‟ grounds the solidarity relationship in our pre-existing 
ethical obligations. I believe this approach, when combined with the common self-
interest requirement, can give us a plausible account for what fraternity as the value 
required by the fact of sociality.  
I. What Solidarity Involves 
 I believe solidarity involves the recognition that individuals identify with one 
another through a common interest that will be ameliorated through collective action. 
This is clear in the commonly used metaphor „we‟re all in the same boat.‟ My task here is 
to explain what this formulation involves: only then will we be able to see whether or 
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how it can meet the requirements of sociality and be reconcilable with autonomy. First, 
I explain the identification involved in solidarity. This identification is not with the other 
individual as a whole, or with some of that individual‟s traits, but with that individual‟s 
interests. Most approaches to solidarity rely on some prior common trait of the 
individuals involved to establish solidarity. I call these identity-based approaches, and 
contrast them with interest-based accounts. Interest-based approaches ground the unity 
solidarity requires in some sort of identification with another‟s interests. Second, I will 
explain the normative requirements of solidarity. As there are two types of obligations 
involved in any discussion of solidarity, I deal with both entry obligations and union 
obligations throughout. Entry obligations are pro tanto obligations to enter into a 
relationship of solidarity that can, and I believe often do end up as ultima facie 
obligations, while union obligations are stronger pro tanto obligations that result from 
entry into solidarity and that must be reconcilable with autonomy. Each kind of 
obligation can be overridden, but once solidarity is established, our obligations within 
such a union take on added strength because of a prior entry obligation. 
A. Identity and Interest 
 Usually solidarity, when discussed at all, is discussed as an identity-based 
practice. Some kind of pre-existing unity is postulated on the basis of a shared identity, 
on which the specific obligations are superimposed. I believe this picture cannot do the 
work of a foundational value in moral and political philosophy. Instead, I argue for an 
interest-based approach to the identification with another involved in solidarity. On this 
view, individuals should adopt a form of solidarity because they have a common 
interest, on which the union obligations are then based. If individuals do not identify 
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with another‟s interests, entry into solidarity would no longer be ethically or politically 
required, and the union obligations would not arise.  
The interest approach has a number of advantages over the identity approach, 
not the least of which is that so much of identity-based solidarity involves the „dubious 
category “race.”‟140 This is well discussed in Tommie Shelby‟s attempt to construct an 
interest-based approach to African American solidarity. While Shelby is indebted to the 
work of W. E. B. Du Bois, particularly in his assessment of the relative duties of black 
elites and the middle and working classes, unlike Du Bois, he moves very deliberately 
beyond identity as a basis for entry into solidarity.141 The central problem is that race 
and the identity-based approaches that mirror it, no longer have any intellectual 
currency. Race depends on a sort of biological essentialism: there is some inescapable 
feature of an individual contained in their genes and manifest in their physical traits.142 
Shelby wishes to maintain that there is a valuable role for unity among black people 
while rejecting essentialism. While the essentialist approaches based their unity or „race 
pride‟ on common phenotypic traits, Shelby‟s conception of solidarity is grounded on a 
common experience of unjust treatment common interest in remedying that injustice 
which happen to arise due to a shared trait. 
 A key advantage of the interest-based account is that even non-essentialist 
notions of identity that attempt to treat it as monistic are now recognized, in philosophy 
if not yet in the broader culture, as deeply implausible. While identification with a 
particular trait is both common and unproblematic, attempting to identify with only one 
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trait is a problem, even when one‟s oppression is due to that one particular trait. 
Amartya Sen points out clearly why this kind of biographical monism is difficult. We 
are, he claims, all subject to a fact of pluralism in that we all have multiple identities.143 
Someone who tries to cling to one of these identities is under what Sen calls the illusion 
of „singular affiliation.‟144 One can, if one wishes, cling exclusively to one identity and 
deny the others, or one can claim that one identity has overriding normative force. 
Nonetheless, Sen claims, in either event one is choosing among identities. However, 
choosing one identity over others involves both epistemic error and moral danger. It is 
false as a matter of history and anthropology. The concepts of nations, races and tribes 
is an old one, but the notion that these were somehow pure or that one‟s nationality, 
race, religion or any single trait is the only trait that matters defies our historical and 
anthropological record. Humans migrate, cultures move with them and to single out any 
trait as essential would be ridiculously arbitrary. History and anthropology also 
demonstrate the ethical dangers involved in monism: the 20th century alone provides a 
series of horrifically grandiose examples. Nonetheless, this sort of monism is 
conceptually pernicious because it is both tempting in its simplicity and generous in its 
applicability. It claims to provide a simple either/or test for inclusion and exclusion 
while simultaneously simplifying one‟s inner diversity into a small number of traits that 
matter and a great number that do not. Race and identity accounts of solidarity depend 
on this false and troubling monism, and should be abandoned accordingly. 
Identity can play a role in generating the interests involved in solidarity. Indeed, 
when the interest involved is racial injustice, it would be difficult for the trait not to 
generate an interest, albeit indirectly. What is important, however, is that the interest-
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based solidarity not depend solely on the trait such that people who don‟t have the trait 
can‟t share the interest and therefore enter into solidarity with those who do. Blacks in 
the United States are not just people who are not treated equally: they are people who 
are not treated equally because they are black. They have a common characteristic against 
which the dominant political culture continues to act unjustly. While they can recognize 
the dubious nature of delineating along that trait, they can also recognize that it is in 
their interest to work so that all who have the trait are no longer subject to the same 
injustices because of that trait. The solidarity will arise because of the interest, while the 
interest is incidentally due to the trait once associated with race. Nothing in this 
formulation precludes non-blacks from also having the interest. Take, for example, a 
white family in an otherwise black neighbourhood. If the school the white children 
attend is underfunded due to racial injustice, they have an interest in alleviating racial 
injustice despite not having the problematic trait. On an interest-based account they can 
enter into solidarity with their black neighbours even though they are not themselves 
black, which would be more problematic if not impossible on an identity-based version 
of solidarity. While traits can play a role in establishing entry and union obligations – as 
the feature leading to injustice – this cannot exclude those who do not share the trait 
from entering into solidaristic relations with those who do, nor can it provide identity-
based obligations for those in the solidaristic relationship. Both of these features and the 
importance of traits to some solidaristic relationships are better explained by an interest-
based account of solidarity. 
An analogous form of discrimination might clarify matters here. While there are 
blind and deaf communities, there are many other traits that while disadvantageous in 
our society do not seem to give rise to the same kind of identity as others. An interest-
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based approach can deal with new injustices as well as the old ones. Individuals who 
cannot walk all share a common trait, but given the plethora of circumstances under 
which they came to share this trait and the varying ways of coping with it in a society 
organized around its ambulatory majority, it does not seem to make sense to claim that 
there is a disambulatory community. Nonetheless, people who cannot walk have an 
interest in ensuring that their needs are met by society, which arises from a trait they 
share. They do not have to identify with their trait in order to enter into solidarity with 
one another, to take pride in one another‟s accomplishments, and to benefit from the 
new accommodations made by some with the ambulatory majority. An interest-based 
account can explain this type of solidarity and black solidarity equally well, while an 
essentialist approach would attempt to distinguish between those who have been 
disambulatory since birth (when everyone is fairly disambulatory) and those who have 
become disambulatory, just as there is some friction in the deaf and blind communities 
between those who have become deaf or blind and those who were never otherwise. An 
interest-based account recognizes that insofar as these individuals have common 
interests solidarity can exist among them, but insofar as their interests differ due to the 
different origin of their traits, their solidarities should also differ. 
B. Solidarity, Normativity and Motivation  
The above discussion leaves unclear the normative character of entry and union 
obligations. One has an entry obligation when one recognizes that one has a reason to 
enter into solidarity, while union obligations are those obligations that arise from a 
relationship of solidarity one has already entered into. Specifically, I have yet to explain 
whether entry and union obligations are pro tanto reasons for action that can be 
overridden or whether they are ultima facie obligations. I must also explain the 
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motivational impact that recognition of each kind of normativity would have. I examine 
the consequences involved in construing entry and union obligations as either pro tanto 
reasons or ultima facie obligations. Specifically, I will show why characterizing both entry 
and union obligations as pro tanto reasons for action better fits our basic intuitions about 
solidarity than ultima facie obligations can. I also explain how I envision the connection 
between the normative character of entry and union obligations and their motivational 
aspect. 
There are several spectra along which one can distinguish types of pro tanto 
reasons. A key spectrum for my purposes is between weaker and stronger reasons. At 
one end of the normative spectrum are weak pro tanto reasons. While these are still, in 
some sense, obligatory – they have enough normative strength that one does wrong in 
adopting maxims and policies pursuant to them, and in other circumstances without 
stronger obligations one would adopt such maxims and policies – they are nonetheless 
easily overridden by other reasons that present themselves in a set of circumstances. 
This is distinct from prima facie reasons, which are also weak but when overridden lose 
their normative force. If, however, entry and union obligations are to be genuine 
obligations they must at least be pro tanto, rather than prima facie. 
I think that ultimately entry obligations are often weak pro tanto reasons, but 
subject to a caveat. Any obligation to enter into a relationship of solidarity with another 
– a relationship where solidarity amplifies the normative strength of obligations among 
you – will be difficult to reconcile with autonomy if it is an overriding or overly strong 
duty. Entry obligations generate other obligations, and accordingly ought not to be so 
strong as to overwhelm all other obligations, lest they become an unending source of 
trumping duties. This sort of unending spiral of obligations would seem to present 
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problems for a life led from within, which is the central feature of liberal autonomy. The 
caveat is that while entry obligations are a weak form of pro tanto reason, they are often 
difficult to override. I think this difficulty arises from the circumstances under which 
they form rather than from the nature of the obligation itself. The catch is that only a 
very narrow set of obligations directly contradicts entry obligations: I call these „enemy 
obligations.‟ For example, presume I have a pro tanto entry obligation with Mr. X. If, 
however, Mr. X were the sworn enemy of someone with whom I already had a 
solidaristic union, and my duties to the prior union include an enemy obligation 
concerning Mr. X, then this pre-existing obligation would override my reasons for 
entering into solidarity with Mr. X. However, only if my prior obligations included the 
enemy obligation would this override. If entry into solidarity with Mr. X might lead me 
to have obligations to him that would conflict with other obligations I already have this 
is not direct enough to block the entry obligation. Accordingly, while entry obligations 
are themselves weak pro tanto reasons, they are difficult to override. 
Union obligations might be pro tanto, but they might also be ultima facie. If they 
are pro tanto, then one can have a union obligation that is not what one ought to do, all 
things considered. If union obligations are ultima facie obligations, however, they would 
always be what one has most reason to do. I think union obligations cannot be ultima 
facie reasons. One cannot have more than one ultima facie obligation. If one appears to 
have two or more then there are two possibilities: either the other options are illusory 
and the original all things considered judgement stands; or the options are genuine but 
the original ultima facie obligations is not actually ultima facie. There are approaches to 
ultima facie reasons that allow more than or less than one valid ultima facie reason, but 
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these circumstances involve multiple individuals.145 While one individual cannot have 
multiple all things considered obligations, it is quite easy to imagine two individuals 
having two conflicting all things considered obligations. The question „what should they 
do,‟ is no less coherent than the clear one-person moral dilemma case where an 
individual has equally strong or incommensurable pro tanto reasons. However, it does not 
apply to the case of union obligations or entry obligations, where the decision is an 
individual one rather than a collective one. The effects of such a construction on 
individual autonomy are problematic, but more difficult seems to be the possibility for 
internal contradiction in a world with multiple relationships of solidarity.146 If solidarity 
generates ultima facie obligations, multiple solidaristic relationships could generate 
multiple ultima facie obligations, opening up the possibility for conflicting ultima facie 
obligations. These would then not really be ultima facie obligations. Alternatively, if 
solidarity were to generate ultima facie obligations it would be acting as a trump, such that 
one‟s solidaristic obligations took precedence over all one‟s other obligations in a way 
that does not seem plausible. 
This reductio ad absurdam of conceiving of union obligations as ultima facie 
obligations clearly speaks in favour of characterizing union obligations as pro tanto 
reasons for action. However, we still do not yet know what strength of pro tanto reason 
we are dealing with here. It seems to me that for solidarity to be a useful concept, the 
obligations arising from it must be stronger than the obligation to enter into it. There 
                                                 
145
 I think this is particularly problematic in the case of multi-person moral dilemmas. While it is 
difficult to imagine one individual having multiple all things considered obligations, it is quite easy to 
imagine two individuals having two conflicting all things considered obligations. The question ‘what 
should they do,’ is no less coherent than the clear one-person moral dilemma case where an individual 
has equally strong or incommensurable obligations. Given that solidarity seems to involve a reciprocal 
relationship between more than one individual, consideration of the multi-party dilemma is apt. After 
all, solidarity requires multiple individuals to hold a particular obligation simultaneously. 
146
 This is akin to Rawls’ fact of pluralism. Rawls 1993, p. 4. 
 128 
must be some sort of solidarity bonus that enhances the duties one has to members of a 
solidaristic relationship. The obligations of general, impartial morality are owed to 
members of both in- and out-groups without distinction. Nonetheless, there are special 
obligations owed to members of the in-group that are not owed to members of the out-
group. The obligations that arise from solidarity are, therefore, moral in character but 
they are not owed to members of the out-group.147 Imagine that I have two 
acquaintances that are looking for a copy of a particular book. One acquaintance is in a 
book club with me while the other is not. If I have a spare copy, the acquaintance with 
which I am in a book club would have an additional reason to think I did wrong were I 
to give the book to the other that is unavailable to the non-member acquaintance. Each 
acquaintance could hold it against me that I gave the book to the other, but only one 
acquaintance could hold my failure to live up to the duties of a fellow member against 
me.148 The same could not be said of a decision to enter into one of two different book 
clubs I might have an interest in joining – the entry obligation version of this scenario. 
All else being equal, neither acquaintance would have reason to feel more aggrieved than 
the other in that situation. So while union obligations must be pro tanto reasons (because 
they cannot be ultima facie obligations), they must be stronger than entry obligations 
simply because they arise within the context of solidarity. 
A second spectrum of importance for pro tanto reasons for action concerns their 
motivational impact. Motivational impact is different from normative strength. 
Normative strength relates to something‟s obligatory quality: how wrong it is for me not 
to act according to a given reason. Motivational impact deals with how committed I am 
to undertaking the obligation as a matter of psychology. Ideally, motivational strength 
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would come from normative strength such that the more obligatory a duty the more 
one is motivated to act on it, resulting in a situation where motivation tracks 
normativity.149 This is, however, an ideal that is not always realized in ordinary life. 
People are sometimes more moved by attachments to individuals and things that play a 
significant role in their lives than by duties to those people and principles that seem 
more removed. As such, while the normative strength of an obligation should serve to 
increase its motivational strength, resulting in a tracking relationship among them, this 
does not always happen. As such, we must recognize the distinction between normative 
and motivational strengths.  
That said, I think there is some benefit in holding normative strength as primary 
such that whatever motivational strength a solidaristic obligation has should arise from 
its normative force. If we expect motivation to track normativity we can explain both 
why an individual fails to live up to their obligations and why they were wrong to do so. 
However, if we have a view of solidarity where we expect normativity to track 
motivation or where we are more concerned with motivation than with normativity, we 
will have a more difficult time demonstrating why someone who fails to live up to his 
duties is wrong. Ultimately, I think solidarity provides us with a set of obligations that 
ordinary people will be moved to follow in ordinary circumstances, and that in unusual 
or exceptional circumstances being able to explain why they are exceptional is of 
conceptual and practical value. By focussing on normativity we can explain why both 
the action and the motivation was wrong. A focus on motivation loses this distinction. 
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Also important here is to note that it is recognition of reasons for solidarity that 
gives rise to obligations, rather than the mere existence of reasons. I am largely 
convinced by Scanlon‟s approach to external reasons, so I must acknowledge that there 
are reasons for entry into relationships of solidarity in a wide array of circumstances. 
However, these reasons will only actually come to have the normative weight of an entry 
obligation if one recognizes them as a reason. To argue otherwise, to claim that one had 
entry obligations whenever one had a reason for entering into a relationship of 
solidarity, would mean that one was acting irrationally in failing to enter into solidaristic 
relationships with others one has never met in situations one has never considered. To 
avoid this problem, I believe that recognition of reasons, rather than the mere existence 
of reasons, is required for entry into solidarity.150  
The two types of solidaristic obligation – entry and union obligations – each 
have different normative strengths. While entry obligations are relatively weak but 
difficult to overrule pro tanto reasons for action, union obligations are stronger but 
nonetheless pro tanto reasons. What can justify entry into a situation where strong 
obligations are generated is the focus of the next section, where I examine different 
approaches to entry obligations to determine if there is a way for solidarity to arise in a 
manner consistent with autonomy.  
II. Types of Solidarity 
In this section I examine three distinct conceptions of solidarity, based on three 
different ways that one can identify with (i.e. adopt as one‟s own) the interests of 
another. The first involves only an identity of pre-existing interests. While self-interest 
will play a critical role, it alone cannot generate the kind of alterity solidarity requires. 
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The second – strong solidarity – involves taking the interests of another as my own 
because of some relationship. Consequently, while it lives up to the needs of alterity, it is 
ill suited to explain entry obligations. Finally, I present a third option – moderate 
solidarity – that incorporates the alterity required of solidarity. In the next section I will 
explain how moderate ethical solidarity can provide the kind of normative strength that 
makes the appeal to solidarity an attractive candidate in articulating the demands of 
fraternity.  
 A. The Uses and Abuses of Self-Interest 
 Self-interest plays an important role in determining whether an entry obligation 
is possible, but common self-interests cannot be all that there is to solidarity. First, I 
must explain the kind of role it can have before I demonstrate why common interests 
alone cannot constitute solidarity. This involves understanding the kinds of impacts 
common interests can have on one another. If two individuals have an interest in the 
same state of affairs occurring, this can lead them to cooperation or conflict, depending 
on the circumstances surrounding the interest. Only a subset of common interests could 
possibly provide a foundation for solidarity. Second, once we understand what kinds of 
common interests can play this role, we must determine what exactly the role is that 
common self-interest is trying to play. Again, there are a number of different 
possibilities, but I ultimately favour a minimal approach, whereby having the right sort 
of mutual interest is a necessary but insufficient condition for entry into solidarity: 
without the interest, entry into solidarity is impossible, but the obligations do not 
necessarily depend wholly on the interest, and can persist when the interest disappears. 
 When more than one person has an interest in a given state of affairs occurring, 
they have what I will call a common interest. Whether this common interest is also a 
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mutually exclusive, mutual or shared interest is another question that must be answered 
prior to understanding which type (or types) of common interests are suitable 
candidates for solidarity‟s entry obligations. In the event that two people have a 
common interest but the satisfaction of one individual‟s interest precludes the 
satisfaction of the other‟s, their interest is a mutually exclusive interest. Take, for 
example, two sons who each have an interest in securing their mother‟s antique wedding 
ring for their spouses. Each of the brothers might, ordinarily, wish for the other to have 
such a ring as brothers can ordinarily be supposed to want one another‟s plans to 
succeed. However, in this situation there is only one such ring, and since only one son 
can have the ring if one has his interests satisfied the other cannot. These are mutually 
exclusive interests, and are not suitable candidates for entry into solidarity. Solidarity 
requires that the other person‟s interests become a part of my interest set. Entry into 
solidarity due to a mutually exclusive interest would lead to a contradiction in one‟s 
interest set that was not there before. At the very least, this would contradict the pre-
existing interest, diminishing its normative and motivational strength. This would make 
solidarity a more difficult state than it ought to be.151 
 Fortunately, not all common interests are mutually exclusive. There are at least 
two more types of common interests that might ground entry obligations. Firstly, there 
are interests where the satisfaction of one person‟s interest has neither a positive nor a 
negative impact on the second person‟s interest. These are what I call shared interests, 
since they are an interest that each party can have at any given time without impacting 
on the other person‟s interest. Members of a book club, for instance, have a shared 
interest in reading a book as long as there are enough copies for everyone. If one person 
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reads the book that does not improve the standing of each person‟s interest in reading 
the book, nor does it preclude the satisfaction of this interest. As such, satisfaction of 
shared interests does not impact on the others who share the interest. In this way shared 
interests are distinct from both mutually exclusive and mutual interests. Mutual interests 
happen when the satisfaction of one individual‟s interest positively affects the second 
person‟s interest. The impact here can range from a simple increase in the probability of 
satisfaction to joint satisfaction. As an example of the first impact, if I win a case on a 
particular legal issue and your case also depends on the same issue, in a system based on 
precedent my success will increase the probability of yours. However, if we are 
members of a class action suit of which I am the representative plaintiff, my success will 
not just make the satisfaction of your interest (in winning your suit) more likely, my 
success means you have succeeded. 
 One might be tempted to restrict the kind of self-interest that leads to entry 
obligations to this final case, a joint-success condition mutual impact. I have no doubt 
that this kind of self-interest often leads to strong entry obligations, but I do not believe 
this is any reason to preclude the possibility of establishing solidarity based on shared or 
weaker mutual self-interests. It seems to me that one individual reading a new and 
exciting book can all incorporate their fellow readers‟ interests in enjoyment and success 
into their interest-set without contradiction. Indeed, it might heighten their enjoyment, 
or provide a new type of enjoyment, to feel that their apparently solitary reading is 
actually part of something larger. This is of course not a necessary feature of shared 
interests: actually sharing them might not improve the quality of the experience, but if it 
does or can then it seems that there might be some obligation to enter into solidarity 
arising from it. With these considerations in mind, I am inclined toward an open 
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approach to the connection between common self-interest and solidarity‟s entry 
obligations. So long as the interests are not mutually exclusive, they can ground 
solidarity. From here on, when I discuss common interests I refer to both common and 
mutual interests, excluding only mutually exclusive interests. 
 However, there is one caveat I must make before I proceed to examine the 
limits of self-interest in an account of solidarity. As I said at the outset, some form of 
common self-interest is a necessary component of solidarity. What that means is that 
without some shared or mutual interest, no solidarity is possible. This is the „common 
plight‟ condition of solidarity. If union obligations are to differ in normative strength 
from our basic moral obligations, including particularly any obligations of general 
beneficence we might have, there must be something distinguishing the in-group from 
the out-group. On identity accounts this distinction appeared easier: if one had the 
relevant trait, one was a member of the in-group and those who did not have the 
relevant trait were excluded. However, the problems with the identity account 
demonstrate that this demarcation of in- and out-groups along trait lines is more 
difficult than it appears. The presence of a common plight, involving a common 
interest, is the interest-theorist‟s way of demarcating in- and out-groups. Insofar as 
solidarity involves in- and out-groups, such a condition is a necessary part of any 
plausible account.  
 But not all common interests can appropriately give rise to solidarity. Let us 
presume that you have an interest in giving a flawless performance of Beethoven‟s 
Appassionata, and I, as an audience member, have an interest in you giving a flawless 
performance too. That said, there is no entry into solidarity with you will make it more 
likely for our common interests to be met. It is only when entry into solidarity improves 
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the likelihood of the common interest being satisfied for either party that entry 
obligations can arise. Thus, while self-interest is an important component of solidarity 
not all interests are appropriate for grounding this kind of unity. 
 Common interests alone are not enough to ensure that solidarity will arise 
among individuals. The presence of such an interest is not a sufficient condition for 
solidarity. Firstly, the mere presence of such an interest does not guarantee the right sort 
of bond among individuals who have the interest. Simply because it is in my interest to 
end racial injustice does not guarantee that I will recognize that it is also in others‟ 
interest and that I will act on their behalf while acting on my own. Likewise, a plaintiff 
in a class action suit might not care about their fellow plaintiffs – they might only care 
about their own interest in getting compensated or in punishing the defendant. If 
someone joined a book club more as a way to push himself to read more different 
works, he might not care whether the other members had read the book at all. Neither 
shared nor mutual, not even joint-success mutual interests require solidarity without 
some additional feature making the interests of the other a part of one‟s own set.  
 Ultimately what this shows are the limits of self-interest. Common self-interests 
are not sufficiently alteristic to ground solidarity by themselves. In order for there to be 
genuine solidarity, my concern for another needs more than a concern for some goal I 
already have for myself prior to the entry into solidarity. Insofar as solidarity matters, it 
has to arise from something more alteristic than self-interest.152 The following two 
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alternatives are an attempt to remedy what is lacking in a self-interest exclusive account 
of solidarity.  
 B. Loyalty, Subservience and Letting Down 
 Concern for other individuals is the more obvious solution to what common 
interests lack. One individual‟s concern for another individual creates a group, which is 
why this kind of motivator is so often discussed in terms of membership in a group. 
This does seem to involve the kind of union Feinberg characterizes as „the sort that 
exists when each member's integrated set of interests contains the integrated interest set 
of each of the others.‟153 Take, for example, two friends who have been invited to a 
couples-only dinner party. Friend A is married and as such has a date, but Friend B is 
single and has an interest (we presume) in securing a date for the party. Friend A wants 
Friend B to be able to go to the party, and so has an interest in Friend B securing a date. 
As such, for different reasons, the two friends have a common interest. This common 
interest satisfies the necessary condition presented by self-interest. The solidarity must, 
however, come from somewhere else since self-interest alone cannot provide it. In this 
case, their friendship is likely to explain why B‟s interests (and supporting reasons) can 
become incorporated into A‟s set of interests.  
We have yet to understand how some sort of concern for an individual can 
generate the interest-incorporating move that solidarity requires. Again, an identity-
based approach to solidarity has an easier time with this problem too. One can simply 
postulate a relevant trait and claim that a group forms around that trait. However, 
Shelby‟s work makes clear that the kinds of relationships that can give rise to solidarity 
depend on more than some trait in common. One must, rather, view oneself as a part of 
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a group. Whether the group has to form around the interests in question or whether the 
group might form prior to recognition of the common interest is a potential source of 
conflict, but one I believe can easily be defused. There is no reason solidarity can only 
form in groups that already exist, so we need not presume that the group must precede 
the interests in common. The friends in my example above were friends before they had 
a common interest. Indeed, to whatever extent the friendship led Friend A to want 
Friend B at the party we can say that their friendship generated the common interest. As 
such, I feel comfortable claiming that the kind of inter-personal concern that, when 
combined with a common interest, can generate solidarity need not arise from the 
interest in question.  
 There are many ways to characterize inter-personal concern, but the one I think 
best to focus on first is membership in a group. In this case, what brings about the kind 
of inter-personal concern that can move individuals to enter into solidarity is 
membership in a group. The critical element here is loyalty, which plays a critical role in 
Shelby‟s approach to solidarity. Loyalty involves taking the other person‟s interests as 
your own simply because they are the other person‟s interests. In Shelby, loyalty serves 
to bind individuals to the goals of the group in such a way as they are more inclined to 
make an extra effort in the service of those goals and that group. Loyalty determines in- 
and out-group distinctions as well: those who are loyal to a set of individuals become 
the in-group while those who are not moved to make the extra effort in pursuit of the 
goals are, by default, in the out-group.  
 However, to predicate entry into solidarity on loyalty is to put the cart before the 
horse. Solidarity might cause loyalty among the members of the group. For loyalty to 
cause solidarity reverses this order. Loyalty is not a necessary ground for entry into 
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solidarity. While loyalty might be an important part of union obligations because 
preserving the union might be one of the common interests, to only have solidarity with 
those to whom one was already loyal would reverse the causal order among them. It 
would thereby limit solidarity to those with whom one had a pre-existing relationship, 
which strikes me as an arbitrary limit. Therefore, if there is a role for loyalty in solidarity 
it is not the role of incorporating the interests of another into my own set of interests. 
To whatever extent this happens, it cannot be simply due to a pre-existing relationship.   
 Further difficulties for solidarity arise if we base entry obligations on pre-existing 
relationships. Firstly, for solidarity to be the kind of concept that can play the role of 
fraternity and explain the basic ethical demands of sociality, it cannot depend on pre-
existing relationships but must be able to emerge from new and unforeseen situations. It 
must be a potential consequence when there is no or minimal pre-existing relationship. 
However, there are serious methodological difficulties with relationship-based solidarity 
that overwhelm this conceptual problem. It is difficult to see how we can reconcile 
loyalty to another individual with autonomy. However, we are as yet unclear about what 
is central to loyalty. If loyalty is chiefly characterized by adherence to the wishes of 
another individual, then it seems autonomy might be in jeopardy. This is the kind of 
loyalty servants have toward good masters, or soldiers to their commanding officers. If 
this sort of adherence is what loyalty involves then the decisions of another might 
override any choices I have already made. If a servant or a soldier wants to pursue some 
course of action they must first confirm that that course of action will not conflict with 
the wishes of their master or commanding officer. Furthermore, if the servant or soldier 
is in progress toward some freely chosen end, and the master or commander changes 
course in a way that conflicts with the servant or soldier‟s desires, loyalty demands that 
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the latter must suborn their wishes to the former. Autonomy in such a relationship is 
highly contingent and deeply problematic. If this kind of loyalty is what solidarity 
involves, solidarity is not reliably compatible with autonomy.  
Alternatively, loyalty could simply involve a common adherence to the other 
individuals in a group. However, even in this circumstance the „letting down‟ problem 
with autonomy persists. Imagine a basketball team. While some teams form to win, and 
others just to play, each team is characterized by collective engagement in the activity. 
This goal of enjoyment or of winning is the principle around which the team forms. We 
are now in a position to see how the requirements of fealty to a principle differ from the 
requirements of loyalty to individuals. When we are loyal to a principle we must act in 
the service of that principle, but there are a whole host of actions that take place outside 
the sphere of the activity in question that do not impact on one‟s ability to serve that 
principle and about which fealty is silent. In the case of a basketball team, one‟s choices 
in an array of off-court situations do not matter. Provided one is still a reliable member 
of the team – capable of playing your role and aiding others in playing theirs – one has 
not been disloyal to the principle. However, if we have to be loyal to the individuals 
involved the demands of solidarity will begin to impact on our off-court behaviour. If 
the other members of my team believe some behaviour is wrong to engage in such 
behaviour can be seen as letting down the team. Unfortunately, examples of team mates 
imposing their sexual mores on their fellows abound, ranging from objections to one 
team-mate‟s involvement with another‟s spouse through to an institutionalized 
homophobia. While the actions involved here range from the prurient to perfectly 
harmless, for loyalty to make demands on them violates the autonomy of an individual 
in a way that fealty to a principle does not. The common goal of winning does not 
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declare major parts of one‟s sexuality as in violation of a collective ethos in a way that 
one‟s team mates can and often do. In this way fealty to a principle interferes less with 
one‟s ability to live life from within through making meaningful choices than does 
loyalty to individuals.  
 C. Moderate Ethical Solidarity  
In my view, what we need is a conception of solidarity that allows for the 
interests of another to become a part of one‟s own set of interests but that does not 
violate the authentically meaningful choices at the heart of liberal individualism. There 
are other ways to show concern beyond loyalty that might provide such a mechanism. I 
believe the seeds of such an idea are found in Kant and have come to fruition in 
Stephen Darwall‟s The Second-person Standpoint. By now, we should not be surprised to 
find Kant at the bottom of a liberal approach to individuality. While Mill and Locke 
played the most significant role for classical liberals like Berlin, Rawls made grounding 
individual liberties in Kantian autonomy acceptable again. His views and those of his 
followers now occupy much of the mainstream of contemporary political philosophy. 
Central to Kantian individualism is the juxtaposition of autonomy and heteronomy. An 
autonomous being is free because it is guided by its own laws, unlike a heteronymous 
individual who is unfree because its actions are determined by laws that are not its own; 
usually those of tradition or other people or his own animalistic inclinations. In 
Darwall‟s view, this connects with concerns raised by Peter Strawson and Samuel 
Pufendorf. In order for a reason to be ethically legitimate it must address itself to our 
moral faculty – specifically our will. I think a version of this could be applied to 
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solidarity to allow for some kind of equilibrium between the demands of others and the 
requirements of autonomy.154 
 Kant makes clear the close connection between freedom and autonomy at the 
core of liberal individualism. Freedom, for Kant, means not being determined by any 
thing other than by the practical reason that constitutes one‟s will. It is, therefore, 
tantamount to goodness, because reason provides the categorical imperative according 
to which we can determine right from wrong. However, we can accept some version of 
the Kantian approach to autonomy without necessarily accepting the rest of his 
structure, and particularly the connection between freedom and morality. Critically, his 
approach to freedom as self-determination fits nicely with both of Berlin‟s formulations 
of freedom.155 Berlin‟s formulation of negative freedom is that it concerns an 
individual‟s capacity to do things unhindered by other individuals. This is not directly 
applicable to the Kantian approach, but when we look at solidarity as involving the 
demands of others it becomes clear that being guided from within, a key part of 
autonomy, involves incorporating the interests of others into one‟s own interest set in a 
way that leaves one free in the relevant sense. Berlin‟s formulation of positive freedom, 
as concerning the question of who is in control of an individual, seems more closely 
allied to the Kantian approach. While Berlin was concerned about the ability to skew 
positive freedom into something undeserving of the label, we can avoid most of his 
problems if we recognize some fact of pluralism discussed earlier. There is no general 
will to which an individual must submit himself to be truly free. Rather, one can remain 
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free and yet submit the demands of others to one‟s own conscience, as will be mirrored 
in my approach to solidarity as explained in the next section. This approach is consistent 
with the Kantian approach to autonomy and should not have the totalitarian overtones 
that so legitimately trouble Berlin, particularly since everyone else should also be 
incorporating your interests into their consciences as well. Furthermore, this approach 
leaves us with a recognition that while freedom necessarily entails autonomy, autonomy 
does not necessarily entail recognition of the universal will. Heteronomy, in this 
formulation arises from failing to mediate the demands of others through one‟s 
conscience. It is still possible, and still serves as the opposite of autonomy, but becomes 
much more restricted than when it meant any deviation from universal reason and the 
moral law. 
 Darwall advances this discussion by clarifying how the interests of others should 
be mediated through one‟s conscience. His The Second-person Standpoint advocates a 
Kantian approach to morality whereby the fact that we are called upon to address others 
in and from a second person presupposes a number of ethical claims about oneself, the 
other, and the relations between self and other. For our present purposes the conclusion 
of his argument is not critical. What I wish to borrow is how what he calls Strawson‟s, 
Fichte‟s and Pufendorf‟s Points combine to show that some features of reason for 
action are required by our moral sense in order to be legitimate to our conscience. While 
Darwall combines these to different effect, I explain these features of his argument 
separately and then show how they combine with the approach to autonomy used here 
to allow a Kantian version of solidarity. Solidarity can coalesce around a basic moral 
duty of consideration that is informed by Darwall‟s approach to ordinary human 
interaction. 
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 Strawson, in „Freedom and Resentment‟ claims that social desirability is not the 
kind of thing that can justify punishment. In Darwall‟s terms, „desirability is a reason of 
the wrong kind to warrant the attitudes and actions in which holding someone 
responsible consists in their own terms.‟156 If we wish to hold someone morally 
responsible, justification for that reactive attitude cannot simply rely on pragmatic 
reasons like “the world goes generally better.” The most frequently offered example is 
epistemic, but the principle extends throughout our conceptual universe. That someone 
has offered you a large sum of money to believe in a proposition for which you have no 
affirmative and significant negative evidence is not something you can ordinarily do. 
More importantly, it is not something you should do. There is some normative structure 
to our basic rationality such that reasons of different kinds should not come to bear on 
one another. In the moral sphere, this entails what Darwall, paraphrasing Williams, calls 
the „morality in, morality out‟ principle.  In Darwall‟s schema this is a limiting principle. 
It serves to exclude quite a variety of potential reasons for moral obligation. In the case 
of solidarity through consideration, it is important because self-interest and is a wrong 
kinds of reason for generating solidarity without some other binding force. 
 In Darwall‟s view, the second-personal nature of addressing other people 
necessarily involves making claims on their will. This is what he refers to as Fichte‟s 
point. „Only in this way,‟ Darwall, following Fichte, claims, „can [an address] 
simultaneously address and direct her as a free agent.‟157 Some kinds of reasons fall afoul 
of this provision, and are the wrong kinds of reason for moral action accordingly. Self-
interest, for instance, does not address itself to the will in the right way because it is 
insufficiently concerned with the interests of the other for it to imply solidarity. 
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However, what is especially important is that the demands of others in solidarity, as a 
kind of address, must appeal to our conscience rather than to our self-interest or to our 
purely calculative faculties. They must provide us with reasons why some course of 
action or some set of obligations are right or wrong, rather than that they are in our best 
interests or a logical consequence of our commitment to a particular group.   
 This becomes clearer in light of “Pufendorf‟s point.” Pufendorf claimed that 
divine moral law‟s legitimacy lies not in the possibility of damnation as punishment for 
sins, nor in its divine source, but because we can know and recognize evil. As Darwall 
puts it, „this is the difference between a kind of coercion, on the one hand, and free self-
determination by an internal acceptance of an authoritative demand, on the other.‟158 If 
God wants to make something wrong, Pufendorf claims, he would have to do so by 
making it immoral rather than by providing us with damnation to scare us into 
compliance. Darwall connects this to Fichte‟s point with Strawson‟s „wrong kind of 
reason‟ argument. Pufendorf‟s point entails that all legitimate moral addresses have to be 
framed in terms that are ultimately second-personal and therefore address our 
conscience. In the context of solidarity, it entails that demands from others that appeal 
to our self-interest or other features are inconsistent with the kinds of reasons that are 
appropriate for moral action because they address themselves to our conscience rather 
than our interests or our purely calculative faculty.  
Following Darwall‟s use of these three principles, we can see the possibility for a 
moderate account of solidarity. Solidarity with someone requires that we us to recognize 
the interests of others as reasons for adopting particular maxims or policies, but if we 
are to be autonomous these demands must be mediated by something internal to the 
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subject. Self-interest alone is not up to the task at hand, nor can we rely on relationships 
to generate demands that, in the right context, can reconcile with autonomy. I believe 
our basic morality, as explained by Darwall‟s approach to the second-personal 
perspective, can play the necessary mediating role. The basic thesis can be put as 
follows: attempts to coerce rather than to counsel are, because of their failure to address 
our conscience (or will), the wrong kinds of reasons for moral action.. I think this is a 
legitimate account of how interpersonal morality must work, and will build on it in the 
next chapter, when I explain how a basic ethical duty of consideration will provide for 
this kind of solidarity. 
III. Conclusion - Solidarity and Sociality 
 I believe a conception of moderate ethical solidarity [MES] can meet the needs 
of fraternity and can serve as a central value reflecting our inherent sociality. While I will 
deal fully with the mechanics of how this works – including explaining consideration 
and the key role it plays – in the next chapter, at the end of this one I will explain how 
my preferred account of solidarity fits the basic conditions set out at the end of chapter 
two. The MES conception incorporates the alterity we find lacking in impartiality and 
other forms of solidarity. Furthermore, since it is compatible with autonomy it need not 
result in the kind of philosophical quagmire dualist approaches so often end in. It can 
ground an ethical obligation that will in turn explain how we can have legitimate moral 
and political obligations that do not arise from autonomy, unlike the kind of impartiality 
that, in its ideal formulation, reduces to a requirement for autonomy. Furthermore, with 
the appropriate ethical obligation as its core, it can be universalizable in the way 
tradition is not. 
 146 
 Since fraternity is meant to provide a political value that arises from our 
sociality, alterity is critically important. Society involves, at a basic level, our relations 
with other people: the simple fact that we encounter others on whose interests we 
impact gives rise to a particular obligation. While MES does not fully explain how this 
can work, the consideration approach I will explain in the next chapter works with MES 
to explain how the interests of other can come to influence me. Given that I have 
shown why respect for autonomy is a necessary condition of the legitimacy of moral and 
political obligations, I cannot advocate a second principle that would violate the first. 
MES accommodates autonomy because of the important role of self-interests in 
establishing obligations and because of the benign nature of the basic ethical obligation 
of consideration. I have shown, using Darwall‟s formulation, how an approach to 
solidarity that puts the interests of others in terms of a basic ethical obligation is 
reconcilable with autonomy. This approach internalizes the interests of others without 
necessarily overriding or undermining our own interests. We still have the ability to live 
our lives from within through making meaningful choices while also recognizing the 
impact the interests of others ought to have on our judgements about what to do.  
 This chapter has shown how one particular conception of solidarity can serve as 
the value at the core of a principle of fraternity that will allow for the legitimacy of 
moral and political obligations in a manner consistent with the demands of autonomy 
and of our basic sociality. It grounds a principle according to which we can understand 
the impact of the interests of others on our moral and political obligations. It seems able 
to explain the requirements of sociality. Whether and how it works, however, is the 


























In this part I examine moderate ethical solidarity via consideration to 
determine what it requires and whether it is compatible with the 
requirements of the sociality. In chapter six I make clear what consideration 
involves and how it can play the role of the mediating ethical obligation 
solidarity requires, while in chapter seven I demonstrate a way in which this 
approach it can be reconciled with autonomy. This leads to the view that 
moderate ethical solidarity via consideration is what fraternity involves and 









Chapter 6 – Solidarity and Consideration 
Abstract 
In chapters three, four, and five we saw why tradition, impartiality and most 
kinds of solidarity cannot adequately explain the basic conditions of sociality. We also 
saw that the right kind of solidarity can account for the demands of sociality in a way 
that is compatible with autonomy. What remained was to fully explain the ethical 
obligation involved in Moderate Ethical Solidarity [MES] and how this can work to 
serve as a principle of fraternity. In this chapter I explain how a basic ethical obligation 
of consideration can play that role. I set out what consideration involves, how this 
approach works with MES to mediate the interests of others through one‟s conscience, 
and how this legitimates the kind of moral and political obligations with which our 
sociality is most concerned. 
Introduction 
 As we saw in chapter five, the demands of our sociality can be met by a 
particular kind of solidarity I call „Moderate Ethical Solidarity‟ [MES]. The demands of 
others can be incorporated into one‟s own set of interests through one‟s conscience in a 
way that should be compatible with autonomy. I then claimed that a basic ethical 
obligation of consideration can play the mediating role. In this chapter I explain how 
consideration makes individuals as agents aware of reasons for action they have based 
on their ability to impact on the interests of others. In the appropriate circumstances – 
i.e. when the other‟s interest corresponds with one of one‟s own interests and when 
solidarity improves the probability of satisfying the interest – these reasons for action 
can generate obligations of solidarity.  
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I begin by offering an explanation of what consideration involves. I explain it as 
a three-part process through which one becomes aware of reasons for action. The first 
stage requires an openness to one‟s ability to impact on the interests of others. This is a 
practical account of a normative requirement – one does ethically wrong by failing to be 
cognizant of one‟s impact on the interests of others in one‟s surroundings. Openness 
leads to the second stage‟s requirement to interpret the interests and impacts involved 
from the perspective of the other. Openness involves a significant alterity, but it is not 
as impossible a standard as some critics claim. The products of these two stages 
combine at the third to make the individual involved aware of reasons for adopting 
maxims or policies that reflect a proper response to the datum from the first two stages. 
This awareness involves being properly disposed toward particular circumstances, where 
what is „proper‟ is always acting as the other wishes. In this way we avoid the problems 
of generating problematic reactions from the outcomes of the first two stages.   
Having explained how consideration works, I then must explain how it can be 
used in establishing obligations to enter into relationships of solidarity. Using two 
examples – one apparently trivial, the other deeply problematic – I will show how 
consideration leads an individual to recognize that she has an interest in common with 
another and that the common interest will be ameliorated by coordinated or collective 
action: a common interest of the right kind. While there can be multiple descriptions of 
the same set of circumstances, if one of those descriptions involves a common interest 
of the right kind then some form of solidarity can emerge in that encounter, however 
tenuous. I then shift my focus to clarifying exactly how MES via consideration fits with 
the methodological constraints established in chapter two and with the depiction of 
solidarity in chapter five. This will lead me to the conclusion that MES via consideration 
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can explain how we have pro tanto obligations that can play the role required of fraternity 
in a dualist theory of the legitimacy of moral and political obligations. 
I. The Nature of Consideration 
 Consideration is a three-stage ethical demand. I label the three stages openness, 
imagination and recognition. Openness requires agents to be aware of their places in the 
world and of their ability to impact on the interests of others. Imagination requires the 
agent to assess the impacts and interests to which the first stage has alerted her 
according to their role in the other‟s “web of norms.” Recognition requires that the 
agent respond appropriately to the content that they became aware of because of the 
first stage and that has been given clear content in the second stage. I characterize an 
appropriate response as one that acts as the other should wish. Together, these three 
stages lead an agent to be aware of reasons for adopting maxims or policies. Once we 
understand how consideration works we will be in a position, in the next section, to 
explain how consideration combines with moderate ethical solidarity to explain the 
obligations of our basic sociality.  
A. Openness and Consideration 
 Openness to one‟s ability to impact on the interests of others is the first stage of 
the consideration. The first-order obligation of consideration is the ethical requirement 
to be aware of one‟s ability to impact on the interests of others. In this subsection I 
explain what this openness consists in and then argue that failure to be appropriately 
aware is ethically wrong. There are both instrumental and intrinsic explanations for this 
wrongness. Instrumentally, a failure of openness is wrong because it increases the 
likelihood of adopting wrongful maxims or policies, or acting wrongfully. Failure of 
openness is intrinsically wrong in that it is a morally inferior version of a morally 
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superior action. Alternatively, we could see a failure of openness as intrinsically wrong 
because it is itself inconsiderate. Finally, I explain how this openness leads to the third-
stage obligations that will be discussed in more detail in following subsections.  
 Openness is a practical requirement that an individual agent should be aware of 
her place in the world, the situations of others around her, and how those situations are 
likely to change through what she does. When walking down the street, we have to be 
aware of the other individuals coming toward or passing us not simply to facilitate our 
own progress but in order to avoid impeding theirs. Stepping to the side in order to 
avoid walking in the same path as the handicapped woman walking towards you is an 
action, but that action arises because you were aware of the possible impact on her 
interests. That awareness is itself openness. Long-term examples also make the 
importance of openness clear. If I am deciding between job offers, I do wrong if I am 
not aware of the impact my choice will have on my immediate family. My children will 
have to attend school, my spouse to adjust or change her career; that my decision will 
impact on each of these interests should play a role in my decision, and they come to 
play this role because of my openness to my impact on their needs. I should note that I 
don‟t believe the long- and short-term versions of openness are fundamentally different: 
they‟re the application of the same basic disposition to different needs, but the practical 
requirement of openness remains the same in each. The impacts on autonomy will, 
naturally, be much greater in long-term planning than in most short-term situations, but 
this should be addressed at the appropriate stage and should not be built into the 
account of openness itself.  
 I have claimed throughout this discussion that openness is an ethical 
requirement – that we do morally wrong in failing to be aware of our ability to impact 
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on others. This claim stands in need of justification, and I can think of three, presented 
here in increasing order of strength. Firstly, a failure of openness is instrumentally 
wrong because it makes one more likely to perform negative consequences. Here, what 
is actually morally wrong are all the negative acts one will do because of the failure of 
openness, but this nonetheless makes the failure of openness part of the wrong. In the 
examples discussed above, failing to notice other people walking down the street – 
perhaps I am distractedly text-messaging a friend, confirming dinner plans – is wrong 
because it makes it more likely that I will have a negative impact on the interests of 
others walking down the street. If I choose a career without thought as to the well-being 
of my family members I will be more likely to harm them in my decision than if I am 
aware of the impact my decision will have on them. Openness could have prevented 
these wrongs and is, from the point of view of my fellow pedestrians or my family, is 
wrong because of its contribution to the intrinsically wrongful (because harmful) acts. 
 However, I believe there is something intrinsically ethically wrong about the 
failure of openness, something I think the above examples show. There is nothing 
wrong with text-messaging or taking a job per se, but in these circumstances these 
actions evidence a failure to be aware of the impact my actions can have on others and 
is, because of that, wrong. Even if, counterfactually, I choose the job that my family 
would wish – that provides the optimal opportunities for my wife to develop her career 
and that allows my children to preserve treasured friendships – I do wrong in not 
recognizing that this is a reason why I should take that job rather than some other. The 
text-messager does wrong not simply in impeding the flow of traffic, but in doing so 
oblivious to the fact that he is having such an effect. In each case, though more directly 
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in the family scenario, the failure of openness is itself a legitimate grievance for the 
wronged parties.  
  The ideal test for a claim of intrinsic wrongness is to imagine two almost 
identical scenarios where openness is the only variable. Let us presume that in two 
otherwise identical worlds a child is afloat in the sea on a small raft that will capsize in 
minutes, drowning the child. They have strayed from a crowded beach on a busy day. In 
each world a swimmer, on his way from a nearby island to the crowded beach will save 
the child. In the first world, a considerate individual will notice that the child‟s raft has a 
rope attached to it, and he will clench the rope in his teeth and drag the child and raft to 
shallow waters. In another world an unaware swimmer will accidentally get the 
equivalent rope caught in his teeth and will inadvertently tug the child to shallow waters. 
It seems clear to me that the actions of the swimmer in the first world have a morally 
valorous quality that the actions of the swimmer in the second world lack. While both 
have done good in some sense by saving the child, only the swimmer in the first world 
has done all that he morally ought. There is, then, some morally positive quality lacking 
in the second swimmer‟s actions. What is lacking is the openness to the impact on the 
interests of another, which because of the difference it makes in determining the morally 
good from the morally lucky, should be seen as good in itself.159  
 The consequences of a failure of openness become clear when we see the 
impact openness has on the other parts of consideration. Openness should make one 
aware of the considerations that, when clarified by the imagination, induce one to 
endorse particular maxims or policies in the third stage. Furthermore, it sparks the 
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second, imaginative stage and serves to reinforce an important point about the 
difference between a failure of imagination and failing to imagine. The content of these 
obligations is determined by the second stage of considerateness; the imaginative stage. 
This provides some direction for openness, which could otherwise succumb to what I 
call the problem of callousness. How this works is the focus of the next section.   
 B. Consideration and Imagination 
 The second stage of consideration involves a cognitive requirement. We must 
judge our impacts on the interests of others according to the other‟s own understanding 
of those impacts and interests: the role those impacts and interests play in another‟s 
“web of normativity.” In explaining this term I will offer an account of what 
consideration requires of the imagination and before I defend it against two sorts of 
criticisms. Individual agents must, to be genuinely considerate of others, understand 
their impact on the interests of others from the point of view of the others in question. 
I believe that it is only through this persepectival shift that genuine consideration is 
possible. There are two main lines of criticism of this approach, each of which is a 
version of an argument from implausibility. Once I have explained the basics of what 
consideration requires of imagination, I will clarify it by defending it against these 
attacks. 
 Each of us has a “web of normativity.” I adopt this term by analogy with the 
term “web of beliefs,” but the connections between a web of normativity and a web of 
beliefs are not merely analogical. An agent‟s web of normativity is the connections 
between the various norms that he recognizes, endorses and rejects. It is closely 
connected to our web of beliefs such that some of our beliefs will have normative 
implications, but it also includes desires and other interests, other things that make our 
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lives go better, that are not necessarily reducible to beliefs or desires. Just as some 
beliefs provide evidence for others, some norms provide justification for the 
endorsement or rejection of others. Take, for example, a norm of abstaining from eating 
bacon. In different individuals this norm will be connected to a different set of other 
norms, in a couple of different ways. For a vegetarian, not eating bacon will be one of a 
number of norms that follow from a deeper norm of abstaining from eating food that 
comes from animals. It will have sister norms of abstaining from steak and chicken. For 
an observant Jew, not eating bacon follows from a deeper norm of not eating „unclean‟ 
foods, where unclean refers to a particular test of what is and is not kosher. For 
someone on a diet, not eating bacon could attach to a deeper norm of not eating 
unhealthy foods. What consideration requires of our imagination is to determine which 
of these possibilities may be the case and, given the various options, determine how the 
individual would wish to be treated given the role the interest in question plays in their 
web of normativity.  
 This becomes important for consideration because without this kind of alterity 
individual agents would not fully appreciate the impact of their interests on others. Let 
us return, for a moment, to the example of deciding among job offers discussed in the 
previous subsection. In acting considerately of my family members, I have to imagine 
the impact on their interests my decision will have from their perspective in order to be 
genuinely considerate. I have to ask myself questions like whether it is important for my 
children to go to good public schools, or whether my wife‟s current career is important 
to her or is she looking to change directions. If my wife is looking to change directions, 
then the career she currently holds will have less importance to her than will be obvious 
when taken from an outsider‟s point of view. Furthermore, while my career might be 
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important to be consideration requires that I not assume that the same holds for her and 
her career. To fail to assess the importance of an interest from the perspective of 
another makes it more likely that one will err in determining how to act. Indeed, such an 
error seems to underlie the problem of well-intentioned paternalism. If I act to impact 
another‟s interests such as I would like if I were in their position this can be paternalistic 
if their interests do not play the same role in their web of normativity as my interest 
does in mine.    
 This sort of imagination goes beyond Hannah Arendt‟s approach to alterity.160 
Her approach was best explained as analogous to spending some time in another‟s 
home. We look at their belongings and their arrangements and make judgements about 
their character from these bits of information. Ultimately, however, in her approach we 
are judging others according to our own standards, which seems at least capable of 
leading to the kind of well-intentioned paternalism I warned about and is not genuinely 
considerate even if benign. The point of my formulation here is to judge our impacts on 
others according to the others‟ own understandings. Simply being aware of the impact 
one has on the interests of others is a start, but it is insufficient if the impact and 
interests in question are assessed in light of one‟s own normative framework rather than 
as a part of the other‟s web of morality.   
 Some authors, notably Iris Marion Young, objected to the attempt to predicate 
ethical obligations on this level of alterity.161 Responding to the central role that taking 
the perspective of the other plays in Habermasian ethics, Young argues that such 
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symmetry of perspectives is neither prudent nor possible.162 Drawing on examples such 
as surveys indicating that many people would consider a disabled life „worse than death,‟ 
the cross-examination of Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas conformation hearings, 
and non-Lakota Indians performing sacred Lakota rites, Young claims that taking the 
perspective of another often distorts the original perspective which is itself a form of 
mistreatment. However, this argument would have little purchase against the kind of 
approach here. In my outline, we are to use our imaginations to understand the meaning 
of an action for the other within their own context. The examples Young uses are 
simply failures to achieve this alterity. While the survey respondents and the non-native 
spiritualists simply fail to achieve the necessary imaginative leap, I wonder whether the 
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee made a genuine effort. On my view, the 
survey respondents and non-native spiritualists were cognitively wrong, while the 
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee might have been morally wrong for failing 
to be open to Hill‟s perspective in the first place.  
 Young‟s second claim, that such alterity is impossible, would be more difficult 
for my proposal, but I believe her arguments on this point fail to address the kind of 
imaginative act I envision. Young claims that symmetry between self and other, in the 
way Habermas and, Young‟s primary target, Seyla Benhabib claim, is not possible.163 
Young‟s argument for the impossibility of symmetry relies on the claim that there will 
always be something of oneself incorporated into the standpoint of the other or that 
there will always be something of the other omitted from the first person‟s account. 
These two remainders indicate, for her, the impossibility of symmetry, leading to her 
advocacy of an „asymmetrical‟ approach to alterity. However, Young is setting the bar 
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higher than Habermas, Benhabib and I need to reach in order to justify the role alterity 
plays in consideration. Consideration requires an understanding of the other‟s point of 
view on their own terms, but this does not mean it requires full submersion of the self 
in the thoughts of the other. It only requires enough alterity to tell us what matters to 
them and why. As Young recognizes with her own proposal, pure symmetry is not 
necessary for genuine alterity to arise. As such, while Young‟s metaphysical arguments 
might have some impact, they do not have enough impact to undermine the plausibility 
of the imaginative requirement offered here. 
 Another critique might not question only the plausibility of this kind of 
imagination, but whether it is really the kind of insight on which to ground a moral 
theory. Richard Holton and Rae Langton‟s article „Empathy and Animal Ethics‟ 
provides an example of such an attack, only targeted at Peter Singer and R. M. Hare.164 
Their contend that „the utilitarianism of Hare and Singer risks being not impartial 
enough. It is too parochial if it ties ethics to what we can in principle imagine.‟165 
Because we are more able to imagine the experiences of those most like us, they claim, 
any ethics that depends on the imagination will be dangerously narrow. They claim that 
in justifying universalization both Hare and Singer are committed to the claim that 
„whenever I believed that someone in certain circumstances desired to do a certain 
thing, I would desire that if I were to find myself in those circumstances.‟166 In their 
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view, this sort of imaginative requirement demands of individuals that they achieve a 
significant level of empathy: specifically, they must appreciate the “what-it-is-like-to-be-
a-Xness” – i.e. the phenomenal character of being an X – in order to assess the desires 
of the X in question. Holton and Langton claim that such a deep phenomenal 
understanding is both impossible and an inadequate ground for ethics. Insofar as it is 
impossible, the utilitarian approaches of Singer and Hare fail, however, for my purposes 
it matters more that they claim that it is an inappropriate ground for ethics. „If,‟ they 
contend, „we owe moral concern to the sentient, then we cannot restrict that concern to 
those whose shows we can, in imagination, borrow. Sentience transcends 
imaginability.‟167 Sentience in Singer is the ability to feel pleasure and pain, which would 
count as interests in my formulation. As such, I am also implicated in Holton and 
Langton‟s critique of imagination. 
 My defence here is similar to my defence to the feminist critique. I believe Hare 
has overstated the demands of universalizability and that in targeting this standard 
Holton and Langton leave an opening beneath which my lesser imaginative 
requirements can pass through. Holton and Langton argue that Hare and Singer‟s 
approach requires them to assess the desires of another from a “what it would be like to 
be them” standpoint, but I believe this interpretation of the proposition discussed above 
is unnecessarily strong, albeit possibly apt when applied to Hare and Singer. An alternate 
reading of this principle would not require us to appreciate the desires of another from 
the standpoint of their phenomenal character, but from a standpoint that recognizes the 
place of that desire in their web of normativity. My approach is one such standard. I do 
not require that we know everything about another: let alone that we appreciate the 
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phenomenal character of their lived experience. What I require is an attempt to grasp 
what role a particular norm plays in another‟s web of normativity, which is a more 
limited form of alterity than empathy requires. This is a lower standard, requiring much 
less of the imagination than the kind of empathy Holton and Langton contend that 
Singer and Hare need. If someone has a norm, this norm is usually derived from some 
deeper norm that it reflects or it has some derivative norm(s) that reflect it. In either 
direction, the lower or higher norms will illustrate something about the content of the 
norm in question, just as knowing whether chicken is acceptable will distinguish the role 
of a bacon-abstention norm in vegetarians and observant Jews. This does not require 
the kind of symmetry that the „what it is like to be the other‟ standard requires, and as 
such should not be an argument against my approach here.168 
  On this approach to consideration, openness to one‟s impact on others 
generates recognition, while the imaginative leap provides a full content to that 
awareness. This is not enough, however, for consideration to exist. The recognition 
created by the first stage and defined by the second must be crystallized into reasons the 
strength of which can then be adjudicated. It is the task of the third stage to take the 
recognition and its content and leave us with a reason to act pursuant to the recognition. 
Explaining how this works, how and when our openness and its content turn to 
recognized reasons for action, is the focus of the next section. 
 C. Consideration and appropriate responses 
 The third stage of consideration, called „recognition,‟ requires that the agent 
respond appropriately to the data that they became aware of because of the first stage 
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and that has been given clear content in the second stage. In this section I explain the 
importance of appropriate reactions to consideration using the basic example of 
recognizing the pain of another. In consideration, the appropriate response is to 
recognize that you have a reason to adopt such maxims and policies as you understand 
the other to wish.169 This will lead to possible demandingness objections that I must 
address before explaining how consideration can play the role needed of an ethical 
obligation in establishing solidarity.  
Imagine a scenario where someone is in pain that you are in a position to stop. 
Take, for example, someone who has been stung by a wasp and is having an allergic 
reaction that is painful but not fatal. Let us assume further that I am able to stop their 
allergic reaction at no cost to myself but the few seconds it takes to administer some 
medication, or by killing the individual. The first stage of consideration should provide 
the recognition that I can stop their pain, while the imagination condition provides me 
with knowledge that the person in pain wishes to have the reaction stopped rather than 
to die.170 As such, I now have the recognition that they wish me to stop the pain by 
administering the medication. It is nonetheless an open question as to how one is to 
deal with the awareness that arises from the first and second stages. A sadist could take 
pleasure in the suffering of the other, while an amoral person might simply take note of 
the state of affairs while having no normative response. However, there is something 
ethically flawed in either of these approaches. They understand the situation but have 
failed to have the appropriate response.  
                                                 
169
 Recognition is key here. Without recognition a reason might apply but cannot rise to the level of 
an interest the individual has and on which solidarity can be built. Just as there are unrecognized 
reasons that apply to individuals, individuals also have unrecognized interests. However, without 
recognition an interest cannot serve as a common interest on which solidarity can be built. On this sort 
of ‘external’ approach to reasons, see Scanlon 1998, while a comparable approach to interests can be 
found in Raz 1986. See also the discussion of this point in Chapter 5 above. 
170
 This may not be true in every case of an individual in pain.  
 162 
A failure at the first stage of consideration is a failure to be aware of some state 
of affairs. A failure at the second stage is a failure to adequately appreciate the nature of 
the state of affairs. However, a failure at the third stage is a failure to adopt such maxims 
and policies as your appreciation of the state of affairs should dictate. However, I have 
yet to explain why the appreciation of a state of affairs should lead to any particular 
maxims or policies. I believe consideration requires that the appropriate response to a 
state of affairs is to recognize that you have a reason to adopt such maxims or policies, 
or to act, as you understand the other individual involved in the state of affairs would 
wish you to adopt, or to act: I call this the alterity maxim. Without such a maxim the 
potential failures of the prior sections could resurface and new problems would arise: 
any of which problem would undermine consideration.   
Let us start with the trivial pedestrian example. If I am walking down the street I 
am under an obligation to be aware of my fellow pedestrians and how I can impact their 
interests. I become aware of an elderly man walking towards me with great difficulty, in 
a path that would lead us to bump into one another. Based on the available data, I can 
imagine that he wishes to continue walking down the street unimpeded. What reaction 
ought I have to this awareness? Furthermore, if we presume that we are each aware of 
the other, I can reasonably presume that he has recognized the eventual conflict, and 
wishes for us to avoid it. He might even think of his own frailty and my relative agility 
and believe that I ought to adjust my path. On this basis, I ought to endorse the maxim 
„the elderly man has a more difficult time adjusting his path than I, so I should adjust 
my path.‟ I believe this maxim is the natural moral response to the scenario presented. 
More importantly, it fits with the requirements of the alterity maxim.   
 163 
Consider next the family situation discussed earlier. I have two job offers, one of 
which, in Alpha City, will be better for my wife and children, than a competing offer in 
Betatown. I recognize that my decision will impact on their interests, and that I imagine 
that they wish that I would take the offer in Alpha City. I should then recognize that I 
have a pro tanto reason to take the job in Alpha City, even if the offer from Betatown is 
more appealing. If I do ultimately take the Betatown job this will be because I believed 
the reasons to pursue that course of action were stronger than the reasons to do what 
consideration required, but this is not a problem for this stage in the argument. What is 
important here is that I recognize that consideration gives me a reason to adopt a 
particular course of action that would not have existed if the decision did not impact on 
the interests of others. Furthermore, the content of that reason is that I do as the others 
wish.  
To turn to the example of the wasp sting, our ordinary moral intuitions are that 
we have reason to do what the other wishes. In this case, we are aware of his suffering 
and we can imagine quite clearly that he wishes us to end his suffering by administering 
the medication. The ordinary result of such a situation is that we recognize that we have 
a reason to administer the medication, rather than to observe his suffering or to take joy 
in watching him die. I believe that the reason we have this intuition is because 
consideration‟s third stage requires us to recognize that we have a reason to adopt the 
maxims or policies an individual on whose interests we can impact wishes.  
I think this maxim explains a great many of our intuitions, but it nonetheless 
presents potential problems. A key set of problems can be categorized as „expensive 
taste problems.‟171 These are problems that arise because someone else wishes 
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something that, for one reason or another, they ought not to wish. Sometimes this will 
be a morally reprehensible wish, while at other times they will simply be a wish that is 
unduly demanding given the circumstances. In either case, my answer will be the same: 
consideration nonetheless provides us with a pro tanto reason to act pursuant to the 
expensive taste in question. We have a pro tanto reason to help others perform immoral 
actions, and to give in to those individuals who have expensive tastes. Nonetheless, each 
of these problems needs a different defence.  
Sometimes what we have most reason to do is something that is on some 
account immoral. In one sense, this is a key part of the phenomenology of moral 
dilemmas. A moral dilemma is usually framed as occurring when one agent is morally 
obliged to carry out two mutually exclusive actions. Antigone is required to care for her 
traitorous brother‟s corpse by burying it, but she is also required to obey the laws of 
Thebes by not burying it. Agamemnon is required by some of the gods to protect his 
daughter, and by others to sacrifice her. However, these dilemmas are usually framed in 
terms of ought and obligation. At this point we are talking about something much 
weaker – reasons for adopting a particular maxim or policy. For some reason we do not 
feel as torn about mutually exclusive reasons as we do about mutually exclusive 
obligations. In part, this is because we are used to talking about a plurality of reasons 
where conflicts are frequent, but obligations seem to end discussion about what one 
ought to do. This is more of an attempt to explain away the problem rather than to 
address it head on, but to whatever extent it softens‟ our concerns about the plausibility 
of moral dilemmas it might be of some use. However, if we can have most reason to do 
something immoral it should not seem so implausible to claim that we can have a pro 
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tanto reason to do something immoral, nor that the source of that reason can be our 
consideration for another.  
If I am wrong about this, however, and a comprehensive and accurate theory of 
morality explained that there could not possibly be moral dilemmas, this would not 
really affect the third stage of consideration. What it would mean is that what I have 
been calling pro tanto reasons would really be prima facie reasons. The third stage would, 
on this account, lead to a prima facie rather than a pro tanto reason but it would appear 
to the individual involved to lead to a reason nonetheless. Since recognition of the 
existence of a reason is what is important here, I will remain officially open to the 
possibility that the reasons in question are prima facie reasons (and therefore may not 
really be reasons in some stronger sense), while nonetheless sceptical about the 
possibility of such a comprehensive and accurate theory of morality emerging and 
excluding the possibility of moral dilemmas.172 
This discussion also illustrates my approach to the more directly “expensive” 
version of the problem of expensive tastes. Such cases arise when, through 
consideration, I appear to have a reason to act in some way that is based on the 
idiosyncratically expensive tastes of another. I think that the result here is a pro tanto 
reason for action. Consider first the case of someone with a relatively benign expensive 
taste: someone who has a deep phobia of stepping on sidewalk cracks. If I am walking 
toward someone who I know from prior experience has this phobia (it is not the kind of 
thing one has reason to imagine, given most ordinary situations), consideration seems to 
give me a pro tanto reason to stay out of his way and allow him to continue to walk on 
solid concrete. Where is the harm in this? If I had countervailing reasons, if I was in a 
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rush to pick up my child, I might have more reason to ignore his phobia. However, if 
no stronger reason arises it seems clear to me that I do have reason to accommodate his 
harmless phobia. It seems clear to me that I do. Now consider someone with more 
harmful expensive tastes – someone who can only walk in new and very expensive 
socks. If I can provide this person with such socks, consideration will give me a reason 
to do so, but it is quite likely that I will also have countervailing reasons to do other 
things that conflict with the reason provided by consideration. If those reasons are 
relatively trivial, I might nonetheless have ultima facie reason to give in to the individual 
with expensive tastes.  
Ultimately, my response to the problem of expensive taste is to claim that 
consideration only provides the individual agent with a reason for action, not with an 
ultima facie obligation. Given this limitation, we should be more comfortable with the 
alterity maxim and recognize it as a guiding rule for explaining what an appropriate 
response to the first two stages of consideration will be in any given situation. Together, 
these three stages lead to the view that we have a basic ethical obligation to be aware of 
our impact on the interests of others as they understand them and to recognize that we 
have reason to adopt maxims and policies as the other wishes. In the next section I will 
explain how this obligation can help an account of moderate ethical solidarity explain 
the demands of our sociality. 
I believe there is one limitation to the scope of consideration I must note before 
moving on to explain how consideration can play the role an ethical account of 
solidarity requires. There is a limit to how far consideration can make one acknowledge 
some behaviour as a reason. This limit is reached when there is a mutually exclusive 
interest involved in one‟s consideration of others. If two people are applying for only 
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one job, each person is capable of impacting on the interests of the other by 
withdrawing or by deliberately botching the interview. They should be aware of this in 
the sense required by the first stage of consideration, and they can imagine clearly that 
the other might wish the first person to remove herself from competition in either way.  
However, the fact that the first person has an interest in obtaining the post that would 
directly conflict with any description of the situation, she is justified in refusing to 
endorse that she has a reason to withdraw from the competition. Most situations lends 
themselves to many descriptions, but in the case of a genuinely mutually exclusive 
interest no description of the situation can make it such that the consideration would 
not lead to an internal contradiction if the first person were required to recognize the 
impacts on the interests of the other as an reason for her.173 While a similar approach 
might also resolve some „expensive taste‟ style cases, I believe it should be restricted to 
genuinely mutually exclusive interests. 
II. Consideration and Fraternity  
While any ethical obligation can work with Moderate Ethical Solidarity, few are 
as suited to explain the demands of sociality or fit as well with the nature of solidarity as 
consideration. In this section I claim that consideration works within moderate ethical 
solidarity to generate entry obligations under the right conditions. Consideration can 
make us recognize that both we and another have a common interest in some object, 
and will also help explain whether coordinated action will make it more likely for us to 
achieve that object. After this I will attempt to explain why consideration is particularly 
important in incorporating a value of solidarity into a principle that can represent the 
demands of sociality. Any principle that claims to represent the normative requirements 
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of our sociality should be capable of explaining the bonds at work in any relationship, 
however trivial or tenuous. While moderate ethical solidarity explains how and when 
non-voluntary obligations can be made legitimate, consideration offers one way of 
explaining how and when non-voluntary obligations arise. It is, then, how MES works 
to incorporate the interests of the other into one‟s own set of interests. I will conclude 
claim that a principle of MES via consideration meets with the methodological 
requirements set out at the end of the first part and should be recognized as a principle 
of fraternity.  
A. Consideration and Moderate Ethical Solidarity  
Moderate ethical solidarity allows for the incorporation of the interests of 
another into one‟s own interest set in a way consistent with one‟s autonomy. It is 
consistent with autonomy because rather than being bound to the will of another 
individual, someone entering into moderate ethical solidarity is only bound to his own 
conscience. Consideration is the ethical obligation that brings the interests of others to 
the conscience of the individual agent. Nonetheless, consideration has both internal 
limits and limits that arise from its combination with solidarity that differentiate it from 
impartial benevolence. 
The examples discussed above illustrate how consideration can lead to 
awareness of ethical obligations on which solidarity can be built, given the right 
circumstances. The case of individuals walking down the street is a trivial example, but it 
shows that even in such trivial situations consideration and solidarity together can 
represent the normative demands of sociality. It also leaves us with an excellent example 
of one important feature of this approach. There are many different ways to describe 
the situations of two individuals walking down the same street. In most of them, the 
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two individuals do not have a genuinely common interest. One has an interest in 
walking in one direction down the street, while the other‟s interest is in walking the 
other way. One‟s interest is in himself walking without obstruction, while the other has 
an interest in his own walking unobstructed. Each of these descriptions of the situation 
do not involve a common interest that could give rise to an entry obligation. 
Consideration makes the interests of the other person something I also have a pro tanto 
reason to ameliorate, thereby incorporating their interests in my set of interests insofar 
as I have a defeasible interest in the things that I have reason to do. Without 
consideration, we each have a reason to achieve different states of affairs, but with 
consideration I have a reason to achieve the same state of affairs that forms the content 
of his reason. We thereby have a common reason that can, in this particular situation, be 
improved by collective action. It is in this way that consideration leads us to have pro 
tanto entry obligations.  
The consideration example is even more effective in the „book club solidarity‟ 
example discussed in the previous chapter. There is a description of the individuals in 
the „walking down the street‟ scenario where they do have a common interest that might 
be more likely met through collective action: they each have an interest in the free flow 
of pedestrian traffic on a given sidewalk. The book club, I believe, does not have such a 
description. It does not matter to me either way whether I read a book as a member of a 
club or independently, but it matters to my acquaintance. Without consideration there 
would be no common interest. However, consideration makes it such that I am aware of 
a pro tanto reason to join the book club because I am aware that it is what my friend 
wishes. Consideration makes me aware of a reason I have to want her to read the book: 
it is what she wants and I am aware of this desire. This then gives me an obligation to 
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enter into solidarity by joining the book club because it is only through collective action 
that our common interest in her reading the book can be achieved. A similar set of 
circumstances would affect the often discussed case of aid for those who cannot 
contribute to a joint enterprise. The able-bodied have obligations of consideration to 
help those who cannot help themselves. In such an instance the less-able might not be 
able to contribute greatly to the collective enterprise, but in what way they can they are 
concomitantly obligated. Nothing in consideration implies that the ultima facie 
obligations will be equal: indeed, it implies that the most able will have the strongest 
obligations. What is important for our purposes here is that consideration incorporates 
the interests of others in my own set such that, under the appropriate circumstances (i.e. 
lack of valid mutually exclusive interest, increased likelihood of success) I ought to 
recognize that I have a reason to enter into solidarity with them.  
The „under the appropriate circumstances‟ clause of the prior sentence is 
important. Not every possible object of consideration leads us to recognize will be able 
to lead to solidarity. Mutually exclusive interests are one omission. For instance, in war 
one has an interest in staying alive and in killing one‟s enemy. One‟s enemy also has 
equivalent interests, but with the referents reversed. As mentioned earlier, consideration 
is not so strong as to require one to adopt a mutually exclusive set of interests, so there 
is no requirement to act pursuant to the interests of another when those interests are 
mutually exclusive with interests one already has. This is not to say that one cannot 
adopt mutually exclusive interests, but to say that consideration cannot obligate one to 
do so. Other ethical relationships – friendships, family, love – might lead to mutually 
exclusive obligations, but consideration is, as mentioned earlier, not as these demands. 
Despite this exemption, the occasions when one will have mutually exclusive interests is 
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limited. Even in war, once someone is a prisoner they are no longer a threat and 
consideration could require one to keep prisoners in good health including, if it were 
not implicit in a „good health‟ clause, refraining from torturing them.  
In addition to mutually exclusive interests, some interests will not be ameliorated 
by coordinated or collective action. However, examples are difficult to find. After all, 
most situations can be redescribed in some way that will lead to a common interest that 
collective action can ameliorate. In the last chapter, I discussed the case of the concert 
pianist and the audience member. I then described the common interest as a in a good 
performance which cannot be ameliorated by collective action, but other descriptions of 
the same situation could, via consideration, lead to a common interest that collective 
action can ameliorate. The audience member can impact on the pianist‟s interest in 
having a silent hall during her performance, and can imagine quite clearly what the 
pianist would wish him to do. He should then recognize that he has an interest in 
staying quiet and in silently urging his fellow audience members to remain quiet (ideally 
through easily understood gestures). This kind of coordination between the audience 
member and the pianist is a form of collective action, illustrating that it can appear in 
even apparently unlikely scenarios. Nonetheless, this cannot eliminate the possibility 
that there will be situations where consideration leads us to recognize a reason for 
action but there is nothing for solidarity to do to ameliorate the scenario.  
The possibility of such limits differentiates the requirements of solidarity via 
consideration from the requirements an obligation of universal benevolence would 
offer. An obligation of benevolence does not observe any difference between mutually 
exclusive interests and other interests. In this way it requires sacrifices that consideration 
does not. Consideration is further tempered by its connection with solidarity. Solidarity 
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requires both common interests, which cannot be found in every circumstance, and that 
the common interests be ameliorable through collective action. Benevolence makes no 
such „collective action‟ requirement. Charity, an example of benevolence, is not a 
collective action. Charity is a unilateral act of giving to another regardless of whether the 
other accepts the gift. Likewise, charity does not require that the interest in question be 
a common interest: that the other needs it suffices for benevolence in a way that is 
precluded by the self-interest condition of solidarity. While there might be some moral 
role for benevolence, it is not the same a consideration, let alone moderate ethical 
solidarity via consideration. 
B. Consideration, Sociality and Solidarity 
Consideration leads us to recognize reasons for action based on the interests of 
others. In the appropriate circumstances – i.e. when they correspond with one of one‟s 
own interests and when solidarity improves the probability of satisfying the interest – 
these reasons for action can generate obligations of solidarity. However, given my 
formulation of solidarity here, it seems plausible that any ethical obligation could 
provide me with a reason for entry into a relationship of moderate ethical solidarity. 
While this is true, it is only MES via consideration that can explain the kind of bare 
sociality needed to represent the demands of sociality. Moderate Ethical Solidarity needs 
consideration if it is to explain these demands.  
Firstly, consideration is broader than most ethical duties in the sense that it 
applies to a wider array of circumstances than most others. An ethical obligation not to 
murder only applies when I am capable of killing other people, which I often am not 
and which some people almost never are. Such an obligation is more live to someone 
who is strong or armed than it does to the diminutive or ill-equipped. The obligation 
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not to lie is fairly basic, but allows withholding the truth in a way that may be 
inconsiderate. These sorts of basic obligations are universal in scope – they apply to 
anyone who happens to find themselves in a situation, but they do not permeate our 
dealings with one another in the way that consideration does.  
Other core moral obligations – like the obligation to act pursuant to the 
categorical imperative or to do no harm or to maximize the good – have the same sort 
of permeability as the obligation of consideration, but they do not seem to have the 
same kind of connection to sociality that consideration does. Obligations to maximize 
the good do not depend on the presence of other people, in the way that consideration 
does.174 Likewise, the categorical imperative applies to any maxim regardless of whether 
it will impact on the interests of others. Consideration, however, is only an ethical duty 
because individuals can impact on the interests of others. If there is no one on whose 
interests one can impact, one‟s obligation to be considerate is silent.  
It seems, then, that consideration has both a connection with sociality that no 
other ethical obligation both in how very often it matters (what I referred to as its ability 
to permeate our dealings with others above) and in when it does not matter. Therefore, 
while solidarity explains the importance non-voluntary obligations of the kind we 
recognized as important in the second chapter, consideration connects solidarity with 
the normative requirements of sociality. When consideration leads one to recognize that 
there is a reason to adopt a maxim or policy, and that maxim or policy will be more 
likely served by collective action than not, solidarity arises. If there is no possibility for 
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ameliorating the interests involved through coordinated action, there seems to me to be 
no relevant sociality involved, or it would make no genuinely normative demands. 
C. Consideration and the Methodological Requirements of Fraternity 
 Having argued for an account of solidarity based on consideration, I must now 
turn to whether it fits with the methodological conditions established earlier. There were 
three major methodological criteria that an account of fraternity must meet. The first is 
that it must be universalizable. The second is that it must explain the kind of alterity 
involved in non-voluntary obligations, while the third is that it must be compatible with 
autonomy. First, I explain how MES via consideration can explain the legitimacy of 
non-voluntary obligations, including obligations to one‟s family and the obligation to 
obey the law. Then I will discuss how it is nonetheless universalizable in a more 
substantive way than the tradition, as detailed in chapter three. Lastly, I will claim that it 
is compatibility with autonomy. MES via consideration is a suitable candidate for 
fraternity. 
 The importance of universalizability is closely connected with the ultimate goal 
of demonstrating the legitimacy of non-voluntary aspects of ethics and political 
morality. If a principle is to explain why a maxim or policy is or is not legitimate, it must 
be capable of explaining that for everyone, rather than merely for some subset of the 
population. It must, so to speak, cover the field.  This does not mean that it must deem 
a given maxim or policy legitimate for everyone, or illegitimate for everyone, just that it 
is capable of deciding the question in all circumstances. A given principle can generate 
the conclusion that a given maxim could be legitimate for one segment of the 
population and illegitimate for another, depending on the individuals involved and their 
respective circumstances. What universality requires is that that there must not be some 
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individuals for whom the proposed principle neither legitimates nor illegitimates the 
given maxim.  
As we saw in chapter three, a failure of universality is the problem with 
tradition‟s ability to serve as the value at the heart of a legitimating principle for ethics 
and political morality. While tradition could legitimate a maxim or policy for that 
segment of the population to whom the tradition applied, it neither legitimated nor 
illegitimated the same maxim or policy for those segments of the population who did 
not have that tradition. Imagine a situation where the government assumes control of a 
church to which half the population belong and to which that half regularly pay 10% of 
their income. The state takes over the properties, the employment contracts and 
assumes the functions of this church including education, welfare and medical care. The 
state then issues a law requiring everyone to pay 10% of their income to the church. 
Half the population has such a tradition, while the other half does not. As such, 
tradition leads half the population to recognize that they have a reason for why they 
ought or ought not continue (it may or may not be legitimate for them – the tradition 
may or may not be broken by state involvement) but provides no such recognition to 
the half of the population who have no such tradition. This does not make it necessarily 
an illegitimate policy, merely one the legitimacy of which cannot be decided by tradition.   
For MES via consideration to do better, it must explain why a given policy or 
maxim would be legitimate or illegitimate for everyone. I believe MES via consideration 
is particularly well placed to address the universality requirement. Ethical obligations like 
consideration do not only apply to part of the population, part of the time. Everyone is 
under a general obligation to be considerate. Furthermore, consideration does have 
something to say to everyone on whether the state enforced tithe of the previous 
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example is a legitimate or illegitimate insofar as it is either consistent or inconsistent 
with the demands of MES via consideration.175 Consideration covers the field in a way 
tradition does not. 
The second key methodological criterion with which I must deal is alterity. The 
key problem with autonomy is its inability to explain the legitimacy of many obligations 
we ordinarily take to be legitimate. As such, for a second principle to do the kind of 
work we would like it to do, it must be able to explain why non-voluntary obligations of 
various sorts can be legitimate or offer a good account of why they are illegitimate that 
does not depend purely on their voluntary nature. This is not to say that MES via 
consideration will legitimate all non-voluntary obligations. Sometimes an obligation will 
be unjustified by consideration, while others maxims or policies will be illegitimate 
because they will involve a genuine infringement of autonomy. What the alterity 
condition requires here is simply a reason that speaks in favour of why non-voluntary 
obligations might be legitimate. A pro tanto reason will suffice. 
MES via consideration offers such a reason. In the case of the example above, 
consideration provides one with some reason why paying the tithe is legitimate. This is 
because it is inconsiderate to break the law. If there is a law, any individual who absents 
himself from the requirements of that law is impacting on the interests of others; by 
acting as a free rider, he makes those who follow the law dupes. Furthermore, the failure 
of some part of the population to participate in a collective enterprise either reduces the 
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level of service possible or increases the costs to the participants. This is an impact on 
an interest, as viewed from the perspective of the others involved, which gives one a 
reason to obey the law. In this way, MES via consideration generates pro tanto reasons to 
legitimate non-voluntary obligations: failure to do so would be inconsiderate while 
sharing in the common interest in the services provided and the increased difficulty of 
achieving the services without the collective obligations raises the value of coordination 
that makes solidarity helpful in achieving a common interest. While this reason is pro 
tanto, and might be outweighed by other considerations, specifically those from 
autonomy, it suffices to establish that MES via consideration can explain why non-
voluntary obligations might be legitimate in a way autonomy cannot.  
One question remains. Are the obligations of MES that arise from consideration 
consistent with the kind of autonomy under discussion? I believe they are. First, not all 
duties arising from consideration will necessarily generate solidarity with another. Only 
those that are consistent with a common interest and those for which solidarity will 
improve the likelihood of success will lead to entry obligations. Ultimately, I believe this 
will be a large number of interests, but it will not be all of them. Not every action for 
which consideration provides me a reason will be an action in which I have an interest, 
nor will all common interests be improved by solidarity. Consideration leads one to 
have interests in other people‟s interests, but through one‟s own conscience rather than 
through some attachment to the other.  
Second, the obligation of consideration itself has little impact on an individual‟s 
ability to lead a life from within through making meaningful choices. It has some 
cognitive demands, but imagining the life of another does not in itself interfere with 
one‟s own life. Even in circumstances where it seems to interfere, where the vivid 
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realization of the impact of one‟s actions on another leads to a reluctant change in one‟s 
lifestyle, this is a change brought about by oneself. Ebenezer Scrooge‟s autonomy was 
not undermined when he changed from a miser to a saint (though whether the ghosts 
might have violated his autonomy in a way consideration does not seems to me a fair if 
frivolous question). One could, ultimately, continue to act as one had prior to the vivid 
realization. Consideration might be the cause of the change but since consideration is a 
part of one‟s conscience the change is not heteronymous. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have examined what is involved in an account of Moderate 
Ethical Solidarity via consideration and explained how this account can meet the 
methodological criteria required by the overall project. Consideration requires us to be 
open to our ability to impact on the interests of others, to see these interests and 
impacts from the other‟s point of view and leads us to recognize that we have a reason 
to act for the amelioration of the other‟s interest. This can, when the interest in question 
is shared and solidarity itself will improve the likelihood of success, lead to obligations 
of solidarity. However, these obligations are pro tanto and must still be reconciled with 
the demands of autonomy. Explaining how this reconciliation can work is the task of 








Chapter 7 – Reconciling Fraternity and Autonomy 
Abstract 
 In this chapter I explain how to reconcile the two central values of my dualist 
approach. First, I discuss how there are two types of legitimacy before explaining how 
each of fraternity and autonomy corresponds well to one of the types. Then I explain 
how to reconcile these two demands, favouring an approach that gives each principle a 
veto over the legitimacy of the obligation. Finally, I defend the strident view of 
legitimacy this account leaves us with as consistent with the methodology of the two 
basic facts. 
Introduction 
In this chapter I explain how we should approach accommodating the two basic 
ethical principles: respect for fraternity (as set out in chapter six) and respect for 
autonomy (as set out in chapter one). Since the goal here is to explain how the principles 
function to determine whether a maxim or policy is legitimate or illegitimate, we must 
first understand what legitimacy involves. I will explain at the outset that there are two 
different types of legitimacy: process legitimacy and threshold legitimacy. I offer an 
account of process legitimacy that requires that a maxim or policy issue from an 
appropriate process for it to be legitimate, but it also determines how strong the reasons 
supporting a maxim or policy are. My version of threshold legitimacy, on the other 
hand, requires only that a maxim or policy not allow the individuals involved to fall 
beneath a certain standard. I believe that fraternity is best understood as a form of 
process legitimacy, while autonomy provides a source of threshold legitimacy. The 
complication with this is that our ordinary intuitions seem to view autonomy as I 
defined it in Chapter 1 as generative of both process and threshold legitimacy. I think 
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this intuition reflects an ambiguity between a principle of respect for the value of 
autonomy and a principle of advancing autonomy as an interest. I explain this ambiguity 
and show that the right use of autonomy here is as a value we respect rather than as a 
value we advance. As such it generates reasons for action that reflect a sort of threshold 
legitimacy, rather than providing a substantive goal toward which our moral and 
political lives must necessarily be structured. While there is a second possible point of 
distinction – between whether the standards in each case are absolute or flexible – in 
explaining this distinction I show that a flexible approach to the two principles is 
inconsistent with the dualism I am examining here. 
Once we have this account of legitimacy and its relationship with the two 
principles, I will set out my preferred method of accommodating their different 
concerns. This involves determining whether the principles should be exclusive or non-
exclusive and the order in which they should be assessed. I favour a non-exclusive 
approach because it fits better with the inflexibility of the principles and the values they 
reflect. I believe a straightforward serial approach where one principle comes first not 
because of any normative priority but because it has an explanatory impact on the 
second principle, is the best way to resolve their competing, and sometimes conflicting, 
demands. Since fraternity provides reasons for particular maxims or policies, we should 
examine the reasons it provides first. If something cannot be justified by consideration it 
will not matter whether the maxim or policy would be supported by autonomy, since 
each principle has a veto over legitimacy. Nonetheless, fraternity should go first because 
it gives us a fuller characterization of what a maxim or policy involves that we can then 
use to determine whether it would violate autonomy. This generates two countervailing 
standards, each of which must be satisfied to call a maxim or policy legitimate. This 
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approach leads to a stringent test. Only those maxims and policies that are adopted in a 
manner consistent with the process required by the principle of respect for fraternity 
and that do not interfere with an individual‟s ability to live their life from within through 
making meaningful choices (i.e. that respects autonomy) can be legitimate. Sometimes, 
this will leave decision makers choosing from among illegitimate options, but I believe 
this accurately reflects the phenomenology of choosing the lesser of two evils, and will 
defend this consequence of my account in the final section of this chapter.   
I. How Legitimacy Works 
 As I mentioned but set aside in Chapter 1, I must explain what it means to say 
that a principle legitimates a maxim or policy. Legitimacy involves determining whether 
a maxim or policy is consistent with the content of a principle, such that a legitimate 
maxim or policy is one that is consistent with the content of the principle while an 
illegitimate maxim or policy is one that is inconsistent with the content of the principle. 
Ultimately, there are two different ways for the consistency involved here to work out. 
A maxim can be consistent with the content of a principle because it derives from that 
principle. This is what I refer to as process legitimacy. It is akin to what H. L. A. Hart, in 
discussing the legitimacy of laws, called pedigree legitimacy.176 In the legal case, a law is 
legitimate when it has the proper pedigree: when it is generated by the right procedure, 
or approved by the proper officials in the correct order. In the case of a more general 
maxim or policy, process legitimacy requires the maxim or policy in question arise from 
the concerns established in the principle. However, not all principles require process 
legitimacy. Other principles are satisfied with non-contradiction, and will consider all 
maxims legitimate so long as they do not interfere with the content under protection. 
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Speed limits are an example of thresholds. One can legitimately drive only so fast; 
beyond the threshold one‟s speed becomes an illegitimate action. 
 In my view fraternity and autonomy are best understood as corresponding to 
one of these types of legitimacy each. Fraternity fits well with process legitimacy, while 
autonomy as a value functions best as a form of threshold legitimacy. I think this 
becomes clear when we look at the content of each of the two principles. For a maxim 
or policy to be consistent with MES via consideration it must either arise from an actual 
process of consideration or be consistent with an equivalent hypothetical process. For 
such a maxim to be legitimate, then, seems to involve either a particular process or 
compatibility with such a process. This resonates more clearly with the kind of 
legitimation involved in process legitimacy. The case of autonomy is more difficult 
because there is a sense in which autonomy can serve as a source for legitimate 
obligations or as a threshold beneath which obligations are illegitimate. I will claim that 
this confusion, however, involves two different senses of autonomy. Insofar as 
individuals have an interest in being treated autonomously it can serve to ground the 
kind of maxims and policies legitimated by fraternity. However, as a value rather than an 
interest, autonomy has the normative requirement that individuals not be treated in such 
a way as to violate their ability to live their lives from within through making meaningful 
choices. The content of autonomy as an interest can, through fraternity, lead to 
particular maxims, while the content of autonomy as a value provides a threshold 
beneath which policies are no longer legitimate. Once we appreciate the different kinds 
of legitimacy each principle grounds we can better appreciate how to reconcile them. 
 
A. The Two Types of Legitimation 
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 When we try and determine what makes a maxim or policy legitimate, we are 
really asking how a maxim or policy fits with principles we already take to be good, just 
or legitimate. There are, however, two different ways for this „fit‟ to work. First, a 
maxim can reflect the content of a given principle. If I have a principle that individuals 
are to be treated equally, a policy that involved splitting resources between individuals 
evenly would reflect the content of that principle while a policy dividing resources 
according to size would not. The first policy would be legitimate, while the second 
would be illegitimate and their legitimacy would arise from their failure to reflect the 
content of the principle. Second, a policy can fit with a principle when it does not 
offend that principle‟s content. If we have a principle requiring people not to be 
harmed, some maxims would offend this principle, some would reflect it but a great 
many maxims would neither offend nor reflect the principle. However, in this case all 
those actions that did not offend the principle would be legitimate. These two types of 
fit correspond to the two types of legitimation. 
Process legitimacy can exist either directly or indirectly. It exists directly when a 
maxim or policy is formulated in accord with a specific procedure that means to reflect 
the principle in question. This is what Hart means by pedigree legitimacy. A law is 
legitimate, he claims, when it is formulated in accordance with secondary rules of 
recognition. For example, in a constitutional monarchy, a law is legitimate when it is 
approved by a majority vote in the legislative chamber (or chambers) and ratified and 
promulgated by the duly appointed monarch. In the case of the more abstract 
connection between a principle and various maxims or policies, direct process legitimacy 
exists when the maxims or policies in question are formulated following a procedure 
established by the principle. If we take the Universal Law Formulation of the categorical 
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imperative as an example of a principle, we can see how it establishes a procedure that 
can be followed in developing legitimate maxims. The universal law formulation 
requires that individuals act pursuant only to such maxims as they can will to be a 
universal law. This could be seen as giving rise to a procedure according to which 
maxims can be made legitimate. One starts with a proposed maxim, and then examines 
it to determine whether it can be willed universally. Such a process might involve two 
stages: first, one could examine whether one can also will others to pursue the maxim – 
does it impinge on one‟s own interests to will a maxim universally; second, one can then 
ask others whether they can will the maxim – is it in conflict with their interests for it to 
be willed universally.177 A maxim that passed each of these two stages would be 
legitimate, while a maxim that failed either stage would be illegitimate.  
While direct process legitimacy involves following the procedure established by 
the principle, such close adherence is not entirely necessary for a maxim or policy to be 
process-legitimated.  A maxim or policy can be legitimated through indirect process 
legitimacy. Not all principles, the categorical imperative included, lend themselves to 
neat and tidy tests for legitimacy in the way Hart‟s pedigree approach imagines. 
Nonetheless, maxims can be recognized as legitimate because they reflect the principle 
in question in much the same way they would were they developed by a principle-
reflecting procedure. In part, this can be accomplished by an „as if‟ test: would the 
maxim in question be adopted by a procedure derived from a given principle; if so, then 
it is legitimate in the same was as if it had been so derived. However, we need not be so 
literal with indirect process legitimacy. As long as a maxim furthers the principle in 
question, it should be understood as legitimated by that principle. To return to the 
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equality example discussed above, a policy of dividing resources evenly among members 
of a community reflects equality in a way that dividing resources according to gender 
does not. On a process legitimacy account only the former is consistent with the 
principle, i.e. legitimate, while the latter policy, which does not flow from the principle, 
is illegitimate. 
However not all principles lend themselves particularly well to process 
legitimacy of either kind. If a principle is such that maxims or policies either reflect their 
content or do not, then process legitimacy might be appropriate. However, if a principle 
intends to protect a particular class of interests it will not be offended when a maxim or 
policy ameliorates those interests or leaves them unharmed. Such a principle would 
generate a legitimacy threshold. Only those maxims or policies that expressly 
contradicted the principle or harmed those values protected by the principle would be 
illegitimate. This use is closely linked to the general ethical notions of permissibility and 
impermissibility. Presume, for example, that one has to punish a criminal. If one has a 
norm that declares some kinds of punishments impermissible – say, those that are cruel 
or unusual – that still leaves legitimate a wide array of possible courses of action, any 
one of which will be legitimate simply because it does not offend the principle. This is a 
weaker approach to legitimacy, but one that nonetheless explains one of the ways in 
which maxims and policies can fit with principles in addition to the serving as a source. 
B. Fraternity and Process legitimacy 
 Having explained the two types of legitimacy, I now show why each of the two 
central principles of political legitimacy fits one type of legitimacy better than the other. 
Here I explain why fraternity is best understood as grounding a kind of indirect process 
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legitimacy, while in the next subsection I show why autonomy as a value most closely 
grounds a version of threshold legitimacy. 
 To understand what kind of legitimacy something like autonomy requires we 
must look to the content of the value. Fraternity requires individuals to recognize, 
through consideration, that they have obligations to enter into solidarity with others, or 
to preserve relationships of solidarity, insofar as such unity makes it more likely that 
some common interest is ameliorated. Consideration turns an interest another has, on 
which I can wilfully impact, into a reason for me to act accordingly. It generates 
obligations of solidarity by showing me when and why I have reason to act in the 
interests of another. This seems to point toward a process obligation rather than a 
threshold obligation because consideration already acts as a source for the obligations of 
solidarity. Without fraternity, some duties would not exist because the process of 
consideration that led to their existence would not have happened. While this is not a 
conclusive argument, it does indicate a certain resonance between the value at the root 
of the principle and the type of legitimacy that should be indicative of an appropriate 
relationship.  
Second, while threshold legitimacy leaves a number of duties neither required by 
nor opposed to the principle involved, process legitimacy seems to more broadly cover 
the field. On a process legitimacy account, if an obligation exists, for it to be legitimate it 
must be derived from a valid legitimating principle. There would be no obligations 
about which it was silent. This seems to be the case with fraternity. This is not to say 
that fraternity requires direct process legitimacy – that all obligations arise from a 
process of consideration. Rather, fraternity requires indirect process legitimacy. All 
obligations can be treated as if they arose from a process like consideration. In this way 
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various habits we have because they are consistent with our obligations need not be 
thought-up anew every time we come across a circumstance that would require us to act 
upon them. The habits are justified if they would be the product of a process of MES 
via consideration, were one undertaken at that moment.  
 Take, for example, the general obligation to obey the law. I have an interest in 
ensuring that others obey the law: it provides for the smooth functioning of society. 
Consideration makes me realize that others also have an interest in my obeying the law: 
they also have an interest in the smooth functioning of society, or in not being made a 
dupe. Each of these interests is more likely to be satisfied if we take on the additional 
reasons for action provided by solidarity. As such, fraternity can be seen to ground a 
general obligation to obey the law. This obligation may be defeasible but explaining how 
will be the focus of the next section. The importance here is in showing that if some 
obligation like a general obligation to obey the law can be legitimized by a principle of 
respect for fraternity, then this would be a form of process legitimation rather than 
threshold legitimation. Ultimately, then, for a maxim or policy to be legitimate because it 
reflects the principle of respect for fraternity, that reflection must take the form of 
direct or indirect process legitimacy.  
C. Autonomy and Threshold Legitimacy  
 There are two factors that increase the difficulty of explaining how autonomy 
legitimates maxims and policies. The first is that when dealing with autonomy I have to 
consider how it has been dealt with by other authors in the liberal tradition. Unlike 
fraternity, which has suffered from too little discussion since the Second World War, 
autonomy suffers from overexposure. Too many authors have too many views about 
what counts as autonomy and why it is important to our individuality. Despite this 
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problem, I will keep to the characterization of autonomy developed in chapter one, as 
this approach was partly intended to cover the mainstream of contemporary liberal 
thought. To this end, I define autonomy as the ability to live one‟s life from within 
through making meaningful choices for the reasons discussed in the first chapter. The 
second difficulty cannot be so easily dismissed. This is that there is an ambiguity with 
autonomy that makes it seem as though autonomy can be a source of legitimacy as well 
as a threshold of legitimacy. Here, I will argue that this ambiguity involves conflating 
autonomy as an interest with autonomy as a value. I will attempt to distinguish the two 
and will explain why autonomy as a value is what we are discussing here and why it is 
best understood as providing a threshold condition for legitimacy. 
 There is a clear sense in which autonomy can be used as a source of process 
legitimacy. Liberal writers do this all the time. Kymlicka‟s attempt to ground linguistic 
and economic protections for minority communities is an example.178 Laws prohibiting 
the use of English on signs or requiring a long period of residency before allowing land 
ownership are all both violations of an individual‟s ability to live a life from within 
through making meaningful choices, but because autonomy requires a degree of self-
respect which is only possible within some background culture, these anti-individualist 
measures are justified. Autonomy, then, plays the role of a source of process legitimacy 
for otherwise heteronymous measures. These measures are taken to be legitimate 
because they reflect the demands of autonomy, which is itself taken as a central good.  
 In my view, this mistakes autonomy as an interest for autonomy as a value. As 
an interest, autonomy can generate positive obligations, but as a value its scope is 
narrower. People have an interest in many of the components of autonomy, including 
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respect and self-determination, but as an interest these will work through the principle 
of respect for fraternity to ground positive obligations. If an individual has an interest in 
a world in which individuals are respected, and others also have an interest in such a 
world, which that is more likely to occur through union, then fraternity will provide for 
such an obligation through MES via consideration. The same can be said of self-
determination. However, these obligations arise through consideration and solidarity 
just as obligations based on the interest individuals have in adequate food and shelter.  
 If autonomy were to provide a source for legitimate obligations, this would 
mean that all and only obligations that promote an individual‟s interest in autonomy – 
that leave him or her more autonomous than they were at the outset – would be 
legitimate. Such a construction is, however, implausible in part for reasons addressed in 
Part I: there are important aspects of our ordinary moral and political lives that 
autonomy cannot adequately ground. It is also implausible on its face. This is the 
„freedom for freedom‟s sake‟ view that Williams mocked and Kymlicka denied.179 On 
this view simply having more choices, or having the choices one has made more 
meaningful, would be enough to ensure autonomy, but it should be clear that this is not 
what is really important to autonomy. What is important is not that everyone‟s choices 
be as meaningful as possible, but that everyone‟s choices be above a certain threshold of 
meaningfulness. Since seems important about autonomy is not its maximization but its 
preservation. Since autonomy as an interest speaks in favour of maximization rather 
than preservation it seems problematic in ways that autonomy as a value would not be, 
since it would be more concerned with maintaining a certain level of autonomy than 
with advancing autonomy endlessly. 
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Furthermore autonomy as an interest can give rise to conflicting demands, like 
the demands of self-respect and community and the demands of self-determination and 
individuality. As a value representing the normative requirements of individuality, 
Autonomy should be univocal. A maxim or policy is either consistent with the principle 
of respect for autonomy or it is not. It either permits an individual to live her life from 
within through making meaningful choices or it interferes with one or another aspect of 
this definition. This binary nature leads to the view that autonomy provides a threshold, 
beneath which a maxim or policy is illegitimate. While this threshold might not be at the 
same point for each individual – as each individual requires different things to ensure a 
life led from within and meaningful choices – autonomy as a value provides an ideal that 
cannot be violated. Some individuals have a harder time making choices than others for 
a variety of reasons connected to their particular psychological quirks. As such, what 
would not violate the autonomy of a relatively resilient individual might violate the 
autonomy of someone with a more fragile psyche. In either event, while the standard of 
autonomy will change for each individual along with the particulars of how to live a life 
from within, any maxim or policy that violates this the standard should be recognized as 
illegitimate. 
II. Accommodating of the Two Principles 
 The previous section shows that each of the two principles involved in this 
approach have different relationships with the maxims and policies through which a 
moral or political philosophy functions. If a maxim or policy is not consistent with 
fraternity as a source – if it could not have arisen as if it were a product of consideration 
and solidarity – then it will be illegitimate. On the other hand, failure to respect 
autonomy as a value – failure to allow an individual to lead a life from within through 
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making meaningful choices – will also make a maxim or policy illegitimate. However, 
there are a couple of different ways these two principles can be accommodated. The 
first task of this section is to explain these different ways and defend my choice of an 
exclusive serial ordering. I begin by explaining the difference between exclusive and 
non-exclusive relationships among principles. Exclusivity claims that each of the 
principles is independent from one another, such that if a maxim or policy is strongly 
supported by fraternity, this is irrelevant to determining whether it is illegitimate due to 
a failure to adequately respect autonomy. The two legitimating principles are measured 
separately, and a failure to satisfy one principle or the other will render a maxim or 
policy illegitimate. Non-exclusivity claims that neither fraternity nor autonomy is 
absolute and, as a result, we must balance their various demands to achieve a solution. I 
defend the claim that only an exclusive approach can adequately satisfy the demands of 
my dualist methodology.    
 Having established the importance of exclusivity in accommodating the 
demands of autonomy and fraternity, I must then deal with how the relationship 
between the two principles is to function. I propose a simple serial ordering, rather than 
a normatively laden lexical ordering, with fraternity first and autonomy second. I believe 
examining the demands of fraternity has an important explanatory role that makes it 
important to understand what fraternity requires before we assess how a maxim or 
policy might violate autonomy. This way, we do not attempt to assess the impact a 
policy or maxim will have on one‟s autonomy until we understand why it is important in 
the first place. Nonetheless, placing autonomy last should not be seen as providing it 
with any more or less of a veto than it already had through exclusivity. Where the order 
matters is because we need to assess what fraternity requires before we can determine 
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how these demands will impact on the autonomy of the individual. Neither principle has 
a trump that the other does not; fraternity merely has an explanatory role that leads me 
to believe it should be assessed before autonomy. In the end, no matter how strongly 
fraternity advocates some maxim or policy, if it violates the autonomy of an individual 
such a maxim or policy cannot be legitimate. This leaves me with a stringent approach 
to the legitimacy of moral and political obligations. Ultimately, I will defend this as an 
explanation of the phenomena involved in the problem of choosing among evils.  
A. Exclusivity and Dualism 
 The chief difficulty of a dualist theory is in understanding how the two 
principles work to produce answers to the basic questions involved. In this case, we 
have to understand how autonomy and fraternity work together to assess the legitimacy 
of various moral and political maxims or policies. The degree to which the principles are 
exclusive is one important dimension in developing such an understanding. If principles 
are exclusive, then failure to satisfy the demands of one principle will lead to a negative 
outcome: each principle has a veto on the legitimacy of a maxim or policy. But when 
principles are non-exclusive, the fact that one principle has some problem with the 
outcome is not necessarily determinative. While it seems like an exclusive account has a 
problem explaining the importance of the principles, ultimately I believe this apparent 
problem is exactly why an exclusive account is required.  
 In a non-exclusive account neither principle has a veto over the determination 
of whether a maxim or policy is legitimate. There are life-and-death situations that make 
this seem plausible. Imagine an entire community is threatened with elimination, 
perhaps due to some disease. Clearly everyone in the community has an interest (indeed, 
several different interests) in the continued existence of the community that is more 
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likely to succeed through collective action. The demands of fraternity are, therefore, 
satisfied. However, if the community can be saved by the death of one individual, the 
carrier, for that community to kill the carrier without his consent would violate his 
autonomy. On an exclusivity account, such an action is illegitimate because it violates 
one of the two central principles. This seems to make the non-exclusive account more 
plausible because it shows the difficulty in the absolute nature of the exclusive approach. 
If fraternity declares that an interest is of particular importance, we often think that the 
autonomy of the individual should be set aside. Alternatively, if an interest cuts to the 
heart of autonomy we think that no obligation could force one to act counter to that 
interest.  
 However, because each of the principles is so important, a non-exclusive 
account will not work. The two principles cannot be played off one another and still 
adequately protect or advance the basic values at their core. If one principle can be 
suborned to the other then we no longer have two principles but one central principle 
and a secondary principle. In addition to making for a cleaner approach to reconciling 
fraternity and autonomy, exclusivity adequately captures our intuitions about the 
relationship between the two facts – the fact of individuality and the fact of sociality – at 
the core of this approach to moral and political philosophy. The point of this exercise 
was to examine what kind of moral and political structure can be built from taking 
seriously the claim that both individuality and sociality matter. A maxim that was 
critically important according to the principle of respect for fraternity is nonetheless 
illegitimate if it impairs the autonomy of the individual in question, and vice versa: to do 
otherwise would suborn one of individuality or sociality to the other.  
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Furthermore, an exclusive account can explain the phenomena involved in the 
example presented above and leaves us with a possibility for a legitimate outcome. A 
legitimate outcome is reached if the carrier consents to being killed or kills him or 
herself. This would be consistent with fraternity since it would ensure the continued 
existence of the community, which is in the carrier‟s interest, but since the carrier would 
choose his or her death, autonomy would be satisfied. This seems like an unfortunate 
result, but even in these dire circumstances it is not the only possible outcome. There is 
a way for the two principles to be satisfied and to save the community, albeit at the cost 
of one of its members. 
 Ultimately, then, I believe an exclusive account is necessary. Given the 
importance of the two facts, neither of their respective principles can be satisfied by a 
non-exclusive account, where either principle can be sacrificed to meet the needs of the 
other. Each of autonomy and fraternity must be independently satisfied for a policy or 
maxim to be legitimate. Without this important characterization, this would not be a 
genuinely dualist theory. 
B. The Order of Principles 
While this discussion of exclusivity answers many of the questions about the 
relationship between the principles, it nonetheless leaves others open. I think the order 
of principles is also important to understanding how the principles function on their 
own and together. Given that there are two principles involved here there are at least 
two different ways in which to order them. However, before we decide which principle 
should be examined first, we must discuss the kind of ordering involved. There are, as I 
see it, two ways to order these principles. One option, a lexical order, involves giving 
normative priority to one principle by satisfying it fully and then satisfying the other 
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principle insofar as its satisfaction does not conflict with the demands of the first 
principle. A second option is a straightforward serial order, where we come to 
understand a maxim or policy involved more fully by examining its application to the 
first principle, and then apply this fuller understanding to the application of the second 
principle, but with no normative priority. Here I explain how each sort of ordering 
works to show why a serial order placing fraternity in the lead position is a more 
appropriate way of reconciling the demands of the two principles.   
The key feature of a lexical order is that it implies a normative relation of 
dominance between the principles. The first principle of a lexical order dominates the 
second principle such that the second principle only makes normative claims when these 
do not conflict with the first principle. Some principles inherently involve lexical 
ordering.  Isaac Asimov‟s „laws of robotics‟ are such an example.180 In these, the second 
law requires robots to follow orders except where such orders would contradict the first 
law of not harming or allowing harm. Likewise, the third law of self-preservation 
contains a clause rendering it void should it interfere with either the first or second laws. 
On a plain reading of these principles, then, they involve a lexical ordering where the 
demands of the third are sacrificed to the first and second, and the demands of the 
second are subordinate to the first. Other principles are not so perspicuous. Rawls 
makes clear that his two basic principles of justice are to be interpreted lexically,181 but 
he must since there is nothing internal to the principles that would necessitate such an 
interpretation. The first principle, requiring equal access to what Rawls terms „primary 
                                                 
180
 While these laws make many appearances in Asimov’s work, what scholarly work there is on 
them usually starts with his 1976 short story ‘The Bi-centennial Man’ in Isaac Asimov, The 
bicentennial man and other stories, (New York: Doubleday, 1984) 
181
 Rawls 1999, pp. 37-40. 
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goods‟ cannot be sacrificed in order to satisfy the second principle, requiring inequalities 
to benefit the worst off members of a society.  
My formulation of the principles of fraternity and autonomy here do not contain 
explicit references to lexicality, so if this is a requirement it will have to be one done 
through interpretation rather than through implementation. However, I believe that a 
lexical ordering is not the appropriate way to reconcile these two principles. While a 
lexical ordering would provide certainty in how to reconcile the two principles, I believe 
such certainty is unnecessary at this stage and runs counter to the methodology 
involved. The desire for certainty here seems to involve a desire to have a ranking of 
just and unjust outcomes that tells us exactly which maxims and policies to favour over 
others and why, including the degree to which illegitimate maxims and policies are 
illegitimate so that we can favour one option even now. It seems to reflect what Berlin 
called the temptation to look for final solutions.182  
Furthermore, lexical ordering is inappropriate here for many of the same 
reasons that non-exclusivity was not an appropriate way for the two principles to 
interact. Lexical ordering makes one principle subordinate to the other in a way 
incompatible with the two facts the principles are meant to represent. Insofar as these 
are two basic principles representing the two basic facts of political morality – 
individuality and sociality – neither can validly be subordinated to the other. If fraternity 
were to trump autonomy this would fail to respect the demands of individuality, while if 
fraternity were subordinate to autonomy this would undermine the needs of sociality. A 
lexical ordering would give primacy to one position over the other in a way that would 
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be incompatible with the two facts I took at the outset of this work as my investigatory 
premise. No theory can incorporate a lexical ordering and still be genuinely dualist. 
This commitment to a dualist theory leads me to conclude that a serial order is 
more appropriate for accommodating the demands of autonomy and fraternity. In a 
serial order one principle is examined before the other principle because of some 
explanatory advantage the first principle has over the second, but neither principle has 
normative priority. Usually, the basis on which we examine the connections between a 
maxim or policy and a principle first is because understanding these connections is 
important to understanding the interaction of the maxim or policy with the second 
principle. There is, then, no normative priority to their placement in the order. This 
better respects the dualist approach because it allows each principle to more fully 
interact with the maxim or policy than a lexical approach would, which is necessary 
when each principle has a veto over the legitimacy of a given maxim or policy.  
On this approach, any given maxim will be considered legitimate only if it 
accords with the principle of respect for fraternity and the principle of respect for 
autonomy. This leaves many possible maxims that might be strongly supported by one 
aspect of our nature illegitimate because they violate the principle required by the other 
aspect. This is a stringent approach to legitimacy, as the example of the community and 
the contagion above illustrates. There is a legitimate outcome in that situation, but the 
only legitimate way for the community to save itself is for the individual who carries the 
contagion to sacrifice him or herself for the benefit of the whole. In the next subsection 
I will defend this kind of stringency as a valuable illustration of what really happens 
when we have to choose from among evils.  
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C. In Defence of Stringency 
 The result of this dualism is a stringent result. By this I mean that many maxims 
and policies will be declared illegitimate because of their failure to adequately respect 
one or another of the principles involved. Nonetheless, I think this result is both 
justified and does a good job of explaining many of our basic intuitions about moral and 
political hard cases. 
 Earlier I discussed the example of the community and the contagion. In that 
scenario the only legitimate outcome is for the individual to sacrifice herself for the 
benefit of the community. Indeed, we can claim that the individual does wrong if she 
does not make such a sacrifice. However, for a community to adopt a maxim by which 
they can kill her to save their village nonetheless violates her autonomy because it 
interferes with her ability to continue living a life from within by making meaningful 
choices. It interferes in this way because she has made a choice, to refuse to sacrifice 
herself, that is meaningful and reflects the ability to live her life from within. The 
community might still end up killing the carrier, but because they are choosing from 
among illegitimate options. This would then be a situation where the relevant authorities 
are choosing from among evils. 
 Situations of direct conflict between principles should be rare, despite the 
inflexibility involved in their reconciliation. In large part this is because of the flexible 
approaches to autonomy and fraternity adopted earlier. Direct conflicts between the two 
principles should be possible only in extreme cases like the scenario discussed above. 
An examination of a slightly different case should make this clear. Imagine a different 
contagion case: one where someone is trying to enter an area in violation of a quarantine 
zone established to prevent spread of the contagion and to preserve order within the 
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zone. Whether an absolute quarantine is legitimate will depend on the circumstances of 
the individuals involved. For what reason are they trying to enter the zone. If she is 
trying to enter the zone to be reunited with family with no intention of leaving or of 
causing a disturbance, then this sort of forced separation prevents her from living her 
life from within and thereby violates her autonomy. In this case, however, consideration 
requires us to allow the woman to enter the contagion zone, since her introduction 
would not allow spread of the contagion outside the zone nor would it impede on the 
imposition of order in the zone. It requires an exemption in the circumstances of the 
original policy. Alternatively, if she is trying to enter the zone because it is the most 
efficient way to reach a destination on the other side of the zone, this would not violate 
her autonomy since she can still has an array of choices about whether and how to reach 
her ultimate destination. Provided one is always ready to temper maxims and policies to 
individual circumstances – which can usually be done even in the most bureaucratic of 
states – the demands of autonomy and fraternity can usually be satisfied. It will be 
occasions where the circumstances or policies cannot be so tailored – due to emergency 
or extreme cost – that conflict will arise. However, we should resist the temptation to 
treat „hard cases‟ as something to which we simply have yet to find an easy solution. 
Hard cases are hard for a reason. It is to what we do in hard cases that I now turn.  
 Firstly, I think that the methodology of the two aspects still has some relevance 
here, even though it has declared both actions illegitimate. Fraternity and autonomy 
provide two standards by which illegitimate actions can nonetheless be measured for 
degrees of illegitimacy. In the scenario under examination the obligation to save the 
community seems like a very serious requirement, involving very strong union 
obligations among the individuals involved. Likewise, the choice of the individual in 
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question is meant to preserve her autonomy, but her autonomy will be of little value 
once she is wiped out along with her community. Her choice, then, can be seen to 
reflect autonomy in a way that is of little (but not no) value, since due to circumstances 
beyond her control she will not be able to live her life from within or make meaningful 
choices for very much longer. In other words, while one of the two values is screaming 
for a particular course of action, the other is holding out despite being trampled by 
circumstance. In any event, the two aspects and their respective principles are still useful 
as evaluative guides even among illegitimate maxims and policies.  
 Secondly, this account is faithful to the phenomenology of choosing among 
evils. Historically available scenarios often involve such a vast scale of interests and 
obligations that determining what to do is difficult even given a clear account of the 
principles involved. However, when we examine competing evils at a smaller level the 
value becomes clear. Assume we have to choose from among breaking a promise to 
meet a friend or lying to my neighbour. To further make clear the connection, let us 
assume my neighbour wishes for me to watch her child for an hour so she can go to an 
important job interview. However, my neighbour is very insistent and will only let me 
go if I tell her I have serious plans – a meeting with my lawyer, perhaps. If I am to meet 
my friend for coffee I will have to lie to my neighbour about the importance of my 
plans, but if I am to help my neighbour I will have to break my promise to my friend. 
Let us assume, reasonably, that each of these is an illegitimate option. We can claim with 
reason that promise-keeping and truth-telling are each required by fraternity and 
consistent with autonomy. Each of these options, then is an illegitimate act. When we 
choose among them we ordinarily feel that the other will be entitled to some 
resentment, for which we usually feel an apology or an explanation is in order. 
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Fraternity and autonomy can be of help here, likely telling us that our neighbour‟s need 
is more important at this time than our friend‟s feelings, but what is important for the 
moment is that our choice does not make an option legitimate. When choosing among 
evils we must be aware of the wrong we are doing to the other and act accordingly, to 
mitigate or compensate where possible and to always acknowledge the unfortunate 
character of the situation. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have explained how the two principles of my liberal dualism 
mean to interact to explain when and how a maxim or policy is legitimate. First, I 
explained what legitimation involves and characterized each of the central principles as 
requiring a different form of legitimacy. Fraternity requires a legitimation process, while 
autonomy provides a threshold for legitimacy. I then explained the interactions of these 
two principles and their differing approaches to legitimacy. I argued that trying to treat 
these principles as non-exclusive or as lexical is ultimately incompatible with the dualism 
at the root of this approach to moral and political questions. I then motivated an 
exclusive, serial approach to reconciliation. This approach leaves me with a stringent 
account of moral and political obligations, but I defended this as consistent with the 
basic phenomena of choosing among illegitimate options. Once we see how these two 
principles can work together to explain the legitimacy of various maxims and policies we 
should see the potential for a renewed communitarianism focussing not on what is 
wrong with liberal individualism, but on how to supplement it with a second principle. 
Autonomy is important because we are individuals, so communitarianism should claim 
instead that Fraternity – or moderate ethical solidarity through consideration – is 
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